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Abstract
The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the 
environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own
level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some 
aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to
emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. 
On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic
firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade
systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained 
under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one
market affects the outcome of the other related market.
A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific
abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most
relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different
oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive
permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a 
Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate
permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition. Secondly, incentives appear 
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if they receive free permits (grandfathering) and incentives grow as the number of free
permits increase.
In Chapter 4 our analysis is based on the assumption of imperfect competition in
both markets. The main consequences of our study are: A dominant firm in the
emissions permit market is always making profit either as a net buyer or as a net seller 
of permits, whatever the oligopolistic structure in the output market. In the absence of
grandfathering, the leader firm in the product market has an advantage in terms of
output and profits but the introduction of grandfathering can partially or totally
compensate that situation if the follower receives enough more free permits than the
leader.  
The second part of this thesis (Chapter 5) focuses on the role that fossil fuel
extraction costs play on the optimal carbon taxes imposed to internalize the externality
created for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. A general
equilibrium model with capital accumulation, a damage function, and the dynamics of a
non-renewable resource, is considered. The extraction cost function takes into account
the flow of extraction and also the scarcity effect in relation with the stock not yet
extracted. This is the so-called stock effect.
The main finding is that the stock effect could create important distortions in the 
dynamics of the optimal tax, and mainly in relation with potential shocks in the proven
reserves of fossil fuels. This statement is supported on analytical basis and confirmed by
a related quantitative analysis. Moreover, it can be the case that the optimal carbon tax
is not time consistent and a second policy instrument would be needed to attain a first 
best policy.
Keywords: Emission Permits, Market Power, Optimal Taxes, Extraction Costs
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Resumen
La reducción de gases de efecto invernadero juega un papel fundamental en las 
políticas de los países, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Esta tesis se dedica a
investigar algunos aspectos de las dos políticas más relevantes sobre el cambio 
climático. La primera parte se dedica a los mercados de derechos de emisión y la 
segunda a la imposición óptima sobre emisiones.
En la primera parte estudiamos el comportamiento estratégico de empresas que
operan en sectores industriales contaminantes sometidos a limitación de emisiones a
través de derechos negociables, con el propósito de identificar las diferencias entre los 
resultados obtenidos cuando hay poder de mercado o en competencia perfecta. Y
además entender como las acciones tomadas en uno de esos mercados afectan al otro.
Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de equilibrio parcial con funciones específicas 
de costes de reducción de emisiones. En el Capítulo 2 este modelo se utiliza para
explicar alguno de los resultados más relevantes de la literatura. En el Capítulo 3 se
utiliza para analizar diferentes estructuras de oligopolio cuando el mercado de permisos
es competitivo. Encontramos dos hechos significativos. En primer lugar y en un modelo
de Stackelberg, se determina que las empresas no tienen incentivos para presionar al 
regulador con el objetivo de manipular al alza el precio de los permisos, a diferencia de
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lo que ocurre cuando el oligopolio es de Cournot. Y en segundo lugar esos incentivos 
aparecen si las empresas reciben permisos negociables gratuitos, incentivos que
aumentan a medida que aumenta el número de dichos permisos.
En el capítulo 4, y bajo la hipótesis de competencia imperfecta en ambos
mercados, las principales consecuencias que se obtienen de nuestro estudio son: La
firma dominante en el mercado de permisos obtiene siempre beneficios, tanto si actúa 
como comprador o como vendedor de permisos, cualquiera que sea el tipo de oligopolio
que se considere en el mercado de producto. Si no hay reparto de títulos gratuitos, la 
firma líder en el mercado de producto obtiene ventas y beneficios superiores al
seguidor, pero la ventaja del líder puede ser parcial o totalmente compensada a medida
que el seguidor recibe más títulos que el líder.
La segunda parte de esta tesis (Capítulo 5) se centra en estudiar el papel que
desempeñan los costes de extracción en el establecimiento de la imposición óptima a la 
externalidad creada por la acumulación de gases de efecto invernadero. Consideramos
un modelo de equilibrio general con acumulación de capital, una función de daños y la 
dinámica de un recurso no renovable. La función de costes de extracción considera tanto
el flujo de extracción como el efecto escasez asociado al recurso aún no extraído.
La contribución más significativa del capítulo es que el “stock effect” puede
crear distorsiones importantes en la dinámica del impuesto, especialmente ante 
variaciones en el nivel de reservas de combustibles fósiles. Este hecho se soporta en
bases analíticas y se confirma a través del análisis cuantitativo. El impuesto óptimo
obtenido al considerar el “stock effect” no es consistente en el tiempo y por tanto un
segundo instrumento sería necesario para alcanzar el llamado “first best”.
Palabras Clave: Derechos de emisión, Poder de Mercado, Impuestos Óptimos, Costes
de Extracción. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Summary
Carbon taxes and emissions permit markets are the most important 
environmental policies that have been put in place in order to reduce the negative effects 
of climate change. This thesis is devoted to the study of some important issues
regarding both policies.
From an economic point of view, climate change is a global massive externality,
and therefore is subject to the free rider issue. This is the reason of the required 
international involvement and cooperation. In this introductory chapter we offer an
overview of the main issues regarding climate change and the policies used to deal with 
it. Specifically we first review the most important advances in the acknowledgment and 
identification of the magnitude of the problem, presenting a historical overview from 
1972 to 2015.
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Then we introduce the different climate change policies, giving particular
attention to those that incorporate economic incentives since they will be the object of
our study. We show the different arguments that have been used to support carbon taxes 
and emission permits markets and also the main issues linked to these policies. We 
finally explain which circumstances can make both policies equivalent in economic
terms, and we also introduce the new policy approach that suggests combining them.
It follows a brief review of the emissions permit markets subject, explaining its
nature and most relevant characteristics. We mainly focus on the two most important
elements of concern that has been covered by the literature. First, the price volatility
issue and the different mechanism that have been proposed to overcome this problem.
Secondly, the market power issue, which is the central object of analysis in the first part
of this thesis. We identify and explore the impact of market power on the efficiency of 
this policy instrument, the incentives that firms face to manipulate permit prices and
finally the interactions between the permit market and the polluting product markets 
were the firms are operating.
The last section in this chapter introduces the carbon tax policy. We start
considering the theoretical aspect of the policy. The Pigouvian tax equals the marginal
external value, known as the social cost of carbon. There are a big number of estimates
due to the lack of accurate information and this is the main difficulty to put in practice
this policy. Then we explain the main conflicting elements of the policy. First we focus
on the target point of application since there is a trade-off between upstream versus
downstream. And finally we describe the equity and efficiency issues. Optimal taxes are
the object of the second part of this thesis.
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1.2 Background and context of study
Nearly all economic activities produce carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are responsible for a phenomenon of global
warming in the atmosphere with serious consequences in the climate of the planet. This
climate change is the most important environmental problem that scientists face in the
twenty-first century and has become a major economic and political issue. In response
to mounting scientific evidence that human activities are contributing significantly to 
global climate change, decision makers are devoting substantial attention to public
policies to reduce GHG and thereby prevent or reduce such change.
The so-called greenhouse gases include not only CO2, but also methane, nitrous
oxide, fluorocarbons (including hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons), tropospheric
ozone (precursors of which include nitrogen oxides, non-methane hydrocarbons, and 
carbon monoxide), and Sulphur hexafluoride. However, CO2 accounts for the bulk of
the aggregate warming potential and so we will refer to it most of the time. 
It has taken a long time to acknowledge the magnitude of the problem and the 
need for corrective policies and to a certain extent it is still a controversial issue. The
first significant step in this direction took place in the United Nations sponsored
Conference on Humans and the Environment (UNCHE). At that time, the UN was 
looking to expand its role into managing global environmental problems. Through 
bringing together government representatives from 114 countries, it hoped to lay the
groundwork for architecture of global environmental governance that would serve the
planet for decades to come.
UNCHE, byname Stockholm Conference, was the first conference that focused 
on international environmental issues. The conference, held in Stockholm, Sweden,
from June 5 to 16, 1972, reflected a growing interest in conservation issues worldwide
16
	
 
 
    
  
        
   
    
 
    
     
       
     
       
 
     
  
      
   
     
 
      
 
  
       
         
and laid the foundations for global environmental governance. The final declaration of
the Stockholm Conference was an environmental manifesto that was a forceful 
statement of the finite nature of Earth’s resources and the necessity for humanity to 
safeguard them. The Stockholm Conference also led to the creation of the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in December 1972 to coordinate global efforts 
to promote sustainability.
Since 1972, global environmental governance has been associated with the
negotiation and implementation by nation states of international (multilateral)
environmental treaties and agreements on an issue by issue basis. By that time it was
clear that climate change is a global common externality that presents a classic free-
rider problem. The benefits of any action taken at a country level are distributed
globally. That is the reason why international cooperation is essential.
After 1972, the UN sponsored two major international summits on environment
and development: the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg. At Rio, two major conventions were
opened for signature: the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
The normative focus of the summits shifted from focusing primarily on 
environmental protection (“the human environment”) to sustainable development, 
conventionally defined in the 1987 Brundtland Report as development that “meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”. Such a vague definition can hardly be used as a working tool but it is
17
	
 
 
    
 
 
      
   
    
 
  
       
      
      
  
       
  
     
       
     
   
     
 
    
       
   
      
                                                 
        
        
 
important to consider its call on intergenerational justice when dealing with exhaustible
resources, environmental quality or ecosystem damages.1 
In 1988, a semi-political conference held in Toronto recommended that, as a first
step, CO2 emissions should be reduced by 20 per cent from the 1988 level by 2005.
Barrett (1998) argues that this so-called ‘Toronto target’ was arbitrary, but the idea that 
countries should commit to meeting a target for emission reduction had endured and it
was the background of the Kyoto protocol.
In the same year that the Toronto conference was held, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed, at the request of the UN General
Assembly. The IPCC is the international body for assessing the science related to
climate change. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to provide 
policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its
impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation.
The startup of the IPCC represented the international recognition of the 
dimension of the problem and the need for a serious and accurate evaluation of the
effects of the global warming in human wellbeing. The IPCC was asked to report on
what was known and not known about climate change, on the potential impacts of
climate change, and on what could be done to forestall and adapt to climate change. The
IPCC’s first assessment report, published in 1990, concluded that ‘emissions resulting
from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the 
greenhouse gases . . . [and] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in 
an additional warming of the Earth’s surface’ (IPCC, 1990, p. 1). The report calculated 
that ‘the long-lived gases [including CO2] would require immediate reductions in
1 UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development chaired
by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1983.
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emissions from human activities of over 60 per cent to stabilize their concentrations at 
today’s levels’, and it predicted that, under the ‘Business-as-Usual’ scenario, global 
mean temperature would rise by between 0,20C and 0,50C, and average global sea level 
would rise by between 3 and 10cm, per decade during the 21st century. 
Article 2 of the UNFCC (United Nations 1992) commits signatory nations to
stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that ‘‘would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system.’’
In an effort to provide some insight into the impacts that might be considered 
DAI, authors of the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC identified 5 ‘‘reasons for
concern’’ and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) states that ‘‘the reasons for
concern identified in the Third Assessment Report remain a viable framework for
assessing key vulnerabilities’’. The reasons for concern (RFC) are:
1.		 Risk to Unique and Threatened Systems. This RFC addresses the potential for
increased damage to or irreversible loss of unique and threatened systems, such 
as coral reefs, tropical glaciers, endangered species, unique ecosystems, 
biodiversity hotspots, small island states, and indigenous communities.
2.		 Risk of Extreme Weather Events. This RFC tracks increases in extreme events 
with substantial consequences for societies and natural systems. Examples
include increase in the frequency, intensity, or consequences of heat waves, 
floods, droughts, wildfires, or tropical cyclones.
3.		 Distribution of Impacts. This RFC concerns disparities of impacts. Some
regions, countries, and populations face greater harm from climate change, 
whereas other regions, countries, or populations would be much less harmed— 
and some may even benefit. The magnitude of the harm can also vary within
regions and across sectors and populations.
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4.		 Aggregate Damages. This RFC covers comprehensive measures of impacts.
Impacts distributed across the globe can be aggregated into a single metric, such 
as monetary damages, lives affected, or lives lost. Aggregation techniques vary
in their treatment of equity of outcomes, as well as treatment of impacts that are
not easily quantified. This RFC is based mainly on monetary aggregation 
techniques available in the literature.
5.		 Risks of Large-Scale Discontinuities. This RFC represents the likelihood that 
certain phenomena (sometimes called singularities or tipping points) would 
occur, any of which may be accompanied by very large impacts. These
phenomena include the deglaciation (partial or complete) of the West Antarctic
or Greenland ice sheets and major changes in some components of the Earth’s 
climate system, such as a substantial reduction or collapse of the North Atlantic
Meridional Overturning Circulation
The First Conference of the Parties (COP 1) of the UNFCC took place in Berlin 
1995, and established that Annex 1 Countries (basically OECD countries) will commit
to targets for emission reductions. The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in December 1997, is
the first international treaty to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. It is a climate
change treaty with an important difference with respect to the previous ones. Unlike the
UNFCC, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates targets and timetables—that is, ceilings on the
emissions of greenhouse gases and dates by which these ceilings must be met. The
Kyoto protocol came into force in February 2005 and began to restrict emissions for
ratified countries in 2008. The Kyoto protocol expired at the end of 2012. 
After Kyoto the nations of the world were continuing negotiating mainly through 
the UNFCCC. Attention to climate change reached unprecedented levels in 2006, 
largely due to the publication of the IPCC fourth Assessment Report (AR4) that warned
20
	
 
 
     
        
      
      
      
 
   
   
   
    
        
 
    
    
    
       
          
   
     
  
     
     
 
     
   
of the serious consequences of doing nothing to control the build-up of GHG. It stated: 
“As a result of the buildup of GHG´s, it is expected that significant climate changes will
occur in the coming decades and beyond”. It was released just before the Bali
conference. The 13th Cop of the UNFCCC and the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in
Bali (COP 13), where the participants settled on a road map for negotiating a new
climate agreement by the end of 2009
After Copenhagen 2009 (COP 15), the Durban Negotiations (COP 17) extended 
Kyoto protocol for a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. But in Doha
negotiations (COP 18) only the European Union and Australia participate in that second 
period. That means about a 14% of global emissions. In addition, many of the world´s 
largest emitting countries have held a series of meetings under the auspices of the Major
Economies Forum for Energy and Climate and the G20.
Only the European Union and Australia have policies which include formal
climate policy targets. Strand (2013) argues that these countries might at later stages be
joined by other high-income countries (including Canada, Japan and the U.S.), and 
perhaps also by some major emerging economies (among which China and South
Africa have already signaled a willingness to impose GHG pricing in the relatively near
future). What seems not achievable, in the near future, is a set of comprehensive and
coordinated climate policies for all GHG emitters globally. Paris 2015 is the next
opportunity to progress although no substantial advances are expected. 
As long as technical economic aspects are concerned and in spite of the great 
effort that has been made in the last 25 years we still have to address issues in the
evaluation of potential damages and the action plan needed to deal with the different 
impacts. Three different areas which require interdisciplinary action can be identified as
the most extensively considered: Mitigation, Adaptation and Negotiation. We focus in 
21
	
 
 
  
      
  
       
       
       
     
       
 
  
    
     
 
     
      
    
       
    
        
  
   
      
     
     
this thesis on the first area, considering policies oriented to reduce GHG emissions. In 
short, our main concern is: what are the best options and how can we ensure they are
selected.
The main problem we face is that climate mitigation policies require more
detailed and accurate information than the one currently available. This is an
unprecedented challenge for economic science. The evaluation of damages in money
terms faces enormous difficulties mainly due to the huge uncertainty about future
impacts and the very long term nature of them. While reducing the uncertainty is crucial 
to determining the right actions, the timing problem is also critical and makes valuations 
highly dependent on the discount rate.
An enormous amount of academic work has been done on the economics of
climate change but the most influential contributions have been the Nordhaus integrated 
assessment model and the Stern report. 
Nordhaus (1993) introduced the DICE model as an integrated model that
incorporates the dynamics of emissions and climate-change impacts as well as the
economic costs of policies to curb emissions. This model extends earlier studies by
integrating the economic costs and benefits of GHG reductions with a simple dynamic
representation of the scientific links among emissions, concentrations, and climate
change. The model was updated during the following years and the fifth version was 
published in 2007. There also exists a regional version named RICE.
In November 2006 the U.K. government published The Economics of Climate
Change: The Stern Review, written by a team led by Nicholas Stern. The Stern Review
(2006) makes an economic case for prompt and significant action to reduce GHG 
emissions. It is generally understood that the climate system is a global public good and 
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the emission of GHG is a massive negative externality. The Stern Review refers to it as 
possibly the greatest market failure in history.
These are the most influential studies on the field and astoundingly they show
huge differences in the damage evaluation and the cost of inaction. The Stern report
estimated that the damages under a business-as-usual scenario are between 5 and 15%
of global GDP. The cost of action to the global economy would be roughly 1% of GDP
while the costs of inaction could be from 5 to 20% of GDP. But Nordhaus estimates the 
cost of inaction in the range of 2-5% of GDP. That big difference is mainly due to three
factors:
 Stern includes intangible values not considered by Nordhaus
 Discount rates are close to zero in Stern´s review while Nordhaus use the 
estimated market return on capital as the discount rate.
 Stern weights more the damages in poor countries
As noted by Heal (2009) there is an amazing disjunction between economists
and natural scientists on this issue: most natural scientists take it as completely self-
evident that the consequences of climate change justify significant actions to mitigate
the buildup of GHG, whereas there is a range of opinions on this matter among 
economists.
Heal (2009) also argues that with such a large un-internalized externality, the 
business as usual scenario with no action on climate change obviously cannot be Pareto 
efficient, so if we move to correct the externality it must in principle be possible to
make a Pareto improving (or “win–win”) change to the world economy. And this point
would be valid whatever the numbers.
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Apart from Nordhaus and Stern, there have been numerous academic papers on 
the subject. Tol (2009) analyses fourteen different estimates of the global economic
impact of Climate Change. Some of them are based on the so called “enumerative
method” while some others use the statistical approach. The main conclusions of Tol´s 
study are:
1.		 The welfare effect of a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gas emissions on the current economy is relatively small—a few percentage
points of GDP
2.		 Some estimates point to initial benefits of a modest increase in temperature, 
followed by losses as temperatures increase further
3.		 Although greenhouse gas emissions per person are higher in high income
countries, relative impacts of climate change are greater in low-income countries
1.3 Climate Change Policies
From an economic point of view, the need for environmental policy to control 
the climate change is due to the fact that the atmosphere is a common property resource
and in the absence of regulation would be excessively polluted. A particular implication 
is due to CO2 emissions that create the greenhouse effect and the consequent increase in 
temperature. The need of implementing an environmental policy is based on the belief
that optimal abatement is ultimately cheaper than adapting to or suffering from the 
damages. Therefore it looks for putting in place policies that bring about meaningful
reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases.
The four standard approaches to environmental policy are property rights,
binding quota restrictions, pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and markets for pollution
permits (se for example, Van der Ploeg & Withagen 1991).
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Property rights are based on the argument that the market can solve the problem
if property rights become explicit and transferable (Coase 1960). He argued that the
market could play a substantial role not only in valuing these rights but also in assuring 
that they gravitated to their best use.
The rather counterintuitive thesis of Coase is that as long as property rights are
well defined, and under the assumption of zero transaction costs, the market and the
corresponding exchanges of rights will naturally lead to the highest valued use of
resources in total, no matter how the rights were initially allocated. Under these
conditions, different initial allocations will lead to different wealth and transfers among
actors, but they will all lead to the same optimal outcome for a same total quantity of
rights.
Binding quota restrictions are implemented through command-and-control 
regulations, which consist of setting specific standards to emission sources, enforced by
administrative controls and penalties. Command-and-control regulatory standards are
either technology-based or performance-based. The first method specifies equipment, 
processes or procedures, like energy efficient motors, combustion processes or landfill-
gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible. They
specify allowable levels of pollutant emissions, but leaving the specific methods of
achieving the target to regulated entities. Aldy & Stavins (2011) argues that uniform 
technology and performance standards can – in principle – be effective in achieving
some environmental purposes. But, given the ubiquitous nature of greenhouse gas 
emissions from diverse sources in an economy, it is unlikely that technology or ordinary
performance standards could form the center‐piece of a meaningful climate policy.
The economic literature opposes command-and-control policies, in which the 
public authority set up standards and rules to directly reduce environmental damages,
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with policies based on “economic tools” that aim at changing the behavior of economic
agents through the modification or the introduction of prices, which reflect the cost of
environmental damages in a context where traditional markets fail to account for
environmental externalities. As pointed out by Tietenberg (2010) economists and policy
makers developed visions of how pollution-control policy should be conducted. But 
these two visions were worlds apart. Policy makers preferred controlling pollution
through a series of legal regulations or quantity based policies while economists
promoted price based mechanisms, that is to say policies based on “economic tools”
that aim at changing the behavior of economic agents through the modification or the
introduction of prices.
The support for systems of tradable emission permits and environmental taxes
over systems of command and control is particularly strong in the literature of 
environmental economics. One of the main arguments is that command-and-control 
regimes generally are not cost-effective. As stated by Tietenberg (2010), theory proved 
that command-and-control regulation typically was not cost effective, but empirical 
work demonstrated that the degree of inefficiency was very large indeed.
A main theoretical attraction of emissions pricing is its potential to achieve
emissions reductions at lower cost than what is possible under direct regulations such as 
mandated technologies or performance standards. Since competitive firms equalize their 
marginal abatement costs to the price of pollution, notably under an emission tax rate or
a price for tradable permits, a socially optimal allocation can be decentralized. This is 
because (a) marginal abatement costs are leveled out among all the polluters, and (b)
marginal abatement costs are equalized to marginal damage.
However, while the cost-efficiency of taxes and competitive emission permit 
markets is independent of the product market structure, the overall efficiency of these
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systems depends on the assumption of perfectly competitive markets. In the case of 
imperfectly competitive markets, both tax and permits systems might not lead to the 
optimization of the resource allocation problem. (Sartzetakis 97)
Carbon pricing (either carbon taxes or emissions trading) is viewed as a critical
instrument for limiting future climate change, not only because it fosters the transition
to a low carbon economy but also because it is the more cost-effective way to achieve
the transition. If the world is to succeed in reducing emissions in line with the two-
degree target, an international price on carbon emissions must be established. And 
carbon pricing is considered our most important policy instrument in the fight against
global climate change. Major options for carbon pricing are carbon taxes, cap and trade
systems, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards and fossil fuel subsidy
reductions. This thesis explores only some aspects of the two main tools: pigouvian
carbon taxes and tradable permits. While the academic literature is in general more in 
favor of taxes, cap and trade programs have been used in USA and Europe as the unique
tool with the only exception of Scandinavian Countries. We review the main
contributions to clarify this field.
1.3.1 Tax or Cap
There is wide agreement among economists as to the potential advantages of
emissions pricing, but there is much debate as to which particular form – carbon taxes 
or cap and trade – is the better climate policy option. In this subsection we summarize
the most important arguments used in the literature.
            Authors in favor of carbon taxes note that the overall administrative costs are
higher under a cap-and-trade program. As argued by Goulder and Schein (2013) the 
reason is that cap and trade imposes an additional administrative responsibility: the 
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regulator must not only monitor emissions but also establish a registry for allowances
and keep track of allowance trades and the associated changes in ownership of
allowances. Historically in general emissions trading has been targeted at large sources 
(e.g. electrical generation and emission-intensive facilities), while taxes have been 
targeted on more diffuse sources such as household and transport emissions.
Price volatility is another issue for a cap-and-trade system. The supply of
allowances is perfectly inelastic, hence shifts in demand can cause significant price
changes – and irregular shifts in demand can produce price volatility. Nordhaus (2009)
notes that demand for allowances is also likely to be highly inelastic in the short run, 
leading to even greater potential for high price volatility. He argues that allowance
trading programs’ price volatility represents a reason to favor carbon taxes over cap and 
trade.
Uncertainty has been used as an argument to favor both systems. The price
versus quantity issue does not look, a priori, like a timing issue: the question is whether
an environmental policy should aim at controlling the user price of the polluting good or 
its quantity. A carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program address uncertainty differently.
The carbon tax stipulates the price of emissions, while leaving uncertain the aggregate
emissions level. Cap and trade stipulates aggregate emissions, leaving the price
uncertain.
The fact that a carbon tax does not guarantee that emissions will be kept within a
given limit is considered by some groups a crucial liability. Under a carbon tax it
remains possible that emissions will significantly exceed the levels considered safety.
At the same time, some business groups highlight the fact that cap and trade leaves 
prices uncertain. They emphasize that uncertainty about emissions prices constrains the
business community’s ability to respond to climate policy: changing the input mix and
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investing in research toward new technologies is more risky when future allowance
prices are uncertain.
The question of whether it would be better to control certain forms of pollution
by setting emission standards or by charging the appropriate pollution taxes was firstly
addressed by Weitzman (1974 & 1978) who established that under complete knowledge
and perfect certainty, both models are identical, while in a world where planners do not
have the required information and outcomes are uncertain there is a relative advantage
in regulating prices as the number of production units becomes larger or the level of
substitution among products becomes greater. He also compared the expected efficiency
gains under uncertainty of a price-based approach (as with carbon taxes) and a quantity-
based approach (as with cap and trade). The relative advantage depends on the slopes of 
the functions that express marginal environmental damages and marginal costs as 
functions of emissions. The quantity-based approach emerges as superior when the
marginal damage function is relatively steep; otherwise the price-based approach is 
more attractive. 
Kaplow and Shavell (2002) emphasize the role of a dubious set of assumptions
in their critique of Weitzman (1974). First they argue that taxes are constrained to be
linear even though marginal harm is taken to be non-linear (rising in the quantity of
emissions) which violates the basic Pigouvian prescription. And secondly taxes are
taken to be fixed for all time.
Goulder and Schein (2013) examine the relative attractions of a carbon tax, a
“pure” cap-and-trade system, and “hybrid” options (a cap-and-trade system with a price
ceiling and/or price floor) and arrive to the following conclusions:
1) Policies that specify emissions prices exogenously have several attractions relative 
to policies that do not. Emissions prices are exogenous under the carbon tax: the
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specified carbon tax rate is the emissions price. A hybrid system – that is, a cap-and-
trade system that establishes a ceiling and/or floor price – also has exogenous prices 
when the floor or ceiling price is in effect. Exogenously specified prices confer
several attractions. One is that they prevent emissions price volatility. Another is that 
they are likely to minimize expected policy errors in the face of uncertainties about
benefits and costs. Two additional and important attractions – which have received
relatively little attention – are that exogenous prices help avoid problematic
interactions with other climate policies, and avoid large wealth transfers to oil
exporting countries. 
2) There are four dimensions along which, contrary to frequently made claims, the 
two approaches are equivalent. 
a) The carbon tax and cap and trade offer qualitatively equivalent incentives to 
reduce emissions, regardless of whether the allowances are introduced through 
auction or free provision. Even when allowances are received for free, each 
additional unit of emissions carries an opportunity cost
      b) In principle any distributional outcome under cap and trade can be matched via 
a carbon tax. The same redistribution brought about through free allocation of
allowances can be produced through the granting of partial or full exemptions to the
carbon tax.
      c) The potential for downstream implementation is not exclusively enjoyed by a
carbon tax. A cap and trade system can also be introduced downstream.
      d) An offset is a credit for emissions reductions achieved by an entity in a sector 
that is not covered by a given CAT system. However it is possible to include or
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exclude offsets as part of a carbon tax program. Thus, considerations relating to 
offsets have no bearing on the choice between cap and trade and the carbon tax.2 
Some other authors have criticized potential deficiencies in the CAT programs. 
Pratlong (2005) argues that a high abatement cost industry (regulated through a tradable 
permits system) can increase its market shares compared to its rivals (regulated through 
pollution taxes system). The reverse applies for a low abatement cost industry. He
concludes that a permits system is not always beneficial for each industry.
Fischer and Preonas (2010) have pointed out a potentially important advantage
of a carbon tax over cap and trade. They have shown that, in the presence of a cap-and-
trade program, introducing an additional GHG-reducing policy such as a performance
standard might yield no further reductions in overall emissions. The reason is that
overall emissions are determined by the overall cap or, equivalently, by the number of
allowances in circulation. In contrast, introducing an additional GHG-reducing policy in 
the presence of a carbon tax can lead to a reduction in overall emissions.
This theoretical debate is completed and influenced by practical experiences. 
Both price-based and quantity-based instruments have effectively been used to control 
environmental externalities, for example carbon taxes in Northern Europe or SO2 
emission trading system in North America in the beginning of the 1990s. The European 
Union, which was initially planning to establish a tax on carbon emissions in the same
period, eventually favored an emission trading system after the negotiation of the Kyoto
Protocol, in order to help the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol among European 
Member States. This led to the creation of the European Union Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS), to date the largest system in the world which effectively puts a price
on the greenhouse gas emissions of energy intensive industries.
2 The authors cited the example of Australia´s emissions pricing program that allows the use of some 
offsets during its “fixed price period” from 2012 to 2014. A fixed price is essentially a carbon tax.
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Traditionally, the analysis on the choice of instruments has focused on
identifying whether carbon taxes or emissions trading is the superior instrument but
nowadays it tends to frame the issue in terms of how they can best be combined. In
Europe, while the EUETS system is already in place, there are also energy and carbon 
taxation schemes in several EU member states that have been guided by the so-called 
environmental tax reform (ETR). This reform of national tax systems seeks to shift the
tax burden from conventional sources, such as labor and capital, to alternative sources 
such as environmental pollution or natural resource use. Another case came recently
from United Kingdom, which decided to impose a tax on CO2 emissions caused by
electric power generators in the country. For each unit of emissions, these generators
had to pay this tax in addition to the price that they paid for EU ETS emissions
allowances.
1.4 Emission Permits Market
In cap-and-trade programs (CAT), regulators impose a cap on the total quantity
of emissions permitted and distribute a corresponding number of tradable emission
permits. Emission permits markets are based on legal regulations for the limitation of
certain economic activities (e.g. taxi licenses in large cities). When emission trading is 
used to set the level of allowable emissions, the regulator does not need to know the 
damage or the cost functions to achieve cost effectiveness, since the price mechanism
and the transferability of rights will end up in accomplishing the required reduction at 
the lowest cost.
Coase’s contribution laid the basis for the development of a new approach to
economics and to environmental regulation in particular. If factors of production are
thought of as rights, the right to do something which has a harmful effect can also be a 
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factor of production. The right to damage the environment up to a certain point, seen as 
a limited factor of production, can be materialized as a tradable right. The regulator has 
to define the total number of rights and ensure their legal force, but do not directly fix 
their price. The price of permits is determined by exchanges between entities on the
market, which under perfect conditions, leads to the most efficient use of the permits. In
this case, the environmental goal is obtained at the least possible cost, without the
regulator having to evaluate ex ante the costs involved.
In an emission trading program, the volatility of allowance prices can undermine
the climate policy, what explains the deep attention given to “cost containment”
measures. These measures include offsets, banking and borrowing, safety valves and
price collars. 
An offset provision links a CAT system with an emission-reduction credit
system. The most important version of this measure is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) where abatement of emissions can be purchased from countries that
do not have a climate policy in order to comply with the requested cap. An objective of 
the CDM is to make it easier (and less costly) for emitters in the policy countries to 
reach their emissions caps.
Banking of permits occurs when regulated entities are allowed to hold unused
permits for future compliance. The cap considers cumulative emissions over a period of
years, rather than a cap on annual emissions. Banking thus diminishes the supply in the 
short term, but raises the supply in the future. Banking makes it difficult for the price of
allowances to fall down to zero as long as the anticipation horizon is distant or highly
uncertain
Borrowing is symmetrical to banking. In this case, permits from future
compliance periods can be used in advance. Borrowing thus diminishes demand in the
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short term, but raises demand in the future because the allowances used in advance have
to be paid back. Nevertheless in the case of a price spike, borrowing can prove to be an 
efficient short term response.
A safety valve puts an upper bound on the costs of abatement by offering
additional allowances at a predetermined fee (the safety valve “trigger price”). This is a
hybrid approach to climate policy: a cap-and-trade system that transitions to a tax under 
high mitigation costs, although in this case, the aggregate emissions exceed the
emission cap.
Murray et al (2009) proposed a mechanism that includes features of both price
and quantity instruments called allowance reserve. While the safety valve stipulates that
an unlimited number of allowances be made available at the specified safety valve price, 
the allowance reserve stipulates both a ceiling price at which cost relief is provided and 
a maximum number of allowances to be issued in exercising that relief. Much like a
safety valve mechanism can mimic either a pure price or pure quantity control, 
depending on how the cap and safety-valve price are set, an allowance reserve can
mimic a pure price, pure quantity, or safety-valve approach, depending on how the
ceiling price and volume are set.
A price collar combines the ceiling of a safety valve with a price floor created by
a minimum price in auction markets or a regulator commitment to purchase allowances 
at a specific price
Nowadays, emission permit markets are being used at an unprecedented scale to
regulate externalities, and it is likely that they will play a key role in any future
international agreement concerning GHG emissions. They have been used with success 
in other environmental domains as well as for pricing CO2 emissions. The U.S. sulfur
dioxide (SO2) cap and trade program cut U.S. power plant SO2 emissions more than 
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50% after 1990 and resulted in compliance costs one half of what they would have been 
under conventional regulatory mandates (Carlson et al, 2000). The success of the SO2 
allowance trading program motivated the design and implementation of the EU ETS, 
the world’s largest cap and trade program, focused on cutting CO2 emissions from
power plants and large manufacturing facilities throughout Europe (Ellerman &
Buchner, 2007).
1.5 Carbon Taxes
Environmental taxes are usually established according to the Pigouvian 
rule.3 The appropriate policy to internalize the externality, according to Pigou, involved
imposing a per unit tax on emissions. The tax rate should be set equal to the marginal
external social damage caused by the last unit of pollution at the efficient allocation. 
While this policy can be identified and found out within theoretical models, it is very
difficult to put in practice since it requires knowing the marginal damage at the
equilibrium point.
The marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide, also known as the “social cost of
carbon” (SCC), is defined as the net present value of the incremental damage due to a
small increase in carbon dioxide emissions. For policy purposes, the marginal damage
cost (if estimated along the optimal emission trajectory) should be equal to the
Pigouvian tax that could be placed on carbon, thus internalizing the externality and
restoring the market to the efficient solution.
SCC is nowadays a very important concept in global warming economics and
has attracted a massive academic attention. Tol (2008) makes an analysis of over 200 
3 The theory behind the integration of environmental damages in the economy dates back to the work of
English economist Arthur C. Pigou (1920) which remains central to modern welfare economics and
particularly to environmental economics.
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estimates and conclude that the big differences found are driven to a large extent by the 
choice of the discount rate, reason why the estimation of the Stern report is the highest 
one representing an outlier in the sample. He also found a downward trend in the 
estimates, in clear contradiction with the 2007 IPCC report (AR 4). In 2013 the same 
author reported 75 studies with 588 estimates.
Nordhaus (2011) estimated social cost of carbon for the current year (2015) 
considering uncertainty, equity weighting, and risk aversion is $44 per ton of carbon (or
$12 per ton CO2) in 2005 US$ and international prices. Uncertainty increases the 
expected value of the SCC by approximately 8 percent. All these data are based on the
RICE 2011 model. This value is in big contrast with the one given by Stern ($85 per ton
CO2) 
Another central point in pricing carbon through a tax is the election of the target 
point of application. Carbon tax can be established at a rate per ton of CO2 emissions or
based on the carbon content of the three main fossil fuels (coal, petroleum and natural 
gas). The carbon tax could be applied at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil
fuels, from the suppliers like refineries or importers (upstream taxation) to final emitters 
at the point of energy generation (downstream taxation). In general terms emissions can 
be controlled indirectly (via “upstream” targeting), more directly (via “downstream”
targeting), or via a hybrid involving some combination of the two. In an upstream
system the taxes or allowance requirements would be targeted at the point of extraction,
production, import, processing, or distribution of substances. A downstream point of
regulation would focus control on the point of use, where emission into the atmosphere
would occur.
Mansur (2010) examines the tradeoffs of regulating greenhouse gases (GHG)
upstream versus downstream. He sets out some key issues in deciding what level of a
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vertical chain of industries to target in designing regulation. He concluded first, that
upstream regulation could substantially reduce transactions costs. He argues that 
incomplete regulation will affect the types of goods produced, traded, and consumed, if 
all nations do not harmonize carbon prices and concludes that the magnitude of the
regulatory leakage depends on whether the policy regulates firms upstream or 
downstream. 
According to Metcalf and Weisbach (2009), leaving aside international trade
concerns, the best place to impose the tax would be at a point in the supply chain where
carbon content could be easily measured and the number of taxpayers relatively small. 
For coal, this would be at the mine, for petroleum at the refinery, and for natural gas at 
processing facilities or, for those that bypass them, the wellhead. Marron and Toder 
(2014) noted that going upstream to oil wells and importers would expand 
administrative and compliance burdens without increasing the effectiveness of the tax,
while going downstream from these points would weaken the link between the tax and 
actual carbon emissions. 
Aldy and Stavins (2011) argues that focusing on the carbon content of fuels, or
upstream taxation, would enable the policy to capture about 98% of US CO2 emissions,
with a relatively small number of covered firms. A crediting system for downstream 
sequestration could complement the emission tax system including potentially emission-
reduction projects (offsets) in other countries.
The big issue that always arises when carbon taxes are considered is equity. It is
argued that the tax will raise the price of energy and poor households will be seriously
penalized. The cost burden of a carbon pricing program is estimated to be regressive
(particularly for non-transport emissions in industrialized countries) in the absence of
any redistribution of the revenues because lower income households use a larger 
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proportion of their earnings to purchase energy intensive products (gas and electricity
being the most important).
Analysts generally assume that a carbon tax would be passed forward onto 
consumers both directly in higher prices for their energy purchases and indirectly in 
higher prices for other goods and services based on the carbon-intensity of production 
but analysts typically focus on the long run when most costs will be passed onto
consumers. Like other taxes on consumers, a carbon tax would be regressive: its burden 
would be higher as a share of income for low-income households than for high-income
ones because low-income households consume a greater share of their income and 
spend relatively more on carbon- intensive goods and services
Some authors have proposed to address this issue by using the proceeds in a way
that offsets the regressivity of this kind of taxes. Nordhaus (2009) argues that the tax
system raises substantial revenues that can be used to alleviate the economic hardships 
of low-income households through reducing other taxes or increasing benefits. 
Alternatively, some of the tax revenues could be used for research and development on
low carbon energy systems
Mathur and Morris (2012) found that in the USA, a carbon tax averaging 1.7 
percent of consumption imposes a burden of 2.1 percent of consumption in the bottom 
decile, but only 1.3 percent in the top decile. 
Tax relief could offset the disproportionate effect of the tax on the poor and 
reduce the economic distortions of the existing tax system. Such a relief could take the 
form of lower income or payroll taxes or new tax credits.
Marron and Toder (2013) estimate that offsetting 50 percent of carbon tax 
revenues with a refundable tax credit and 50 percent with a cut in the corporate income
tax rate would leave both low-income and upper-income households better off but raise 
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net taxes on middle-income households. Adding payroll tax cuts to the mix would
redistribute some of these benefits to the middle class.
Jointly to the equity issue appears the efficiency issue. The analysis of the trade-
offs between economic growth and climate policies fighting global warming is central
to the research on optimal carbon taxes. To date, academic researchers have relied 
heavily on deterministic neoclassical growth models called IAM (Integrated Assessment 
Models), like DICE or the one by Golosov et al (2014) to address optimal climate
policy.
The optimal tax results in a first best policy are heavily dependent upon some 
key assumptions like the level of fossil fuel proven reserves or the backstop
technologies. Other key assumptions like discount rates, social cost of carbon and 
uncertainty levels have already been discussed in this chapter. 
Second best policies have also been investigated, but subjects like the double 
dividend or the role of distortionary taxes in climate policies are well beyond our scope.
1.6 Outline of the thesis
This thesis performs an evaluation of some particular aspects of the main climate 
change policies based on economic incentives. Particularly we examine the role of 
market power in the behavior of firms participating in emission permit markets, and the
impact of extraction costs and proven reserves in the optimal carbon taxes setting.
The remainder of the document is divided in two distinct parts: chapters 2, 3 and
4 are focused on tradable emission permits while chapter 5 deals with environmental
taxes.
In the first part, our emission permits study covers three chapters: The first one
(Chapter 2) consists of a comprehensive literature survey on theoretical models dealing
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with the market power issue. Our aim in this chapter is to summarize the main findings
in one simple and canonical model that will be the base for the next two chapters.
The second chapter of this part (Chapter 3) is dedicated to the analysis of the 
existence of scarcity rents and the possibility that such rents provide incentives for 
strategic price manipulation when the correspondent output market is oligopolistic but 
firms are price takers in the emission permits market. Our work is closely related to 
Sartzetakis (97 and 2004) and Erhard et al (2008) who used a Cournot model to analyse
the impact of market power in efficiency and welfare. We use a Stackelberg model
which is the main difference with them, since we are interested in studying the role of
output asymmetries in the firm´s behavior. We particularly focus on the impact of 
scarcity rents and we compare the results of this analysis under different oligopolistic
structures.
The third chapter of this part (Chapter 4) covers again Cournot and Stackelberg 
oligopolies in the product market but introducing a dominant firm in the emissions 
permit markets which make endogenous the permit price. We show the key role that
grandfathering is playing at the level of output and profit to compensate the leadership 
advantage of one firm in the output market
Optimal climate policy is investigated in an IAM very close to Golosov et al
(2014). These models are widely used to evaluate the size of the social cost of carbon
and hence the optimal carbon tax. Our model is a neoclassical growth model in discrete 
time.
We firstly deal with theoretical aspects of the optimal tax when varying 
extraction costs are considered. Our main contribution is the analysis of the stock effect 
impact on the dynamics of the optimal carbon tax and their relationship with the green 
paradox. We examine conditions under which the optimal carbon tax increases or
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decreases based on the level of reserves and assumptions for the stock-dependent oil
extraction costs.
Secondly we perform a quantitative assessment, also in line with Golosov et al
(2009) parameterization, to explore whether the role of extraction costs are significant 
in the optimal tax setting. 
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Chapter 2
Market Power and Emission Permit Markets
2.1 Introduction
As we have discussed in Chapter 1, there are two ways of introducing a price
that incorporates environmental externalities in the markets: price-based and quantity-
based regulation. Quantity-based policies usually consist of cap-and-trade (CAT) or
baseline and credit programs, which create tradable emission rights that aim at reducing
pollution emissions in the most efficient way, i.e. in the sense of minimizing the total
cost of pollution abatement.
The CAT programs are attractive from an economic point of view for, as long as 
marginal abatement costs differ, incentives for trade exist and the market can play a
positive role in achieving a pre-specified target at a minimum cost. In addition to this
practical advantage, emission trading allows pollution emitters some flexibility to
comply with the regulation, either reducing emissions or acquiring emissions reductions 
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from other firms. All with the aim of being economically efficient (cost effective). 
Emissions trading change the nature of the regulatory process with respect to 
traditional command-and-control policies. The burden of identifying the appropriate
control strategies is shifted from the control authority to the polluter. Tradable permits
allow flexibility in the timing of control investments and different pollution reduction
strategies can take place. Temporal flexibility in emissions trading is provided by
banking, borrowing and advance auctions. Banking allows holding allowances beyond 
their designated year for later use. Borrowing allows an allowance to be used before its 
designated date. Advance Auctions sell allowances that can be used after some future
date, commonly 6 or 7 years hence.
CAT programs represent nowadays a common tool used by authorities to
regulate pollution emissions, although this policy instrument is not without its own
limitations. To mention one of the most obvious, a policy relying on quantity
restrictions, by definition requires an estimate of the optimal amount of emissions, 
which is not an easy task to accomplish. Tradable emissions permit systems4 (TEP) are
in place for several pollutants at national levels within Europe and the US. In the US 
there already exists a nation-wide TEP system for sulphur-dioxide (Verbon & Whitagen
2005). A TEP system was implemented for the entire EU for greenhouse gas emissions.
Such a system, known as EUETS (European Union Emission Trading System) is
nowadays the most important emissions market in the world.
One of the central results in the literature shows that a CAT system is effective
in attaining the pollution reduction objective at the least cost under a set of assumptions.
But this result is challenged by the violation of some of those assumptions. The
literature has mainly focused on three important aspects of CAT systems: Different
4 TEP refers to CAT programs in a little more restricted way, only including local and global pollutants.
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mechanisms to make the initial allocation of permits, banking and borrowing
regulations and market imperfections. After a brief review of all three aspects, this work 
mainly focuses on the third one, imperfect competition.
DIFFERENT PERMITS ALLOCATION.
Two main methods are considered as the most important to distribute permits
among polluters. The first one, which consists of free allocation of permits based on
past emissions, is called grandfathering. The second one is auctioning the permits. We
will focus our study along this and the next two chapters on the grandfathering case, due
to its relevance, notably in the EUETS market implementation and its impact on 
effectiveness and welfare. Grandfathering involves a transfer of wealth, equal to the
value of the allowances, to existing firms, whereas, with an auction, this same wealth is
transferred to the government. To mitigate potentially adverse competitiveness impacts, 
and to engender political support for the program, it has become standard to allocate
some percentage (or all) of these emissions permits for free to industrial stakeholders 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998; Hahn and Stavins, 2011).
Under a grandfathering regime, permits are freely distributed to regulated
sources based on a pre-determined criterion, such as historic emissions. At least two
different issues regarding grandfathering have been investigated: The effect of
sequential versus simultaneous allocation on the one hand and imperfect competition on
the related output market on the other hand.
The sequential version was used in the early phases of the EUETS, when 
domestic permit allocations were often announced at separate times.5 MacKenzie (2011)
concludes that this option may result in strategic behavior from the different countries
5 This secuential allocation can happen in schemes with sovereign governments, if the regulator allows
them the option to announce their permit allocations at different dates.
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involved. Each government announces an allocation level in order to maximize social
welfare in its region and social welfare can be reduced because aggregate emissions
differ between sequential and simultaneous allocation announcements. 
Imperfect competition allows firms to pass pollution costs on to consumers. If
they receive permits for free, they essentially get reimbursed for costs they never had to 
incur. According to Hintermann (2011), existing firms favor freely allocated tradable
permits not only because they convey rents (known in the literature as windfall profits), 
that represent a wealth transfer from consumers to firms, but also for the fact that it sets 
entry barriers, as long as the newcomers have to purchase permits. 
BANKING AND BORROWING REGULATIONS
With banking of permits, one agent that has reduced emissions more than 
indicated by the permits it holds, can keep the excess permits for future use. Thus, if
borrowing is allowed, an agent can increase its emissions in excess of the permits it
holds against future emission reductions
Banking and borrowing, as opposed to the basic trading case, change the nature
of standards since firms can emit above the standard at some points in time. When
social damages from emissions are related not only to the cumulative emission level,
but also to the emission level in each period, least-cost allocation of emissions for
agents through time can be different from the socially optimal emission level in each 
period.. Hence, restrictions on banking and borrowing can be required, for instance, by
only allowing a certain amount of permits to be banked and borrowed through time.
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MARKET COMPETITION
Unfortunately, perfect market assumptions rarely hold in practice. Indeed, 
emissions permits markets can suffer from several impediments, such as uncertainties, 
transaction costs (see Cason & Gangadharan, 2003; Montero, 1997), market power (see
Hahn, 1984; Liski & Montero, 2005; Misiolek & Elder, 1989; Hinterman 2011), and 
imperfect compliance behaviors (Keeler, 1991; van Egteren & Weber, 1996; Malik, 
1990, 2002; Arguedas et al 2010).
These problems did raise questions regarding the cost effectiveness of CAP
policies and cost bearing. In order to understand and explain the way in which the 
market works, a number of models were developed that can be static or dynamic, and 
consider different market structures, like Cournot, Stackelberg or models of conjectural 
variations. 
Our investigation aims at a consolidation of this work. It brings together the
different strands, and highlights the main results in one specific model. For this purpose
in Section 2.3, we set up a two period model where two firms compete in a polluting
product market and receive some tradable permits by means of grandfathering. We
specifically focus on cross-market links when firms maximize profits in both markets. 
2.2 Market Power Literature Review
The theory behind emissions trading was formalized by Baumol & Oates (71)
for the case of uniformly mixed pollutants and Montgomery (1972) for the case of non-
uniformly mixed pollutants. Baumol & Oates proposed to establish a set of arbitrary
standards and then impose a set of charges on emissions sufficient to attain these
standards. They admitted that the system do not generally produce a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of resources, but they also showed some important optimality properties as 
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achieving a specified reduction in pollution levels at a minimum cost.
Under the assumption of competitive markets, cost effectiveness is achieved 
regardless of the allocation rule chosen (Montgomery 1972). Under the assumption of
competitive permits market, the initial allocation of emission permits does not affect the 
equilibrium, and the allocation scheme does not influence the results (Sartzetakis 1997).
Cost effectiveness holds when permits are bankable in a competitive permit
market with perfect foresight, but only if all the firms are not subject to profit
regulations (Cronshaw & Kruse 1996). Rubin (1996) considers banking and borrowing
of quotas in an intertemporal, continuous time model. Within this framework he shows 
that in a competitive permit market an equilibrium solution exists and is cost effective, 
which means that marginal abatement costs are equalized across all agents (static 
optimum), present values of marginal abatement costs are equalized (dynamic optimum) 
and there are equal marginal abatement costs across agents and across periods (cost 
effectiveness)
But the majority of emissions regulated under existing and planned regulations
come from industries that are highly concentrated like electricity, cement or refining.
Therefore it is not realistic to assume perfect competition and accordingly a literature
analyzing the relationship between imperfect competition and emission permits has
been developed. Since the results are sensitive to the assumption of competitive market,
either in emission permit markets or the polluting product market, this literature can be
divided in three different lines where market power is introduced on the permits market, 
the good market or both simultaneously.
The first line considers market power just in the permit market. The ground-
breaking paper is Hahn (1984), which, based on a static model a la Stackelberg, stated
that the efficiency loss due to market power depends on the initial allocation of permits
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and the permit price is an increasing function of the leader’s allocation. The dominant
firm will manipulate the price (upwards if it is a seller and downwards if it is a buyer) 
unless the initial allocation equals the cost-effective one, which requires a perfectly
informed regulator. Hagen & Westskog (1998) extended the Hahn setting in a dynamic
two-period model and found a non-optimal distribution of abatement in an imperfectly
competitive market with banking and borrowing.
On the second line, authors have addressed the issue of imperfect competition in 
the goods market combined with perfect competition in the permit market. Some
articles have shown that perfect competition in the permit market might not be sufficient 
to render a cost-effective outcome if the product market is not perfectly competitive. 
Within the framework of a Cournot duopoly, Sartzetakis (1997) compares the efficiency
of a competitive emissions market to a command-and-control regulation. Emissions
trading modifies the allocation of emissions among firms and hence their production 
choices. Sartzetakis (2004) shows that welfare can decrease when emission trading is 
allowed between asymmetric firms endowed with different abatement and production
technologies. The permit price that clears the market is a weighted average of the value
of emissions of firms under command and control and therefore the cost of the more
inefficient firm is reduced while the cost of the more efficient one is increased when 
permit trading is introduced.
According to Liski & Montero (2005) borrowing of permits from future vintages 
could also be included, and may be efficient. For both to actually happen, permits
allocations must decrease overtime and at least at a rate higher than the discount rate for
some period of time. They also concluded that a dominant firm exhausts its stock of
banked permits slower than a competitive firm, because the dominant firm will
manipulate the permit price upwards.    
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Ehrhart, Hope and Löschel (2008) use game theoretical methods to show that, if
the output market is not perfectly competitive, firms may have incentives to collude in
the permit market even if there is no explicit market power on the latter. These authors
conclude that, under certain circumstances an increase in the permit prices lead to 
higher profits due to a decrease in product quantities as a result on a higher cost and a
decrease in the output.
Meunier (2011) analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two
imperfectly competitive product markets and conclude that even if firms are price takers 
in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of
imperfect competition in product markets. Theoretically, if markets are perfectly
competitive, a unique global permit market that covers all polluting activities would be
efficient to allocate an aggregate emissions level. If markets are not perfect, but some 
firms enjoy market power, several permit markets may be more efficient than an 
integrated one.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation fits in this second line of research and extends the 
Ehrhart et al (2008) model to analyze an oligopoly ala Stackelberg, introducing cost 
asymmetry between agents.
A third line addresses the concurrent existence of market power in both permit 
and output markets. Misiolek & Elder (1989) extended Hahn’s setting to the product
market and concluded that a single dominant firm can manipulate the permit market to
drive up the fringe firm’s cost in the product market. Hinterman (2011) found that the
threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above
its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market, and 
that overall efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone.
Tanaka & Chen (2012) consider a Cournot-fringe model with market power in 
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both product and permits market to simulate the California electricity market and they
show that Cournot firms can significantly raise both power price and permit price,
which results in a great loss in social surplus. 
The market power in both markets lead to results that are based on the fact that 
the dominant firm may increase its profits by increasing industry costs. In the industrial 
organization literature this strategy is known as “raising rivals´ costs”. 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation fits in the third line. We will consider an 
Stackelberg model where one firm is dominant in both markets and the same model
with two different leaders, one for the output market and another one for the permit 
market.
2.3 A Canonical Model
In this section, we develop a two-period partial equilibrium model with two
markets. The permit market can integrate several polluting sectors as designated by the
regulator and it allows full banking and borrowing. One of these sectors is composed by
firms that produce a final good (energy, for instance) by emitting a global pollutant. The
model is conceived for the analysis of different market structures in both markets. 
Our aim is twofold. First we try to show in (slightly modified versions of) one
single model some of the basic results of the literature under different market structures. 
Second, we set up a framework that will be used in the following chapters to explore
some specific cases in order to answer some questions that have not yet been considered
in academic literature, as far as we know. Our model is based in the conjectural 
variations structure as presented for example in Ehrhart et al (2008). Modified versions 
of this framework will be the base of the Stackelberg model that will be developed in
the next chapters.
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2.3.1 Basic Elements
We consider two firms labeled as i = 1, 2 and two periods j = 1, 2. We denote 
the variables with subscripts where the first subscript refers to the agent (i), and the
second is related to the period (j), unless total variable per period, which only has a time 
subscript. For example, we denote output of firm 2 in period 1 asx21and total output of
period 1 as X1. Individual firms will be considering in analyzing competitive output
market, Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg model.6 
Let 1 2:j j jX x x  be output quantity for period j. Firms face the inverse demand
function  P X , where 0
j
dP
dX
 . Production results in emissions of a pollutant. We
denote as ije the emissions net of abatement of firm “i” in period “j”. The cost function 
of firm I at time j,  ,ij ij ijC x e , depends on output and emissions and is continuous and 
twice differentiable in both arguments with the following properties:
	
2 2
2
0 ,     0 ,     0 ,     0.i i i i
i i i i i
C C C C
x e e x e
   
   
    
(1)
These cost assumptions are common in the emission trading literature. They
mean that cost is increasing with respect to output and decreasing and convex with
respect to emissions. These assumptions can also be thought as involving a positive and
increasing marginal abatement cost. The fourth condition implies that marginal cost is 
decreasing in emissions.   
Under a cap and trade scheme, emissions become a factor of production that has 
to be paid for. As highlighted by Hahn (84), the assumption of downward sloping
demand curves for emission permits is equivalent to the assumption that marginal 
6 In some imperfect competition models in the literature, there is one dominant firm and a fringe of
competitive firms. To some extent, the Stackelberg version of our model can be linked to this type of
model by considering the firm 1 as leader and there is a single price taking firm indexed by i = 2.
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abatement costs are increasing. This assumption implies that the firm attains a regular
minimum in solving the profit maximization problem. 
The firms can receive an initial endowment of permits in each period and they
can go to the market in order to purchase additional required permits or sell remaining
ones. Let 1 2j j jS S S  represent total and individual endowments of period j and let yij 
represent the purchases or sales by firm i to firm j A positive value of yij corresponds to
a purchase and a negative value to a sale of permits by firm i. Unused permits may be
banked (saved for next period use) or sold. Let Bij be the permits banked in period j by
agent i.
The stock of permits evolves overtime according to the following banking 
conditions:
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
i i i i
i i i i
B S e y
B S e y
  
  
(2)
	
The amount of permits banked by firm i in period 1 equals the difference
between the total amount of permits hold by the firm (initial endowment plus purchases)
and its total emissions net of abatement. At the end of the second period it is optimal for
both firms not to bank any permit. 2 0, 1,2iB i  We also assume, as it is frequently
seen in the literature that the emissions generated by both firms can be perfectly
monitored without cost by the regulatory authorities, which implies that firms cannot 
emit more than the holdings of permits allows them to. 
The competition in the product market is modeled using the conjectural
variations model of oligopoly.7 In this approach instead of considering that each agent
7 Conjectural variation is typically viewed as a reduced form approximation to the repeated dynamic 
games. The conjectural variations model includes monopolistic and competitive behavior as special cases.
This model is discussed by Bresnahan (1981) and Seade (1980) and is surveyed by Dixit (1986).
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takes the action of the rival as given, agents form conjectures about the rival´s response
to their own strategy.
If we assume that both firms have constant and identical conjectural variations
equal to δ, it follows that:
2 1 11 21
1 2 11 11 11
; 1
x x dx dxdX
x x dx dx dx
 
    
        
    
(2a)
which means that when one firm increases its own production by one unit, it conjectures 
that total output in the market will increase by 1 + δ units. 
The attractive of this approach is that it can be seen as a general framework to
include different well known market structures that can be seen as particular cases by
taking particular values of δ. Cournot equilibrium is obtained when δ equals zero. The
competitive equilibrium corresponds to the case in which δ equals minus one and a
collusive cartel is obtained when δ equals one.
We can also assume firms have constant but different conjectural variations. In 
this case
2 11 21
1 1
1 11 11 11
1 21 11
2 2
2 21 21 21
; 1
; 1
x dx dxdX
x dx dx dx
x dx dxdX
x dx dx dx
 
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
(2b)
The Stackelberg equilibrium in the case that firm 1 is the leader, corresponds to
δ2 equals zero and δ1 equals minus one half. To have a full description of the model we
need to determine whether the output and the permit markets are competitive or not. In 
what follows we study each case separately. Specifically we analyze a competitive 
output market in subsection 2.3.2 and imperfect competition in the output market in 
subsection 2.3.3
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2.3.2 Competitive Output Market
In this subsection we study the case in which the output market is competitive,
which in turn, gives raise to two different scenarios depending on whether the permit 
market is competitive or not.
Competitive permit market
We consider first that both markets (output and permit) are competitive. Let β be
the discount factor. Firm i faces the following two-period profit maximization problem
     
   
1 1 1 1 1 1, , ,
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1
1
2
,
               ,
. .            
                
                0
                0
i i i ix e y B
i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i
i
i
Max P X x C x e p y
P X x C x e cx p y
s t B S e y
B S e y B
B
B

  
    
  
   


(3)
Let λj and μj be the multipliers on the equality and inequality constraints 
respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to the variables that are linked to the
emissions permit market (y,e,B) are the following:
 1 1 1iFOC y p 
   1 1 1 1
1
i i
i
C
FOC e e f p
e


    

 2 2 2iFOC y p  
   2 2 2 2
2
i i
i
C
FOC e e f p
e
 

    

 1 1 2 1 0iFOC B      
 2 2 2 0iFOC B    
(4)
	
(5)
	
(6)
	
(7)
	
(8)
	
(9)
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1 1 1 10; 0; 0i iB B   
2 20; 0iB  
(10)
	
(11)
	
We assume throughout the analysis that all agents’ marginal abatement costs are
strictly positive and therefore, it is not optimal for any firm to keep unused permits by
the end of period 2. That is the reason why the conditions in Equation (11) differ from
those in Equation (10).
As it is shown in the previous literature, under the assumption of competitive
markets, cost effectiveness is achieved regardless of the allocation rule chosen
(Montgomery 1972). In our case this result straightforwardly follows from equations (5)
and (7) which are the standard conditions, according to which the marginal cost of
abatement equals the permit price and therefore the marginal cost is equalized across
firms. In our framework this equality holds every period regardless of the value of S.
Using equations (4) and (6) into equation (8) and taking into account that the 
multiplier μ is non negative, we conclude that if the problem has a unique solution, the
present value permit prices are not decreasing over time. Formally
1 2 1 0p p   
In a similar way, it can be established by using equations (5) and (7) into 
equation (8) that the marginal abatement cost is not increasing over time in present
value
1
1 2
0
i i
C C
e e
 
 
  
 
According to equations (10) and (11) the amount of banked permits in any
period can be positive only if the multiplier μ for that period is zero. This is in line with 
one of the results in Cronshaw & Kruse (1996). They stated “Suppose that one of the
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firms is not subject to profit regulation. Then that firm is only willing to bank permits if
the futures price is the same in the two periods, or equivalently if the spot price rises 
with the rate of interest” (p. 185). It should be also noted that in this case, the present 
value of marginal abatement cost is also equated among periods. In our case, it is 
rational to bank permits only in the first period, not in the second, as the economic value
of remaining permits at the end of the second period is zero.
Imperfect Competition in the Permit Market
Now we consider that there is market power in the permit market and 
specifically, that firm 1 is a dominant firm, and firm 2 is a price taker.8 The dominant
firm solves the following problem with regard to the emissions permit market:
(12)
	
while taking into account the follower´s demand for permits.
The static one-period model addressed by Hahn (1984) can be seen as a
particular case of this framework by considering β = 0 and not allowing for banking. 
We start by analyzing this case and in this way, we adapt our model to represent the
seminal Hahn (1984) static framework. The follower FOC´s are exactly the same as in
equations (4) and (5). Now firm 1´s problem can be stated as:
   
 
1 11 11 11
11 11 11 21 21
 ,
. .       
pMin C x e py
s t y e S S e p

    (13)
	
where e21(p) is the follower´s demand function for permits, resulting from the follower´s 
profit maximization problem.
8 Qualitatively similar results that can be obtained if firm 2 is interpreted as a fringe of competitive firms
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The leader´s FOC with respect to p yields
	
11 21 11 11 21
11
11 21 1 11 21 1
0
e e y e eC
p y
e e p e e p
    
  
      (14)
	
This is the first Hahn (1984) result. He stated “Suppose that there is one firm 
with market power. If it does not receive an amount of permits equal to the number that
it holds in equilibrium, then the total expenditure on abatement will exceed the cost-
minimizing solution.” (Proposition 1 p. 756)
A simple manipulation in equation (14) makes Hahn´s statement clear in our
model:
11 21
11
21 11
1 0
e eC
p y
e e p
  
       
   
The dominant firm equals its marginal abatement cost to the permit price only
when there is no trade (y11 = 0)
The second Hahn´s result says that for the case where a regular interior
minimum exists, a transfer of permits from any of the price takers to the firm with
market power will result in an increase in the equilibrium price. This result can be
immediately shown by differentiating (14). 
1
2 22
21 21 21
1 2 2 2
11 11 1 11 1 1
2
e e ep C C
p
S e p e p p

            
            
             
Note that the expression in brackets is just the second order condition and must
be positive for a minimum. An immediate corollary to this result is that the number of
permits that the firm with market power uses will increase as its initial allocation of
permits is increased.
We have already seen that when permit markets are competitive, as in 
Montgomery (1972), the distribution of permits is strictly an equity issue, but as soon as 
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we relax the perfect competition assumption, the distribution of permits matters, with 
regard not only to equity considerations but also to cost.  
Let us now consider a two period framework with banking and borrowing. For
convenience denote gross emissions (i.e. emissions in the absence of abatement 
activities) as Z and emission units abated as q. Then net emissions equal the difference
between gross emissions (Z) and abatement (q). 
ij ij ije Z q  (15)
	
Taking into account that it is optimal for both firms not to keep permits at the 
end of the second period, firm 2 faces the following constraint
 21 22 21 22 21 22 21 22q q Z Z S S y y       (16)
	
Consider the situation where firm 2 is a net buyer of permits, which implies that 

21 22 0y y  . In this case firm 2 solves the following problem 
(17)
	
The FOC´s of this problem are:
	
 21 1FOC y p 
 21
21
C
FOC q
q


 

 22 2FOC y p  
 22
22
C
FOC q
q
 

 

(18)
	
(19)
	
(20)
	
(21)
	
Equations (18) and (20) imply that the present value price of permits must be
constant over time in equilibrium. Equations (19) and (21) show that it is optimal for
firm 2 in equilibrium to abate emissions until the present value of marginal abatement 
costs equals the present value price of permits. These are again the previously shown 
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results of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996). From equations (18) to (21) we can get the 
permit price as a function of the correspondent abated quantities.
The dominant firm faces a constraint similar to the follower´s
 11 12 11 12 11 12 11 12q q Z Z S S y y       (22)
	
The leader minimizes the cost of abatement in both periods minus the income
from selling permits. From equations (18) to (21) we can get permit prices as a function 
of the correspondent traded permits
         
 
11 11 12 12 11 11 1 21 11 12 12 2 22 12, , ,
1 2
 , ,
. .                     . 22
                         
q y q y
j j
Min C x q p y y C x q p y y
s t Eq
y y
    
 
(23)
The first order conditions show the following results:
	
 
 1 21 21 11 1 21
11 21 11
p y yC
y p y
q y y
 
 
  
 
 2 22 22 12 2 22
12 22 12
p y yC
y p y
q y y
 
 
  
(24)
	
(25)
	
In words, it is optimal for the dominant firm in equilibrium to abate emissions
until the present value of marginal abatement cost in each period equals the present 
value of the marginal revenue from selling permits.
The follower´s marginal abatement costs will exceed the marginal abatement
costs of the dominant firm in each period. The dominant firm sells too few quotas and 
hence abates too little compared to a cost-effective distribution of abatement across
agents. This result is equivalent to the one in Hagem & Westskog (1998). According to 
them, “in the banking and borrowing system the monopolist extracts the full monopoly
rent from the total sale of permits over both periods.” (p. 95)
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2.3.3 Imperfect Competition in the Output Market
Consider now that the output market is imperfectly competitive. To analyze this 
case let us come back to problem (3).
Competitive permit market
We keep the assumption that the permit market is competitive and therefore
equations (4) to (11) hold. With regard to the output market, we consider conjectural 
variations in line with equation (2a). This problem yields the following necessary
conditions for an optimal solution:
   11 1 1
1 1
1 0i i
i
dP C
FOC x P x
dX x


    

   22 2 2
2 2
1 0i i
i
dP C
FOC x P x
dX x


    

(26)
	
(27)
	
Several authors have noted that the output market structure matters when 
considering the efficiency of CAP policies. Meunier (2011) based his analysis on the
observation of the EUETS and concluded that even if the firms are price takers in the 
permit market, the integration of these permit markets can decrease welfare because of
imperfect competition in the product markets. A qualitative equivalent result can be
obtained in our framework. To this aim, let us consider that i = 1,2 represent polluting
product markets instead of agents and there are ni different firms in each of them. We
denote by Xi the aggregate quantity of good i produced at market i and by Pi (Xi) the
inverse demand function, which is assumed to satisfy the conditions required to ensure
existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Particularly the price function is not
too convex and quantities are strategic substitutes. (See Meunier 2011 for details)
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In each market a CAP is implemented with the local price of emissions denoted 
as pi. Let us assume the static version of our canonical model with β = 0 and assume
that there is no allocation of free permits, (Si = 0). Then, problem (3) becomes:
     , ,
                
i i i i i i i i ix e
i i
Max P X x C x e p y
e y
 

(28)
	
If we consider the same cost function for all agents, the equilibrium is symmetric
in the sense that output and emissions are equally distributed among firms on each
output market. Therefore individual quantities are given by Xi/ni and individual
emissions by Ei/ni where Ei is the overall quantity of emissions in market i = 1,2.
Total quantity produced can be written as a function of total emissions Xi*(Ei) as 
the unique solution of the following equation
,i i i ii i
i ii i
X C X EP P n nn x
     
  
(29)
	
The demand for permits of each firm in market i, as a function of the permit 
price Ei*(pi) is implicitly determined by the following condition
    * * *, , 1,2i i ii i ii
i ii
X E pC E p
p in ne
 
   
   
(30)
The welfare implications of the interaction of a competitive market for emission
permits with an oligopolistic product market can be analyzed with the introduction of
the following welfare function:
   1 2 1 2, , , ,i ii i i
i ii
X EW X X E E Z X n C n n
    
 
 (31)
Welfare is the sum of surpluses net of production cost. Gross surplus from 
consumption is V(X) with dV/dX = P(X). The optimal allocation of emissions denoted 
(E1*, E2*) solves the following problem:
      1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2, , , ,   . . E EMax W X E X E E E s t E E E  (32)
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On each market i = 1, 2 an additional unit of emissions increases the local net 
surplus by:
*
i i i i
i
i i ii
dW C X CP x E edE
         
(33)
	
The first term is the effect related to market power. An additional permit
increases production and because of the existence of market power, this has a strictly
positive effect on welfare.
If it is interior, the optimal allocation of emissions satisfies the first order condition
* *
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
C X C C X CP Px E e x E e
                       
(34)
With an integrated permit market, local permit prices are equalized and the
marginal costs of emissions for each firm are equalized across output markets. If the 
difference between the product price and the marginal cost is not the same in both 
markets, then the market allocation does not satisfy Eq. (34) and welfare is lower than 
in Eq. (32). This is the result of Meunier (2011), which says that the integration of
markets does not increase welfare in general. The inefficiency of an integrated permit
market arises from the divergence between price and marginal cost and the sensitivity of 
production to emissions.
Ehrhart et al (2008) investigate the effect of a permit price increase on firms´
profit and consumer surplus under the assumption of imperfect competition in the
product market. The influence of an increase of the permit price on firm´s profit is
ambiguous because there are two counteracting effects. A negative effect is due to more
expensive permit purchasing costs and a positive effect is due to higher revenues in the
output markets. This positive effect is directly related to the imperfect competition
product market because a permit price increase will lead to a decreasing output level,
and to an increase in the output price. That means a revenue increase in an imperfect 
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competition market. Under particular conditions a higher permit price will make firms´
profit increase and consumer´ surplus and social welfare decrease.
To derive these findings in our framework we solve problem (28) in two stages
by backward induction. In the second stage, the cost minimization problem for firm “i”
is given by:
 ,         . .   0
ie i i i i
Min C x e pe s t e  (35)
	
Marginal cost of emissions equals permit price which is the FOC in a
competitive market. Based on the conditions stated in Eq. (1), the cost function is
convex in emissions and the second order condition is always fulfilled. Let us denote ei* 
the emissions amount that minimizes abatement costs
In the first stage we solve the profit maximization problem given by:
      
*
, , , ,i i i i i i i ix x pMax P x x x TC x e x p   (36)
	
The FOC for maximization is:
	
   
   ,
1 0i i ii i i
i
P x x TC x p
P x x x
X x
 
  
    
 
(37)
The equilibrium is symmetric and so we can write xi = x-i = x 
*. Differentiating
the profit function, and taking into account Eq. (37) yields
      
 * * ** * * * * 22 , 1
P xd x TC
P x x TC x p x
dp X p p

  
   
  
(38)
The sign of (38) is ambiguous. The condition for being positive is:
	
 
 
 
   
*
* *
*
* * *
2
1
0
2 ,
3
i
i
i
i i
P x
x eX e
xP x TC x p
X x x


 
     
  
     
(39)
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which is Ehrhart et al (2008) result. They stated “ that under certain parameter
ranges, a higher permits price induces higher firm profits for all types of expected 
competition, with the exception of a monopoly scenario (δ = 1).” (p. 352)
As it was defined in Eq (31), welfare is the sum of surpluses net of production
cost.
     
2 * *
1 2 0
, , 2 ,
x
W x x p P z dz TC x p

 
Independent of the effects on firms’ profits, an increasing permit price never 
leads to an increase in social welfare, because the negative effect on the consumers’
surplus always outweighs the possibly increasing profits.
 
 
   * * * **1 2 *
*
, ,, ,
2 2 2 2 0
TC x p TC x pW x x p dx
P x
p x dp p
  
    
    
(40)
This is the second Ehrhart et al (2008) result. We investigate in chapter 3, the same 
problem under a different market structure. Specifically we use a Stackelberg model 
which is asymmetrical in nature instead of the Cournot symmetrical model we have just
shown.
2.4 A Particular Model with Endogenous Permit Prices
The model used in previous sections has allowed us to show some of the main
results provided by the literature, but we need to introduce some specific production and
abatement functions to study how different technologies influence the oligopolistic
firm´s behavior and markets equilibrium. These particular functions will be used in this
chapter to get a more precise view of the connections between the output market and the 
permit market. And they will also be used in chapters 3 and 4 to analyze in more detail
some aspects within a duopoly Stackelberg model. 
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In the output market we keep a duopolistic framework, with linear demand. The
inverse demand function is P = a – bX. On the production side we assume that the firms
face a constant marginal cost of production c. Gross emissions are assumed to be
proportional to the firms´ output, (rxi), where r is the pollution intensity, which is
assumed to be common for both firms. The firms can reduce emissions by either
reducing output or reducing emissions. A quadratic abatement function is used. Firm i´s
total abatement cost is (d + tqi)qi, where qi is firm´s total abatement.
The profit maximization problem considered in Equation (3) becomes
(3a)
The corresponding Kuhn Tucker conditions from equations (4) to (11) and (26)
to (27) take the following form:
 1 1 1iFOC y p 
  11 1 1 12 2i i i
p d
FOC q d tq p q
t

    
   1 1 1 11i iFOC x P bx c rp    
 2 2 2iFOC y p  
    22 2 2 22 2i i i
p d
FOC q d tq q
t
 

     
   2 2 2 21i iFOC x P bx c rp    
 1 1 2 1 0iFOC B      
 2 2 2 0iFOC B    
(4a)
	
(5a)
	
(26a)
	
(6a)
	
(7a)
	
(27a)
	
(8a)
	
(9a)
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1 1 1 10; 0; 0i iB B   
2 20; 0iB  
(10a)
	
(11a)
	
From equations (26a) and (27a) it is trivial to see that the product price is 
increasing in the permit price, as a simple algebraic manipulation yields the following 
values for the output market equilibrium:
 
   11 1
1 1
1 2
2
1 3
a c rpP c rp
X P
b

 
   
   
 
(41)
Permit market equilibrium is obtained under the assumption that both firms are
the only agents operating in the emissions permit market and they are price takers. 
Therefore the market is closed based on the following condition:
     1 2 1 2 11 21 12 22 0r X X S S q q q q        (42)
	
Total output in each period is given by:
	
 
 
2
  
3
j
j
a c rp
X
b 
 


(43)
	
From the first order conditions, abatement is a function of the permit price, and
using Eq. (5a) and Eq. (7a) into Eq. (42) and Eq. (43) lead us to the permit price.
     
   
2 2
1 2
2 2 2
8 2 3 2
 
1 4 2 3
rt a c b S S t dt
p
r t bt

 
      
    
(44)
From this equation we can analyze and compare the endogenous permit price in
the different market structures, represented by the parameter δ. From Eq (43) we know 
that total output is decreasing in both the permit price and the conjectural variation 
parameter.
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LEMMA 1
The quantities abated and the permit price decrease as the product market becomes less
competitive. They are decreasing at a decreasing rate.
PROOF 
We show in the Appendix at the end of this chapter that the sign of the derivative of p
with respect to δ in (44) is unambiguously negative for both periods.
PROPOSITION 1
The price of permits is higher when the product market is controlled by a Stackelberg
leader than in the case of a cartel. It is also higher than the case of a Cournot
competition. But it is lower if the product market is competitive.
PROOF 
We show in the Appendix that in the Stackelberg model the corresponding product
output and permit price become:
 3
  
4
j
j
a c rp
X
b
 
 (45)
   
 
2 2
1 2
2 2 2
6 4 2
 
1 3 4
rt a c b S S t dt
p
r t bt
     
   
(46)
Then the comparison of Equation (46) with the different values of Equation (44)
yields the result. Details of these comparisons can be found in the Appendix.
The permit price level under different market structures follows the same 
behavior as the total quantities produced in each type of market. As the equilibrium
output quantities decrease so the permit prices do. It is worth noting that the permit
price depends on the output technology (parameter c) and the abatement technology
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(parameters d and t) which are assumed to be the same for both firms. Therefore only
the total output quantity matters regardless the output of any single firm.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has described the role played by market competition within CAT
programs, paying special attention to the interaction between two related markets. One
is the tradable permits market and the other one is the polluting product market 
associated to it. And the market power issue affects to both of them. Along this chapter 
and within the framework of a canonical model, we have reviewed some of the main 
results provided by the literature about the impact that imperfect competition has over 
the effectiveness of this type of environmental policy.
Another goal of this chapter was to set up a specific model with a double 
objective. First we have used this model as a unified framework to address some of the 
main literature results related to the effect of different market structures on the 
effectiveness of a CAP program. Secondly we want to use this model as the base for our
investigation within the next two chapters. In this sense, the conjectural variations 
model provides a natural framework to make comparisons between different oligopolies 
structures.     
We have also analyzed in a particular but rather standard model how market
power in the polluting product market affects the price in the emissions market. Our
analysis shows that the permit price level under different market structures follows the
same behavior as the quantities produced. As the equilibrium output quantities decrease
so the permit prices do. We have analyzed four different structures that we enumerate 
from higher to lower equilibrium output quantities (from higher to lower price of
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permits): A competitive market, a Stackelberg oligopoly, a Cournot oligopoly and a
cartel. 
This result is based on the assumption that product and abatement cost functions
are the very same for both firms. Therefore only the total quantity produced affects the 
price of permits regardless each firm output. In the following chapters we will address 
this issue considering different production and abatement technologies between agents. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the following changes to simplify the expression of the emissions permits
price in period 2.
 
 
 
 
2
2
1 2
2 2
8
2 2
1 4
1 2
A r a c t
B b S S t dt
C r t
D bt


 
    
 
 
Now equation (44) and its partial derivative with respect to delta becomes
(A1)
A > 0 Note that (a – c - rp2) must be positive if product quantities are positive. C and D 
are unambiguously positive. The sign of B is ambiguous.
Assume (A1) is positive. Therefore B must be negative and –BC > AD. If this is the 
case we have the following inequality
       
   
     
2 2 2 2
1 2
2
1 2
2
1 2
2 2 1 4 8 1 2
2 2
2 2 0
b S S t dt r t r a c t bt
S S t dt r a c t
rdt a c t S S rt rd a c
         
      
       
But the last expression must be negative if product quantity is positive because
	
   2 20 2 0 0 0ia c rp a c r d tq a c rd rd a c                (A2)
We have used equation (7a) to substitute p2 in (A2)
2
12 2 1222
p d
q p d tq
t

   
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We conclude that AD > -BC and (A1) is negative.
	
To see that is decreasing at a decreasing rate, we just take the second order derivative
	
 
 
2
2
32
2
0
3
D BC ADp
C D 

 
    
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider firm 1 as the Stackelberg leader. The conjectural variations are δ2 = 0
and δ1 = -1/2. Based on Eq. (26a) the total output for the first period is:
     1 1 1 1 1 1
1 11 21
2 3P c rp P c rp P c rp
X x x
b b b
     
     (A3)
And the corresponding product price is:
 1
1 1
3
4
a c rp
P a bX
 
  
Leading to the standard Stackelberg result where the leader is producing a double 
quantity than the follower as long as the marginal product cost is the same.
 11 1
1 11 21
3
2 4 4
a c rpa c rp a c rp
X x x
b b b
    
     (A4)
	
Now Eq. 36 becomes
	
   1 2 1 2
1 2
3 3
0
4 4
a c rp a c rp p d p d
r S S
b b t t
      
      
 
And taking into account that p1 = βp2 the last expression lead us to
      22
1 2
1 26 3 1
0
4 4
p da c rp
r S S
b b t
    
     
 
Therefore second period permit price is
	
   
 
   
 
2 2
1 21 2
2 2 2 2
6 4 26 4 2
1 3 4 1 3 4
rt a c b S S t dtrt a c b S S t d
p
r t b r t bt 
            
         
(A5)
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We make the second expression for comparison purposes.
	
Consider the following changes to simplify the expression of the emissions permit price
	
in period 2.
	
 
 
 
 
2
2
1 2
2 2
2
1
1 2
A rt a c
B b S S t dt
C r t
D bt


 
    
 
 
A > 0 Note that (a – c - rp2) must be positive if product quantities are positive. C and D 
are unambiguously positive. The sign of B is ambiguous.
The simplified expression for Equation (A5) is
  2
6 4
1 3 2
S A Bp
C D


 
(A6)
	
Now we proceed to compare the Stackelberg permit price with other oligopolistic
structures. The conjectural variation for a Cournot competition takes δ = 0 in Equation
38 and the permit price simplified form is 
  2
8 6
1 4 3
C A Bp
C D


 
(A7)
	
The comparison shows that the Stackelberg permit price is higher
	
  
  
6 4 4 3 24 18 16 12
6 4 4 3 24 16 18 12
0 18 16 16 18
A B C D AC AD BC BD
A B C D AC AD BC BD
B AD BC AD BC
     
     
    
The result is also valid if B < 0, because we have shown in the proof of Lemma 1 the 
result (AD > –BC). That implies:
2 2 18 16 16 18AD BC AD BC AD BC AD BC       
We apply the same rational to prove that the emission permits price is also higher in the 
Stackelberg model than in the case of a cartel but is lower when the product market is 
competitive.
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The permit price under a cartel structure is:
	
(A8)
	
  2
8 8
1 4 4
Cartel A Bp
C D


 
The comparison with (A6) yields the proposed result
	
  
  
6 4 4 4 24 24 16 16
8 8 3 2 24 16 24 16
0 24 16 16 24
0 24 16 24 16
A B C D AC AD BC BD
A B C D AC AD BC BD
B AD BC AD BC
B AD AD BC BC AD BC
     
     
    
        
The permit price under a competitive structure is
	
  2
8 4
1 4 2
comp A Bp
C D


 
(A9)
	
This price is higher than in Stackelberg
	
  
  
6 4 4 2 24 12 16 8
8 4 3 2 24 16 12 8
0 16 12 12 16
0 4 4
A B C D AC AD BC BD
A B C D AC AD BC BD
B AD BC AD BC
B AD BC
     
     
    
   
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Chapter 3
Imperfect Competition in the Product Market9 
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the existence of scarcity rents and incentives for
firms to collude in order to inflate the price of emission permits under the assumption of
a leader-follower relationship in the output market. Both scarcity rents and price
manipulation have been pointed out as relevant factors in the European Union Emission
Trading System (EU ETS).
The main reason why cap-and-trade (CAT) programs are so attractive and 
popular among economists is that they theoretically allow emissions to be reduced in a
cost-effective way by means of a price system. Regardless of the initial allocation rule
chosen for the permits, the cost-effectiveness property is well documented in the
9 This chapter represents joint work together with Francisco J. André (Universidad Complutense). It is
published in MPRA Paper nº 61770 under the title “Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation
in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition” 
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literature under the assumption of perfect competition (see Montgomery 1972). 
Unfortunately, the perfect-market assumption rarely holds in practice and the cost-
effectiveness property is in fact challenged if there is market power in either the permit 
market, in the associated product market or in both. As it has been discussed in Chapter
2 (Section 2) the literature analyzing the relationship between imperfect competition
and emission permits can be divided in three different branches, depending on whether
market power is introduced in the permit market, in the good market or in both
simultaneously.
This paper fits within the branch of research that considers market power in the
product market, but not in the permit market. The reason to choose this branch is 
twofold. First, as noted by Montero (2009) and Muller et al. (2002), whereas market
power among firms is very common in output markets, the existence of market power in 
emissions permits is more likely to appear when the relevant players are countries rather
than firms or facilities.10 In the latter case, there are normally a very large number of
them, which makes it very difficult for market power to arise. It can be argued that this 
is the case in the EU ETS, with more than 11,000 facilities involved. Moreover, the
latest steps taken by the European Commission seem to be aimed at increasing the 
degree of competition even more (for example, by enlarging the number of involved 
sectors, centralizing the allocation of permits or moving from grandfathering to 
auctioning). On the other hand, among the economic sectors that are subject to the EU 
ETS, it is rather realistic to assume that at least in some of them there is some market
power in the output market (see, e.g. Smale et al. 2006 or Hinterman 2011).
As a second reason for this line of research, the EU-ETS price shock in 2005 
10 As an example regarding Annex 1 countries in the Kyoto Protocol, Russia initially received roughly a 
fifth of the permits and a third went to the USA. Countries with market power can easily manipulate
prices up (down) through tariffs on permit exports (domestic subsidies to cleaner technologies) and also
implement policies regarding the linkage between domestic and foreigner markets. See Montero (2009) or
Barrett (1998) for a related discussion.
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generated a great deal of interest in issues related to market power. Initially, the price of
allowances was far in excess of expectations, but it suddenly fell in April 2006, 
reaching zero in mid-2007. Empirical studies have not been able to perfectly explain
these excessively high price levels when the number of permits exceeded emissions in
every year of the first phase (see, e.g. Ellerman et al. 2010). It is therefore natural to ask
whether the reason for these variations in price might be linked to the output market 
rather than the permit market insofar as permits could somehow be used to obtain
windfall profits in the output market.
The closest paper to ours is the one by Ehrhart et al. (2008), which claims that
under some conditions a permit price increase leads to higher firms’ profit due to a
decrease in product quantities, which in turn increases the output price. This result can
be seen as an important case of scarcity rents. As far as permits are a limited input,
output price will reflect the scarcity value of the permits.11 Due to the tradable nature of
emission permits, some firms can take the opportunity to obtain additional revenues by
selling permits. Empirical evidence suggests that this phenomenon has been rather
important in the first phase of the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS).
For example, Newell et al. (2013) point out that power generators extracted rents by
receiving carbon allowances for free and then passing along the opportunity costs of 
these allowances to their customers. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Ellerman 
and Joskow (2008) or Ellerman et al. (2010).
Ehrhart et al. (2008) show that under some conditions firms benefit from a
higher price of permits even if they are net buyers rather than seller of permits. 
Although an increase in the permit price has the direct effect of increasing one’s cost,
11 See, e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) for a discussion on scarcity rents. In a perfect competition
framework, Mohr and Saha (2008) claim that, via the generation of scarcity rents, a stricter environmental 
regulation might have a distributional impact in the sense of increasing firm's profits and passing the cost 
onto consumers. André et al. (2009) make a similar discussion in a strategic setting with quality
competition.
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seeing as it also raises the rival’s cost, it can generate scarcity rents for both firms by
restricting the quantity and increasing the price of output. They conclude that, under
these conditions, firms have incentives to collude in order to push the price of permits
upwards.
Importantly, Ehrhart et al. (2008) also claim that, although there is apparently no 
explicit market power as such in the EU ETS, there are loopholes in the trading law that
allow collusive behavior among firms to manipulate the price of permits. The most
important of these mechanisms are first, the possibility to influence the initial allocation
of permits (to make it more stringent); second, the ‘opt-in’ rule, which enables
industries not committed to participating in the permits trading system to do so 
voluntarily; third, the possibility to implement project-based mechanisms and pay more
for these credits than they would in the market and fourth, by paying additional 
emissions duties. It has also been argued that price manipulation practices might be
responsible for the variations in price observed during the first phase of the EU ETS.
For example, Hinterman (2011) concludes that the largest electricity producers in
Germany, the UK and the Nordpool market might have found it profitable to manipulate 
the permit price upwards and he claims that this could explain the elevated allowance
price level during the first 18 months of the EU ETS.12
This paper addresses the question as to whether, via the generation of scarcity
rents, firms’ interests could be aligned to push the price of permits up (and therefore if 
there are incentives to collude) under Stackelberg competition in the output market. We
thus investigate whether the colluding incentives reported by Ehrhart et al. (2008) in a
symmetric scenario might still arise in a setting that is asymmetric in nature in the sense 
that there is a leader and a follower. This seems a relevant case to consider seeing as, in 
12 Note, however, that Hinterman's analysis is not fully comparable to ours as he assumes explicit market
power in both output and permit markets.
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the EU ETS, there are some big leading firms together with small firms that probably
act as followers. As an additional contribution of this model, it fills a gap in the
literature by considering Stackelberg competition in the third line of research, among
the three reported above. In fact, leader-follower competition has been addressed in the 
first line by Hahn (1984) and in the second one by Hinterman (2011) but, as far as we
know, it has not been studied in the third line, as we do.
As in Ehrhart et al. (2008), we take the permit price as given and thus we do not 
explicitly model the permit market. Consequently, we restrict ourselves to testing the 
existence of incentives for collusion to manipulate the price of permits rather than 
modeling price manipulation itself or determining if such manipulation has taken place
in practice.
We first use a general model to show that a higher permit price increases the
firms’ cost of purchasing permits but also restricts output and increases the output price, 
generating some scarcity rents. Therefore, the final effect on both the leader’s and the 
follower’s profit is ambiguous. Hence, the possibility that firms benefit from a price
increase still exists as in Ehrhart et al. (2008), but in our case the asymmetric role of the 
firms means that such a possibility arises under different conditions for the leader and 
the follower. This introduces the possibility of one firm being interested in raising and
the other in decreasing the permit price.
We subsequently proceed to explore a particular case with a separable cost 
function to gain more accurate insights. We start with a basic case in which both firms 
have the same cost function and there is no grandfathering. As a first core finding, under 
the reasonable assumption that the solution is interior (both firms produce, pollute and
abate to some extent), we conclude that both firms face a profit function that is convex 
in the permit price. Moreover, within the relevant range, when the price is sufficiently
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low, both firms will benefit from a further price reduction, whereas for sufficiently high 
prices, the follower will benefit from a price increase, while the leader will still prefer
the price to decrease. Hence, in the absence of grandfathering, there is no room for
collusion in the latter range. This is contrary to Ehrhart et al. (2008), which uses a 
symmetric model where both firms’ interests are always aligned. The implication of this 
finding is that the existence of leadership in output markets reduces the room for
collusion in the permit market. In fact, in our specific example with a separable 
function, we conclude that the collusive region shrinks to the extent that it disappears.
As a first extension, we consider the possibility that some permits are distributed
for free (by means of grandfathering) and conclude that this possibility opens up the 
way for collusion. In fact, apart from the two regions identified in the simple case, there
is a third region in which both firms are interested in pushing the price up and this 
region becomes wider the more permits are distributed for free. This result represents an 
important argument against grandfathering insofar as it could introduce incentives to 
foster collusive behavior for price manipulation.
As a second extension, we explore the effect of asymmetries and conclude that
the likelihood of facing an environment that is conductive to collusion is sensitive to the 
cost parameters of both firms and the allocation of free permits received by the leader, 
but not by the follower. In short, those parameter changes that tend to undermine the
leader’s advantage in output production (i.e., an increase in the leader’s cost, or a
decrease in the follower’s cost) have the effect of making the firms more symmetric in a
certain sense and hence increase the likelihood of observing collusive behavior. The
opposite occurs with abatement costs: the likelihood of collusive behavior tends to
decrease with the leader’s abatement cost and to increase with the follower’s. The
reason is that, seeing as the leader produces more output than the follower, its cost is
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more sensitive to the permit price and thus it is more difficult for the former to benefit 
from such a price increase, and this is truer, the higher the leader’s abatement cost. On
the other hand, an increase in the follower’s abatement cost reduces the possibility of its 
being optimal for it to pollute zero, which widens the interior solution range and hence
also the scope for collusion.
Section 2 expounds the basic model. A particular abatement cost function is
considered in Section 3, including the basic case and the two extensions. Concluding 
remarks are given in Section 4. All the mathematical proofs are gathered in the
appendix.
3.2 The general model
Let us consider a simple duopoly Stackelberg model of a polluting industry that 
is subject to a tradable permit system. Firm 1 is a leader and firm 2 is a follower in the 
output market. Following Ehrhart et al. (2008), we assume no explicit market power in 
the permit market and thus the permit price is taken as an exogenous value. The game
has three stages: in the two first stages firms sequentially decide on their output levels,
1x and 2x , a la Stackelberg, facing the inverse demand function  P X , where
and 0
dP
dX
 . In the third stage, they simultaneously choose their cost-
minimizing emission levels, 1e and 2e .
The cost function of firm i ∈ (1, 2),  ,i i iC x e , depends on output (xi) and 
emissions (ei) and is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments with the
following properties:
2 2
2
0 ,     0 ,     0 ,     0.i i i i
i i i i i
C C C C
x e e x e
   
   
    
(1)
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This function integrates production and abatement costs and reflects the fact that 
producing clean (with low emissions) is more costly than producing dirty. Each unit of
emissions must be covered by an emission permit. Initially, each firm i is endowed with 
a given amount of permits Si, and additionally required permits, i ie S , can be obtained 
on the market at a given price, p . Considering the cost of permit purchasing, the total 
cost of firm i is given by
     , : ,i i i i i i i iTC x e C x e p e S   . (2)
	
The model is solved by backward induction. In the third stage of the game, both
	
firms decide on their emissions levels to minimize their total cost,  ,i i iTC x e , while
taking their output levels and the price of permits as given. If the solution is interior, we
obtain the standard first-order condition (FOC),13 
, (3)
	
from which we obtain each firm’s demand for permits,  * ,i ie x p .
14 Total differentiation
of the FOC shows that optimal emissions are increasing in output and decreasing in the
permit price:
2
2 2
22
2
0 0
i
i i i i i
i i
ii i i i
i
C
C C e e x
de dx
Ce e x x
e


   
    
   

, (4)
2
22
2
1
0 0i ii
ii
i
C e
de dp
Ce p
e
  
    
 

. (5)
Using the Envelope Theorem, we conclude that the minimized total cost
	
function defined as
	
13 The second order condition is always fulfilled due to the convexity of Ci in emissions.
	
14 Throughout the paper we use asterisks to denote equilibrium values.
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         * * * *, : , , , , ,
i i i i i i i i i i i
TC x p TC x e x p C x e x p p e x p S      (6)
has the following properties:
*
*i
i i
TC
e Sp

 

, (7)
*
i i i i i
i i i i i
TC C C e C
p
x x e x x
     
    
     
, (8)
	
22
2 * 2 2 2
22 2 2
2
 i
i
i ii i i i
ii i i i i i
i
C
TC x eC C e C
Cx x x e x x
e
 
           
     

, (9)
2
2 * 2
2
2
0i
i
i i i i
ii i i
i
C
TC C e x e
Cx p x e p
e


    
  
    

. (10)
	
We now move on to the first and the second stages, in which the firms choose
their output levels. The follower faces the following maximization problem:
      
2
* *
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2, , , , ,
x
Max x x e x p p P x x x TC x p    . (11)
The FOC of this problem is
*
2
2
2
0
TCdP
P x
dX x

  

, (12)
which, solving for 2x , gives the reaction function of the follower,  2 1
Rx x , p . 
Differentiating the FOC and operating, we conclude that the optimal follower’s output
is decreasing in the leader’s output and the price of permits:
2
2
21
2
2
0
2
R
dP
x dX
TCdPx
dX x


 



,
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
0
2
R
TC
x x p
TCdPp
dX x

  
 



. (13)
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Finally, in the first stage, the leader takes the follower’s reaction function into 
account when maximizing its own profit. The FOC of the corresponding problem is
  2 11 2 1
1 1
1 0
Rx TCdP
P x x x
dX x x
  
     
  
, (14)
from which we obtain the leader’s optimal output as a function of the permit price, 
By differentiating (14), we conclude that the leader’s output supply is also
decreasing in the price of permits:
 *1x p . 
1
1
2 *
*
1 1
2 *
2
2
1 1
0
2
R
TC
dx x p
TCdp xdP
dX x x

 
 
 
  
  
. (15)
Equations (13) and (15) show how the leader and the follower react to a permit 
price increase. While the follower only takes into account the effect of its own output
variation on the output price, the leader incorporates, not only its own, but also the 
follower’s. This tends to make the denominator smaller in absolute value and, hence,
the whole value of (15) greater in absolute value. 
Using the equilibrium output values we can express the profit of both firms 
solely as a function of the permit price:  *1 p ,  
*
2 p . We are now ready to address 
the main question of this paper, namely the effect of an increase in the price of permits
on firm's profit. The question is: could both firms benefit simultaneously from a price
increase as predicted by Ehrhart et al. (2008) in a symmetric setting? The motivation
behind this question is that, if the answer happens to be positive, both firms might have
incentives to collude in order to manipulate the price of permits upwards. For the sake
of realism, it is relevant to ask this question in a setting in which the firms play different
roles regarding their market power, as this situation is commonly observed in the real
world and, specifically, in the EU ETS. As in Ehrhart et al. (2008), we do not model
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explicitly price manipulation. We simply test for the existence of firms’ incentives to do
so.
By direct differentiation of the profit functions, and dropping the terms that 
cancel out due to the FOCs, we conclude that the marginal effect of the price of permits
on both firms’ profit has two effects: on the one hand, it drives cost up, which tends to
reduce firm's profit. On the other hand, however, it also causes output to decrease and 
therefore the product price to increase, which is beneficial for both firms. Formally,
 1
1
*
* *2
1 1 1
R
SR
d xdP
x e S
dp dX p
 
  

 2
2
* *
* *1
2 2 2
SR
d dxdP
x e S
dp dX dp

  
, (16)
	
. (17)
	
The first summand in equations (16) and (17) can be seen as the scarcity rents 
from the point of view of firms 1 and 2 respectively (SR1 and SR2), i.e., the additional
revenue that each firm will receive thanks to the reduction in output supply. It is 
interesting to note that a higher value of p causes the output of both firms to decrease
but each firm can only benefit from the effect that is due to the rival’s output reduction.
The reason is that decreasing the own output has a positive effect (increasing the price
and decreasing the cost) and a negative effect (decreasing the number of sold units) and
in equilibrium both effects cancel out as both firms are at the profit maximizing output
level. Note also that the effect of a price increase on the follower’s output has two 
components: a direct one and an indirect one through the leader’s output. Formally,
* *
2 2 2 1
1
R Rdx x x dx
dp p x dp
 
 
 
. Nevertheless, the latter effect is already accounted for in the
leader’s optimizing process and hence only the former matter to determine the leader’s 
scarcity rent.
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Direct comparison of (16) and (17) shows that 
 *
2 1
1 2 , ,Rx p x p
SR SR     , where
,A B denotes the elasticity of A with respect to B , i.e., a firm can enjoy more scarcity
rents than its rival if its rival’s output is more sensitive to the permit price than its own 
output.
The second term in (16) and (17) is the marginal increase in cost due to a higher 
permit price, which simply equals each firm’s purchase of permits. It determines which 
part of the scarcity rents is captured by each firm. In the most favorable case, if all the
permits were distributed for free, *i ie S , then the marginal impact of p on the cost 
would be zero and each firm would capture the whole available scarcity rent. 
The sign of both (16) and (17) is ambiguous. If the first term (the scarcity rent) 
dominates the first (the marginal cost) then profit will increase with the price of permits. 
If this occurs simultaneously for both firms, there exist incentives to collude in order to 
manipulate the price upward, as Ehrhart et al. (2008) noted in a symmetric setting. 
Actually, their analysis is conducted in the absence of free permits ( 0iS  ), which is the
less favorable case for the firms and they conclude that, even in this case, the net effect 
might be positive. According to our interpretation, the question is to determine to what
extent a higher permit price generates enough scarcity rents for both firms to
compensate for the higher cost of purchasing permits.
Equations (16) and (17) also show that the conditions under which a higher price
is profit-enhancing are different for the leader and the follower. This is due, not only to
the fact that they may have different cost structures, but also to the fact that their 
reactions to a price increase, given in (13) and (15), are different. This opens up the
possibility of disagreement between the firms insofar as one of them is interested in a
price increase and the other one in a price decrease. This is contrary to Ehrhart et al.
(2008), in which both firms are symmetric and therefore either both firms are better-off 
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or both are worse-off after a price increase. Hence, the introduction of asymmetry seems
to reduce the scope for collusion. At this level of generality, it is not possible to gain 
more specific insights. For that reason, we explore a specific case in the next section.
3.3 A Separable Function  
To gain some additional insight, we assume now a separable cost function. As is 
done in Ehrhart et al. (2008), we initially consider a basic case with no grandfathering
( 1 2 0S S  ) and the same cost functions for both firms, so that the only difference
between them is due to their roles as leader and follower. After studying this basic case,
we first explore the effect of distributing free permits to the firms and second, the 
consequences of considering cost asymmetries.
3.3.1 Basic case
Let us assume that production and abatement costs are separable in the following
way. The production cost of firm i is given by icx , so there is a constant marginal
production cost equal to c. The (inverse) demand function for output has the linear form 
 P X a bX  . Each unit of output generates r units of pollution, where 0r  is a
constant coefficient of pollution intensity (the gross emissions of firm i are hence given
by rxi). By performing abatement activities, firms can reduce their flow of pollution. Let
us denote as qi ≥ 0 the amount of emissions abated by firm i. Thus, net emissions are
given by ei = rxi – qi. Following Sarzetakis (1997), we assume the following quadratic
abatement cost function, which is common to both firms:
   i i iAC q q d tq  , (18)
where d and t are positive parameters. Adding up all the costs we have the cost function
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      ,i i i i i i i i iTC x e cx rx e d t rx e pe      . (19)
To ensure an interior solution, we bound the relevant parameters by including
the following technical assumption:
Assumption 1:  d p p  , where  * *2 2: / , 0p p e x p  . (20)
This assumption rules out uninteresting solutions in which either of the firms
produces zero, pollutes zero or abates zero. The lower bound for p prevents abatement
from being negative (see Equation (22) below). To understand this result, note that d is
the marginal cost of abatement at 0iq  . If the price of permits is even lower than the 
cost of the first unit of abatement it will never be profitable for the firms to abate, as
buying permits is a cheaper option. The upper bound for is defined as that value ofp
the permit price such that, in equilibrium, it is optimal for the follower to pollute zero.15 
The reason to include this assumption is that, in our setting, the follower’s emissions is
the first variable to reach a zero value as p increases and hence this is a sufficient 
condition to ensure a nonnegative solution.16 
Proceeding as in the general model, we first solve the third stage, in which both
firms choose their emission levels. Endowed with our specific analytical expressions,
we can compute the optimal amount of emissions of firm i as a function of output:
 * ,
2i i i
p d
e x p rx
t

  , (21)
and it is straightforward to conclude that firm i’s optimal abatement is 
15 The specific expression for p can be found in the appendix. Specifically, it is given by (A3) in the
basic model, but takes a different form in the subsequently developed extensions.
	
16 If both the follower’s abatement and the follower’s net emissions are nonnegative, it is straightforward
	
2rxto conclude that the follower’s gross emissions,
	 , are nonnegative, which implies that the follower’s
output is nonnegative. As we subsequently show, in equilibrium the leader always produces more and
pollutes more than the follower and thus Assumption 1 ensures that all the relevant variables of the model 
are nonnegative in equilibrium.
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 * 0
2i
p d
q p
t

  , 1,2,i  (22)
	
which, due to separability, is independent of output and, due to cost symmetry, is 
common for both firms. Using (21) in (19), we obtain the expression for the minimized
cost function, which reveals that the marginal product cost is constant in output and
increasing in permit price:
   
 
2
* ,
4i i i
p d
TC x p x c pr
t

   . (23)
	
We now move on to solve the two first stages, in which both firms decide on
their output levels. By standard methods,17 we obtain
*
1 2
a c rp
x
b
 

*
2 4
a c rp
x
b
 

, (24)
	
. (25)
	
From (24) and (25), we conclude that the leader’s output is twice that of the 
follower’s, as in the classical Stackelberg model with linear demand and constant 
marginal cost, both firms’ output depend positively on the demand intercept, a, and
negatively on the demand slope, b, and all the cost parameters c, r and p. The
equilibrium profits can be now be written as a function of the price of permits, defined
as:
     * * * * * *1 2: ,i i i ip a b x x x TC x p       . (26)
Using our specific functions to substitute in (16) and (17) we obtain
*
*
* *
2 2
i
i
i
i i
SR e
r p d
x rx
dp t

 
   , (27)
17 The follower chooses x2 to maximize its profit while taking x1 as given. The leader chooses x1 to
maximize its own profit taking into account the follower’s reaction function.
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from which we conclude that the scarcity rent due to the rise in the permit price that 

accrue to firm i is given by
*
2
irx . The second and the third terms in (27) determine the 
marginal increase in cost due to permit purchasing. The second term is gross emissions
and measure how much cost would increase in the absence of abatement. Finally, the 
third term measures how much the firms are able to save by performing abatement 
activities.
There are some straightforward insights that we can get from equation (27). 
First, if the firms were not able to abate (and thus the third term would be absent), 
scarcity rents by themselves would never be able to compensate for the cost increase
and thus firms would never benefit from a higher permit price. Second, the positive
abatement effect is increasing in the price of permits, which means that the higher the 
permit price the more firms can gain by using abatement to adapt themselves to the 
market conditions.
As a third important insight, the simple form of equation (27) allows a
straightforward comparison between the effects on the leader’s and the follower’s profit. 
Indeed, simple manipulation of (27), together with (24) and (25) gives 
 
 
1 2
* *
* *
1 2 02 8
r a c rpr
x x
dp dp b
   
       , (28)
where the inequality always holds under interior solution. Thus, we conclude that a rise
in the permit price will always benefit the follower more than the leader or will harm the
leader more than the follower. According to (28), the reason for this result lies in the
output difference: since the leader produces more output than the follower it also 
pollutes more and, therefore, its cost is more sensitive to a higher permit price.
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To study the effect on firms’ incentives, we conduct now a more detailed study
of the profit functions. For notational convenience, we denote as ˆ ip the value of the
permit price that minimizes firm i’s profit. Formally,
 *ˆ : arg mini i
p
p p  1,2i  . (29)
	
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 show the main results of this part of the paper. 
Lemma 1 determines the shape of the equilibrium profit functions in terms of the permit
price and Proposition 1 splits the relevant range in two regions with different
consequences for the firms’ interests regarding the evolution of .p
LEMMA 1 
 *1 p and  
*
2 p are strictly convex functions of p with 2 1ˆ ˆd p p p   .
PROPOSITION 1
	
If 2ˆd p p  , a price decrease will make the profit of both firms increase. If
	
2pˆ p p  , a price increase will decrease the leader’s profit and increase the
	
follower’s profit.
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Region II
 *1 p
 *2 p
d
i
p
Region I
1pˆ p2pˆ
FIGURE 3.1: Equilibrium profits as a function of p (basic case)
The results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are shown in Figure 1. There are two 
important facts worth highlighting in this figure. First, profits are strictly convex in p
with a minimum at ˆ ip (for i=1, 2). As it can be concluded from equation (27), the 
convex shape of the profit functions is a direct implication of the firm’s reaction to a
price increase by abating more and purchasing fewer permits.
The second insight from Figure 1 is that the minima of the profit functions are
unambiguously ordered such that 2pˆ < 1pˆ ; i.e., the follower reaches a minimum for a
lower price than the leader. Hence, we have that, if p < 2pˆ , both firms are situated in the 
decreasing part of their profit functions, which implies that their profit will increase if 
the permit price decreases. If, instead, 2pˆ < p < 1pˆ , the follower is situated in the
increasing part (and so will benefit from a price increase), whereas the leader is still in
the decreasing part (and therefore will still prefer the price to decrease). As we can 
conclude form our previous discussion, the reason why firm 2’s profit reaches a
minimum before firm 1’s is that, being a Stackelberg follower, it is optimal for firm 2 to 
produce less than firm 1 and therefore to pollute less. This implies that the direct effect
of a price increase on its cost is less pronounced that it is for the leader.
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Apparently, if p > 1pˆ , the leader enters the increasing part of its profit function 
and both firms will benefit from a higher price. Under our specification, however, we
	
have that 1pˆ p ; i.e., the minimum of the leader’s profit function is reached precisely
	
at the highest value of the price that is compatible with an interior solution (specifically, 

(21) renders e2 < 0 for any 1ˆp p ) and hence there is no feasible range under which 
both firms will benefit from a price increase. 
Regarding the existence of incentives for collusion, the main consequence of 
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 is that, in our example, there is a range within which both
firms are interested in decreasing the price but, unlike the symmetric case developed by
Ehrhart el al. (2008), it is never the case that both firms simultaneously profit from a
price increase. Therefore, they never have incentives to collude in order to push the
price up. Moreover, there is a range of disagreement within which the interests of both
firms diverge, which can never occur in the symmetric case.
In this example, we have shown how asymmetry between firms (in the form of a
leader-follower relationship) reduces the likelihood of collusive behavior to such an
extent that they disappear. In the next subsections, we show two generalizations of this 
example in which the result is not so extreme in the sense that the likelihood of
collusion, though smaller than in a purely symmetric setting, does not fully disappear.
3.3.2 Grandfathering
In the basic case, for the sake of comparability with Ehrhart et al. (2008), we
have assumed that firms do not have any initial allocation of permits and therefore have
to buy all the permits they need on the market. In reality, it is common for the 
participants in CAP systems to receive some permits for free by means of a
grandfathering scheme. In fact, as is discussed for example in Alvarez and André
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(2014), grandfathering has traditionally been the most widespread method used to 
distribute permits.
We now extend our setting to consider the possibility that some permits are
initially distributed with no cost for the firms via a grandfathering scheme.18 Hence, 
firms need only buy those permits that exceed their initial allocation and, moreover, 
they have the option to sell permits if they pollute less than their initial allocation.
Let us consider that both firms receive an equal allocation of free permits, S , 
and denote as iy the amount of permits that firm i buys (if 0iy  ) or sells (if 0iy  ) 
on the market, which can be calculated as the difference between net emissions and the 
allocation of permits:
i i i iy e S rx q S     , (30)
	
from which we have that i ie y S  ; i.e., the net emissions of a firm must be covered 

by permits that either come from its free allocation or are bought on the market. 
Therefore, firm i’s total cost function is now given by the expression
      ,i i i i i i i i iTC x y cx rx y S d t rx y S py        , (31)
which can be written in terms of output and net emissions as
	
        ,i i i i i i i i iTC x e cx rx e d t rx e p e S       . (32)
Solving the third stage of the game, we conclude that the optimal levels of
emissions and abatement for each firm are still given by (21) and (22), respectively, and 
it is straightforward to obtain the optimal traded permits and the corresponding
minimized cost function:
 * ,
2i i i
d p
y x p rx S
t

   , (33)
	
18 Actually, the fact that permits are distributed for free is not crucial for our results. The only important
assumption is that firms enjoy an exogenously given amount of permits.
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   
 
2
* ,
4i i i
p d
TC x p x c pr pS
t

    , (34)
where separability entails that the minimized cost function has the same structure as in 
the basic case, except for the fact that the initial permit endowment appears as a
reduction in the cost. Regarding the sensitivity of profits to the permit price, as we know 
from equations (16) and (17), the inclusion of grandfathering does not affect the overall
value of scarcity rents, but it modifies the cost term and thus has an impact on the part 
of the scarcity rents that each firm is able to capture in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 are the main results of this part of the paper. We still
use the notation introduced in (29) to refer to the value of the permit price that
minimizes each profit function. For notational convenience, we also define the
following threshold value for S:
 
:
8
r a c dr
S
b
 
 . (35)
	
LEMMA 2 
When both firms are initially endowed with the same free allocation of permits, S , the
equilibrium profit functions for both firms are strictly convex with a unique minimum 
each at ˆ ip for 1,2i  , with 
ˆ
0i
p
S



. Moreover, we have the following ordering:
a) If S S , then 2 1ˆ ˆd p p p   .
	
b) If 2S S S  , then 2 1ˆ ˆp d p p   .
c) If 2S S , then 2 1ˆ ˆp p d p   .
PROPOSITION 2
When both firms are initially endowed with a free allocation of permits, the following
results hold:
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a) If S S , the relevant range of values for has three regions: In region I, defined p
by 2ˆd p p  , both firms become better off when p decreases. In region II, defined by
	
2pˆ < p < 1pˆ , the leader becomes better off when p decreases and the follower becomes
better off when p increases. In region III, defined by 1pˆ p p  , both firms become
	
better off when p increases. 
b) If 2S S S  , region I disappears and region II is delimited by 1ˆd p p  .
c) If 2S S , regions I and II disappear and region III is defined by the entire feasible
range,  ,d p .
 *1 p
 *2 p
d
i
p
Reg. I
1pˆ2pˆ
Reg. II Reg. III
p
FIGURE 3.2: Equilibrium profits as a function of p (grandfathering)
The consequences of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 are the following. The profit of
both firms is still strictly convex in the price of permits, with a minimum at ˆ ip , i =1, 2.
When grandfathering is introduced, the values of the permit price at which the minima
are reached, 1pˆ and 2pˆ , shift to the left and do so to a greater extent the higher the
value of S . This shift implies that, for each firm, there is a wider range of the permit
price such that it becomes better-off when the price increases. The reason is that the
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existence of free permits makes permit purchasing less costly for firms. Moreover, it
opens the way for obtaining positive revenues by selling some permits.
More importantly, the inclusion of grandfathering opens up the possibility of
collusion. Let us focus first on case a) (with S S ). We have now three regions instead 

of two, as shown in Figure 3.2. In region III, to the right of 1pˆ , both firms benefit from 
a price increase, while the solution is still interior ( 1 2, 0e e  ). The technical reason why
	
this new region arises is that the direct effect of a price increase on cost is now less 
pronounced, as the firms have to buy fewer permits and thus they can capture a higher 
part of the scarcity rents. Furthermore, if the price is high enough, it can also be the case
that it is profitable for the firms to sell part of their free endowment instead of buying 
additional permits, which provides a new opportunity to increase profits. Nevertheless, 
it can be shown that at 1pˆ we have 1 0y  ; i.e., at the point where the leader starts 
finding it profitable to increase the price, it is still a net buyer of permits and hence the
profit-enhancing effect is not yet due to selling permits.
Moreover, if the initial allocation of permits is large enough, it could be the case
that region I disappears, which implies that the follower is always interested in 
increasing the price of permits (case b in Lemma 2 and Proposition 2), or even that both
regions I and II disappear, which implies that both the leader and the follower are
always interested in manipulating the price upward. This is the most favorable case for
collusion.
The focus of this paper is on region III, given that this is the only region within 
which firms can find it profitable to collude in order to push the price up. One natural 
question is how large this region is, or, in other words, how likely it is to fall within this
region. To answer this question, we focus on case a) ( S S ), which is perhaps the most
	
realistic. The discussion of the other two cases is more straightforward. Region III is
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thus delimited by two threshold values for p. First, 1pˆ , which is the price above which it
is profitable, not only for the follower, but also for the leader to push the price up. The
second threshold is the upper bound, p , which is the highest value of the price
compatible with an interior solution. The size of region III is thus given by the
difference between these two thresholds:
1 2
4
ˆ
2
btS
p p
b tr
 

, (36)
	
which depends positively on the number of free permits as well as the slope of the
demand curve, b, and the abatement cost parameter t, whereas it depends negatively on 
the emissions intensity parameter, r.
3.3.3 Asymmetric cost
In the previous subsections we have assumed both firms to be fully symmetric in 
terms of cost functions and also, in the case of grandfathering, of free permit
endowment. There are two reasons for making this assumption. The first is for the sake
of simplicity. The second is to focus on the leader-follower relationship as the (only)
source of asymmetry between firms. As a sensitivity analysis, in this subsection we
consider the possibility that firms are asymmetric in terms of cost and/or initial permit 
endowment and explore the effect of these asymmetries on the likelihood of generating
a propitious environment for collusive behavior. In other words, we explore the effect of 
different parameters on the size of region III as defined in the previous subsection.
To account for cost asymmetry, we denote the production cost of firm i as i ic x , 
where ic is a firm-specific unit cost parameter. Seeing as we have postulated that firm 1 
is a leader and firm 2 is a follower in the output market, it is natural to conjecture that 
1 2c c ; i.e., the position of the leader might well be due to the fact that it enjoys a cost
97
	
 
 
    
 
      
     
     
         
     
     
      
      
         
 
      
     
    
       
      
     
                                                 
            
         
            
            
              
    
advantage. However, nothing prevents us from considering the opposite case as a
theoretical possibility. Analogously, firm i’s abatement cost function is given by:
   i i i i i iAC q q d t q  , i = 1, 2. (37)
Finally, each firm might receive an initial free endowment of permits, Si, which
is not necessarily constant across firms. Proceeding as in the basic case, we conclude 
that the optimal amounts of emissions, abatement and purchase of permits for each firm
in the third stage are given, respectively, by19 
 * ,
2
i
i i i
i
d p
e x p rx
t

  ,
 *
2
i
i
i
p d
q p
t

 ,
(38)
(39)
 * ,
2
i
i i i i
p d
y x p rx S
t

   , (40)
	
and, moving on to the first and second stages, we can compute the equilibrium levels of
output:
* 2 1
1
2
2
a c c rp
x
b
  
 , (41)
	
* 1 2
2
2 3
4
a c c rp
x
b
  
 . (42)
	
To investigate the likelihood of observing collusive behavior, we proceed by
analyzing the effect of different parameters on the size of region III. In the previous
subsection we concluded that, simply by introducing a constant initial allocation of
permits, three different cases arise. Now, due to the larger number of varying
19 Unlike the other parameters, we assume that the emissions intensity parameter, r, is common to both
firms; i.e.,
1 2r r r  . There are two pragmatic reasons for this simplification. First, the sensitivity analysis
results related to these parameters are unclear and so we do not gain any valuable insight by exploring
them. Second, the sign of some equilibrium values for some of the key variables are affected by the terms
1 22r r and/or 1 23 2r r and this fact forces us to keep the asymmetry between these parameters bounded so
as to avoid meaningless results.
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parameters, by choosing the right combination of these parameters we could generate 
almost any imaginable case. Hence, we need to bound the range of possibilities in some 
way so as to avoid, on the one hand, meaningless results (such as negative output, 
negative abatement or negative emissions) and, on the other, a qualitative change in the 
nature of the solution. For this reason, we introduce the following assumptions in this
subsection:
Assumption 1’: 1 2,  d d p p , where p is defined in (20).
Assumption 2: 
Assumption 3:
1 2e e .
2 1ˆ ˆp p .
The two first assumptions ensure nonnegative values for all the relevant 
variables. The idea is that the leader will still be the one who produces a larger amount
of output and a larger amount of emissions. Hence, the follower will still be the one
who finds it profitable to pollute zero for a lower value of p and such a value
determines the upper bound for the range that is compatible with an interior solution,
. If this is the case, it is natural to accept that Assumption 3 also holds; i.e., it is easierp
for the follower than it is for the leader to benefit from a price increase.
Under these assumptions, region III is still delimited by 1pˆ and p and hence its 
size increases if p increases and/or 1pˆ decreases. Proposition 3 summarizes how the 
size of this region depends on the parameters of the model. Table 1 presents a taxonomy
of all the relevant effects.
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PROPOSITION 3
The size of region III is increasing in the following cases:
a) If the leader’s marginal production cost, 1c , increases or the follower’s marginal
production cost, 2c , decreases.
b) If the parameter of the linear term in the abatement cost function decreases for the
leader ( 1d ) or increases for the follower ( 2d ). 

c) If the parameter of the quadratic term in the leader’s abatement cost function, 
 1t ,
decreases (provided the number of free permits is moderate) or the equivalent 
follower’s parameter, 2t , increases. 

d) If the number of free permits received by the leader, 
 1S , is increasing regardless of 

the free permits received by the follower.
	
Effects on
thresholds
Changes in model parameters 
c1 c2 d1 d2 t1 t2 S1 S2 
+ - 0 + 0 + 0 0
1pˆ - + + 0 + (*) 0 - 0
 1ˆp p  + - - + - (*) + + 0
Table 3.1. Summary of sensitivity analysis results.
	
(*) For a moderate value of S1.
	
Regarding point a) in Proposition 3, increasing the leader’s production cost or
reducing the follower’s cost tends to erode the leader’s advantage with respect to the 
follower, which has the effect of making the firms more symmetric in terms of their 
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position in the market. The more symmetric the firms are, the more aligned their 
interests will be and hence it is more likely for them to find it profitable to collude. 
Table 3.1 shows that increasing 1c has a twofold effect. On the one hand, p grows 
because the output of the follower increases, which makes it less likely for firm 2 to
decide not to emit at all (in other words, the range of prices under which there is an 
interior solution widens). On the other hand, 1pˆ decreases, as, due to the higher cost, 
firm 1 tends to produce less and to emit less and hence its total cost will be less 
sensitive to an increase in the price of permits. Both of these effects tend to enlarge the 
collusion region. Just the opposite occurs when 2c increases. Firm 1 tends to produce
more and pollute more and hence its cost becomes more sensitive to an increase in the
price of permits (which increases the value of 1pˆ ), whereas the follower tends to
produce less and to reach the point where it finds it profitable to stop polluting ( 
decreases) sooner, which reduces the size of the collusion region.
p
As to the parameters of the abatement cost function ( id and it ), notice that, due
to separability, each firm’s parameters are only relevant for the own firm, but not for its 
rival. Both the linear and the quadratic term of firm 2 are irrelevant in determining the 
value of 1pˆ . However, increasing either of them makes the follower’s abatement cost
increase, which in turn makes it less likely to reach the point where it decides to pollute
zero. In other words, it enlarges the relevant feasible range. The corresponding
parameters for firm 1 are immaterial in determining the value of p , their only relevant 
effect being on 1pˆ . Assuming a moderate value of the leader’s initial endowment of
permits, any increase in 1d and 1t makes the leader’s abatement cost higher, which
makes firm 1 become more sensitive to increases in the price of permits.
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Finally, the initial allocation of permits is irrelevant for the upper bound of p, as
it represents simply a fixed term in the cost (and the profit) function and so the optimal 
decisions are not affected. The value of a firm’s profits is affected by its own
endowment (not the rival’s) and hence only S1 is relevant in determining the size of
region III. When the leader’s free endowment increases, its cost becomes less sensitive
to an increase in the price of permits and it will hence be more receptive to the idea of
pushing the price up, thereby increasing the likelihood of observing collusive behavior.
3.4 Conclusions and policy implications
We have explored the possibility that two firms that compete a la Stackelberg in
the output market and are subject to a CAT system could have incentives to manipulate
the price of permits upward and increase their profits. We do so within a framework 
similar to that proposed by Ehrhart et al. (2008), with the difference that these authors 
restrict their study to symmetric situations, whereas we explore a situation that is
asymmetric in nature. We also include a reading of their results in terms of scarcity
rents generation. The main research question is whether the incentives for this type of
collusive behavior still exist in a situation in which some firm has a dominant position
and the other or others act as followers.
We have shown in a general model that the effect of a permit price increase on 
the firms’ profit has an ambiguous sign as it has two effects: on the one hand, it raises
cost but, on the other hand, it creates scarcity rents, of which each firm can only benefit 
from that part that is due to the rival’s output reduction. This ambiguity opens the way
for firms to benefit from a price increase and the possibility of colluding in order to 
manipulate the price upward. However, the asymmetric role of each firm means that the
conditions under which a price is profit-enhancing are different for each of them.
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Under a separable cost function, we first show that the profit functions are
strictly convex in the permit price and secondly that the minima of the profit functions 
are different for both firms, which creates a region of disagreement within which the
leader prefers the price to go down, whereas the follower prefers it to go up. This 
situation is ruled out in Ehrhart et al. (2008) by construction, as the interests of fully
symmetric firms are always aligned. 
The main message is that a leader-follower relationship in the output market
reduces the scope for collusion to manipulate the price of permits upward. Actually, in a
standard separable case with symmetric costs functions, if no free permits are
distributed among the firms, the region within which there is incentives to collude
shrinks to the extent of disappearing. The main policy implication of this finding is that
a situation of market power in the product market can preclude the existence of
incentives for collusion in the permit market.
Another central policy implication of our research is that distributing some 
permits for free (e.g. by means of grandfathering) allows the firms to capture a larger
share of the scarcity rents and thus opens up the possibility for collusive behavior. The
greater the number of permits distributed by a non-market scheme, particularly to firms 
that enjoy market power, the more incentives there are for collusion. The European 
Union is reducing the use of grandfathering and increasing the use of auctioning to 
distribute emission permits. The 2008 revised European Emission Trading Directive
established the mandate that auctioning of allowances is to be the default method for
allocating allowances as a fundamental change for the third trading period, starting in 
2013. The arguments put forward by the European Commission (EC) to support the
introduction of auctions are that auctioning “best ensures the efficiency, transparency
and simplicity of the system, creates the greatest incentives for investment in a low-
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carbon economy and eliminates windfall profits”.20 Our results suggest an additional
argument to reduce the use of grandfathering (and arguably to increase the use of
auctioning), as it might introduce incentives for price manipulation.
Our final insight is that the likelihood of firms finding collusion profitable is
very sensitive to the cost asymmetries between them. In general terms, the more
asymmetric the firms are, the more difficult collusion becomes. Moreover, if a
grandfathering scheme exists, the more permits are allocated to firms enjoying market 
power, the more likely collusion becomes.
.
20 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/faq_en.htm, section “Why are allowances
being auctioned?”. Alvarez and André (2014) present a discussion on the efficiency argument.
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APPENDIX 1
	
A.1 A Extension: Scarcity Rents in a Cournot Model21 
A.1.1 Introduction
In this section we change the output market structure and introduce a Cournot
model while keeping the same assumptions for the emission permits market. The
objective is twofold. Firstly we make a comparison with the most relevant results shown
in this chapter for the Stackelberg model particularly the ones related to scarcity rents. 
Secondly we revisit the paper by Erhard et al (2008) in terms of scarcity rents and 
extend it by introducing grandfathering with the purpose of evaluating the effects of
these changes in the firm´s incentives to collude in order to manipulate the price of
permits. 
Now the game has two stages. In the first one both firms simultaneously decide 
their output levels (reaction curves) and then in the second stage they decide at the same
time on their cost minimizing emission levels. We solve the model by backward 
induction. Due to the symmetry of the Cournot model we denote firms as (i, -i) 
A.1.2 General Model
Within the general model considered in subsection 2, the firms behavior in the 
emission permits market is the very same as above and equations (1) to (10) apply in 
this model. In the output market both agents solve its profit maximization problem 
which yields an equal first order condition for them
21 This Appendix is not part of the joint work with Francisco J. André that has been the content of this
chapter.
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  0ii i i
i
TCP
P x x x
X x

   
 
(12a)
	
From this equation we get the reaction function of the firms
	
 * * ,i i ix x x p (12b)
	
In a similar way as we did for equation (13) we get
	
2
2 2
2 2
0     0
2 2
iR R
i i
i ii i
i i
TCdPx x x pdX
TC TCx xdP dP
dX dXx x
 

   
   
  
 
 
(13a)
and so, one agent´s output is decreasing in the other agent´s output and the price of 
permits.
Using both reaction functions, we can get the final equilibrium as a function of 
the permit price and we can also write both agents´ profit as a function of permit prices. 
     * * * * * * * *, , , ,i i i i i i i i ix x e p P x x x TC x e     (14a)
	
Differentiating this function with respect to permit prices and taking into account 
equations (7) and (12a) we conclude
*
* *
*
i i
i i
i
P x x ep px


  
    
(16a)
	
The marginal effect of the permit price on the profit profit has two components.
The first one is the scarcity rent which means a profit increase while the second one is
the cost increasing effect due to the higher permit price. This is the same result as in the
Stackelberg model in qualitative terms. The main difference is that both agents are in 
the same position because there is no leader or follower. Since the sign of the equation
is ambiguous it means that both firms will benefit from a price increase at the same
time, so there is no room for different strategies. This is basically Ehrhart et al (2008)
result.
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The comparison in quantitative terms with our Stackelberg model is not possible
in this general case, so we will now consider the same separable cost function as in
section 3 and the same linear demand function.
A.1.3 A Separable Function 
Abatement and Total Cost functions do not change and equations (18) and (19)
apply. We still consider assumption 1 to rule out meaningless solutions. Equation 20 
becomes:
C Cd p p  where  * *: / , 0C i ip p e x p  (20a)
The optimal amount of emissions and optimal abatement are given by equations
(21) and (22), and the minimized cost function is given by equation (23). The output
level which is common for both firms is given by
* *
3i i
a c rp
x x
b
 
  (24a)
	
The equilibrium profits can be stated as a function of the price of permits, and equation
(26) applies. The marginal profit is common for both agents
  1
3 2
i
i i
p p d
rx rx
p t
 
  

(26a)
	
Once again the sign of this derivative is ambiguous. The first term is the scarcity
rent, whiles the second and third relates to gross emissions and the abatement cost. The
scarcity rents as a proportion of output are lower for Cournot firms (r/3) than for
Stackelberg firms (r/2). But the amount that the firms are able to save by performing
abatement activities is equal in both models. This means that the positive abatement
effect is more important for Cournot firms as it is the incentive to abate when the permit 
price increases.
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As it was proven in Section 3, the profit function is convex and a critical point
can be established. This critical point shows a particular price that yields the minimum
profit.
Lemma 1.A
There is an equilibrium permit price that is common for both agents where the marginal 
profit with respect to the permit price is zero. For higher prices the profit is increasing
with price. For lower prices is decreasing. 
We denote as ˆCp the value of the permit price that minimizes firm i’s profit. In the
Appendix we prove that 
ˆC Cd p p  (29a)
	
For comparison purposes we also denote the critical prices for the Stackelberg leader
and follower as
ˆ ˆ: ´             : ´  L Fp Leader s price p Follower s price 
Proposition 1.A
The critical price for Cournot firms is lower than the Stackelberg leader but higher than 
the follower´s. The upper bound for p, (defined as that value of the permit price such 
that, in equilibrium, it is optimal to pollute zero) is higher in the Cournot model.
ˆ ˆ ˆ                           L C F C Fp p p p p  
A.1.4 Grandfathering in the Cournot model
We consider a grandfathering scheme as in subsection 3.2. The amount of traded 
permits and the total cost function are in accordance to equations (30) to (32) and the 
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optimal traded permits and the correspondence minimizes cost functions like equations 
(33) and (34).
In a similar way as happened in the Stackelberg model, the introduction of free permits
shifts the minimum permit price to the left while the upper bound price remains the 
same, because equation (21) applies. It means that the range of prices for which a price
increase implies a profit increase is wider now. Even more, the region where profit
decreases as price increases just disappears for a certain value of S, as in the Stackelberg 
model.
Let us denote by Region I the range of permit prices where firm´s profit are decreasing
and Region II the range of permit prices where profits are increasing. Let
 2
9
r a c dr
S
b
 
 be a particular amount of permits. Now:
	
Proposition 2.A
The introduction of grandfathering wideness Region II, to the extent that Region I 
disappears when the amount of free permits exceed the quantity 
We prove it in the Appendix 2
S .
APPENDIX 2
Proof of Lemma 1
Using (24) and (25) in (21), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions:
 
   2* *
1 1 , 2
db rt a c p b tr
e x p
bt
   
 , (A1)
	
 
   2* *
2 2
2 2
,
4
bd tr a c p b tr
e x p
bt
   
 , (A2)
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and using the definition given in (20), we compute the value of p by equating (A2) to 
zero: 

 
 * *
2 2 2
2
, 0
2
bd rt a c
e x p p p
b tr
 
   

. (A3)
Using (24) and (25) in the inverse demand expression  P X a bX  , we get 
the equilibrium price of output: 
 3
4
a c pr
P
 
 . Using the equilibrium expressions
for 1x , 2x , 1e , 2e and P together with (19), we obtain the expressions for the
equilibrium profits of both firms:
 
   
1
2 2
* 2
8
t a c pr b p d
p
bt
   
  ,
 
   
2 2
*
2
4
16
t a c pr b p d
p
bt
   
  .
Differentiating twice with respect to p , we conclude that the second derivative
of both functions is positive and thus both of them are strictly convex in p . By
inspection of the first derivative and bearing in mind (A3), we conclude that 1 has a
minimum at 1ˆp p p  , which implies that 1 is decreasing in p for all the feasible
values of p below p . We similarly conclude that 2 has a minimum at 
 
2 2
4
ˆ :
4
tr a c bd
p
b tr
 


, which implies that 2 is decreasing in p for 2p p and
increasing for . 
The last step is to check that the thresholds are ordered in the right way. By
direct comparison, we conclude that 
2ˆ .d p p a c dr    
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To prove that the last inequality is true, using (22) and the definition of
	
abatement ( i i iq rx e  ), we conclude that, within the relevant range, 

2
2 0
e
x
r
  . 
Using the expression for *2x given in (25), we conclude that 2 0x  implies a c rp  , 
and that this inequality, together with d p (Assumption 1), implies 
 .a c dr 
QED.
Proof of Proposition 1
The result follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1: the relevant range for p is
delimited by d and p . As *2 is strictly convex and reaches a minimum at 2pˆ , we
conclude that it is strictly decreasing between d and 2pˆ and strictly increasing between 
2pˆ and p . As 
*
1 is strictly convex and reaches a minimum at 1pˆ p , it is strictly
decreasing between d and p . This completes the proof. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2
As the expressions for ie (i=1,2) are the same as in the basic case and the minimized
cost function (34) is the same as (23), except for a constant term, it immediately follows 
that the expressions for ix (i=1,2) are also the same as in the basic case. Using these
values, we get the equilibrium profits of both firms
     
   
     
   
2 2
* * * * * *
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2
* * * * * *
2 1 2 2 2 2
2 8
, ,
8
4 16
, .
16
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
    
    
    
    
The second derivative reveals that these functions are still strictly convex. 
Differentiating them with respect to p, we conclude that they have respective minima at
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 
 
 
 
*
1 1 2
*
2 2 2
2 4
ˆmin ,
2
4 8
ˆmin ,
4
p
p
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
  
  

  
  

and it follows straightforwardly that both 1pˆ and 2pˆ depend negatively on S .
Regarding the order of the thresholds, by direct comparison we conclude
	
that  1 2ˆ ˆ 2 2 0p p brt a c dr rSt      ; however, in the proof of Proposition 1 we
	
have proved 0a c dr   , which ensures that 1 2ˆ ˆp p . Moreover, using (A3) we also 
conclude that 1 12
4
ˆ ˆ
2
btS
p p p
b tr
  

. Hence, we have that 2 1ˆ ˆp p p  . To determine the
relative position of d , let us first recall that, from Lemma 1, we know that d p and 
hence we only have to check whether d is below 2pˆ , in the interval  2 1ˆ ˆ,p p or in the
interval  1ˆ ,p p . By direct comparison, we conclude the following:
	
 
1ˆ 24
r a c dr
p d S S
b
 
    ,
 
2ˆ 8
r a c rd
p d S S
b
 
    .
(A4)
(A5)
This completes the proof. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first consider statement a). The results in regions I and II follow from Lemma 2 
according to a similar reasoning to that used in the proof of Proposition 1. In region III,
between 1pˆ and p , it is straightforward to conclude that both  
*
1 p and  
*
2 p are
strictly increasing in p . Statements b) and c) follow straightforwardly from (A4), (A5)
and Assumption 1. QED.
112
	
 
 
 
   
 
     
  
   
     
  
 
 
 
       
 
 * 1 2 1 1 1 11
12
1
2 2 4
ˆ0 .
2
rt a c c bd bt S
p p
p r t b
   
   
 
   
      
 
     
Proof of Proposition 3
Using (41) and (42) in (38), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions:
 
   1 1 2 1* *
1 1
1
2
,
2
b d p t r a c c rp
e x p
bt
    
 ,
 
   2 2 1 2* *
2 2
2
2 2 3
,
4
b d p rt a c c rp
e x p
bt
    
 . 
By imposing the non-negativity conditions on the follower’s emissions, we
obtain the upper bound value for the permit price, in this case:p
 2 2 2 1*
2 2
2
2 3 2
0
2
bd rt a c c
e p p
b r t
  
   

. (A6)
	
By substitution of the relevant variables in the profit function, we obtain the 
expression for the leader’s profit function in terms of the model parameters:
 
   
2 2
2 1 1*
1 1
1
2
8 4
a c c rp p d
p pS
b t
   
   
Differentiating with respect to p , we obtain
   * 1 1 1 1 2 11
1
2 4 2
4
b p d bt S rt a c c rp
p bt
     


and, by equating this derivative to zero, we get the minimum value of p such that the
leader finds it profitable to push the price up, 1pˆ :
(A7)
By direct differentiation of the values of p and 1pˆ , we obtain the results in the
proposition:
2
2
1 2
2
0 ;
2
rtp
c b r t

 
 
1 1
1 1
ˆ 2
0 ;
2
p rt
c b rt
 
 
 
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2
2
2 2
3
0 ;
2
rtp
c b r t

 
 
1 1
2 1
ˆ
0 ;
2
p rt
c b rt

 
 
1
0 ;
p
d



1
1 1
ˆ 2
0 ;
2
p b
d b rt

 
 
2
2 2
2
0 ;
2
p b
d b r t

 
 
1
2
ˆ
0 ;
p
d



1 2
0 ;
p p
S S
 
 
 
1 1
1 1
ˆ 4
0 ;
2
p bt
S b rt
 
 
 
1
2
ˆ
0 ;
p
S



   22 1 1 1 2 1 11
12
1 1
2 2 8 2ˆ
0 ;
42
br a c c d r b S r a c c d rp
S
t br t b
      
   
   
 
 
2 1 2
22
2 2
2 3 2
0,
2
br a c c rdp
t b r t
  
 
 
where, in an interior solution, the numerator of the last expression must be positive for
the follower’s output to be positive. QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.A
The equilibrium values for emissions can be obtained from equations (21) and (24a). 
Equating this value to zero we get the maximum permit price
     *
2
2 3 2 3
0
6 3 2i C
rt a c rp b p d rt a c bd
e p
bt b r t
     
   

(A3a)
Using equations (19) and (24a) together with the inverse demand function yields the
following expression for the equilibrium profit
 
   
2 2
4 9
36i
t a c rp b p d
p
bt
   
 
Differentiating the function with respect to p we get the critical price
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 
2
4 9
ˆ
9 4C
rt a c bd
p
b r t
 


By comparison of these two values and taking into account equation (20a) we conclude
	
 ˆ ˆ6C C C Cp p brt a c rd d p p      
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.A
We just compare the corresponding expressions, compute the difference and check the 
sign to prove the first part of the proposition.
   
       
   
   
       
 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
2 4 9
ˆ ˆ
2 9 4
2 9 4 4 9 2
0
4 9 4
ˆ ˆ
9 4 4
4 9 4 4 9 4
7
L C
C F
rt a c bd rt a c bd
p p
b r t b r t
rt a c bd b r t rt a c bd b r t
brt a c dbr t brt a c dr
rt a c bd rt a c bd
p p
b r t b r t
rt a c bd b r t rt a c bd b r t
brt a c
   
  
 
             
      
   
  
 
             
    27 7 0dbr t brt a c dr   
By direct comparison of equation (A3a) with the equation (A3) we prove the second 
part of the proposition
   
 2 2
3 2 2
0
3 2 2
bd rt a c bd rt a c
rbt a c dr
b r t b r t
   
    
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.A
The equilibrium profit is now
 
   
2 2
* 4 9 36
36i
t a c rp b p d bptS
p
bt
    
 
Differentiating the function we obtain the minimum price value
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 
2
4 9 18
ˆ
9 4
G
C
rt a c bd btS
p
b r t
  


Now we compare this minimum profit price with and without calculation and check the 
sign to prove the first part of the proposition 
2
18
ˆ ˆ 0
9 4
G
C C
btS
p p
b r t
  

To prove the second part of the proposition we note that Region I disappears when the 

lower bound of prices equals the minimum price. We can formally write this condition
	
like ˆ GCd p . We calculate the limit value of free permits to meet this condition
   
´ 2
4 9 18 2
ˆ
9 4 9
G
C
rt a c bd btS r a c dr
p d d S S
b r t b
    
     

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Chapter 4
Imperfect Competition in Product and Permit
Markets
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the strategic behavior of polluting oligopolistic firms that
interact strategically both in the output and the permit markets. The main difference
with Chapter 3 is that we now consider the price of permits as endogenous instead of an 
exogenously given variable. We consider a model of two firms competing under
different oligopolistic structures while there is a dominant firm in the permit market. In
this framework, we study and compare the effect of market power under three different 
situations.
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We first study the permit market assuming that there is a dominant firm and 
another one that behaves as a price taker. We show that the equilibrium of such a
market is crucially determined by the equilibrium in the output market and the initial
allocation of permits. Then, we move on to study the output market and its link with the
permit market
Regarding the output market, we consider three alternative market structures. In 
the first version we consider a Cournot oligopoly whereas in the other two there are a
leader and a follower a la Stackelberg. Specifically, in the second version we consider 
that the firm that acts as a leader in the output market (Firm 1) is the follower in the 
permits market. As far as we know, a double duopoly with different leaders has not
been analyzed yet. In this case we look for conditions to ensure that being a leader in
one of these markets implies a competitive advantage or, in other words, which is the
best place to exercise market power. In the third version, we consider a dominant firm
in the emissions permits market that is also a Stackelberg leader in the product market.
Some papers have used the Stackelberg model to analyze the impact of market
power in the efficiency of cap-and-trade environmental policies. Hahn (84) considers 
the existence of a dominant firm in the emissions permit market while the output market
is competitive. The third chapter of this thesis considers the Stackelberg model in the
output market while the related permits market is competitive.
Hinterman (2011) considers a firm which is a dominant firm in both markets
and found that such a firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs
and therefore efficiency cannot be achieved by means of the permit allocation alone. 
Chevalier (2008) considers a permit market with both spatial and intertemporal
trading. Market power is introduced by assuming a large dominant agent in a
Stackelberg position and a large number of small firms who are nonstrategic but 
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forward looking. The equilibrium is characterized for the monopoly case and for 
intermediate cases.
The leader-fringe models are also very close to ours. Tanaka & Chen (2012)
consider a Cournot-fringe model with market power in both product and permits market 
to simulate the California electricity market and they show that Cournot firms can 
significantly raise both power price and permit price, which results in a great loss in
social surplus. 
We try to address situations in which there is a strong interaction between the 
strategic behavior of firms or countries in both product and permit markets. The NOx 
permit market in California is one example. Nearly 25% of the NOx permits were
allocated to facilities that sell power into the California electricity market, which has
been recognized for its (unilateral) market power problems. In fact, Kolstad and Wolak
(2003) argue that electric utilities used the NOx market to enhance their ability to 
exercise (unilateral) market power in the electricity market22 
Hagem and Maestad (2005) analyses the optimal strategies for a country like
Russia that could have market power in an international market for emission permits
and at the same time participates in a non-competitive fuel export market. By means of
numerical simulations, they concluded that Russia could benefit from coordinating its 
permit exports with its oil and gas exports during the commitment period.
In the same line, Montero (2009) argues that some of the large countries in an
eventual global carbon market are also big players in energy markets. One paradigmatic 
example is the Russia´s role in the Kyoto Protocol. It has been argued23 that USA
rejection resulted from the fact that its least costly way to implement targets would have
22 See Fowlie (2010) for the analysis of the effects on permit market efficiency.
23 See Russia’s Role in the Kyoto Protocol Alain Bernard, Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reilly Marc Vielle 
and Laurent Viguier Report No. 98 June 2003 The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of
Global Change
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involved large purchases of emission credits from Russia, which is also a major fossil
fuel exporter.
Some other key aspects have already been covered by the literature. Malueg and
Yates (2009) develop a model that deals precisely with a permit market in which there
are only strategic players due to the observation that for some permit markets, the 
oligopoly fringe structure may not apply.
Another concern is that under cap and trade, the economic rents can be lost to
energy exporting countries. Berger et al (91) showed that when the supply side of fossil
fuel markets is imperfectly competitive, cap and trade could lead to the transfer of
policy-generated rents from the domestic economy to fossil-fuel-exporting countries. 
The remainder of the chapter has the following structure: In the next section
(4.2) we describe the basic elements of the model. Section 4.3 analyses the equilibrium
in the emissions permit market. In the next three sections we explore the implications of
grandfathering in the firms output and profit within three different oligopolistic
structures. In section 4.4 we present a Cournot model. Section 4.5 describes a model 
where the price taker firm in the permit market is a Stackelberg leader in the related 
product market. In Section 6, the dominant firm in the permit market is also the 
Stackelberg leader in the product market. Section 7 states our conclusions. 
4.2 The Model. Basic Elements
We consider a model with two firms labeled i = 1, 2. Both firms enjoy an initial
firm-specific free allocation of permits, Si (i=1,2). We set up the model with the same
particular functions as in section 2.4. In the output market, the inverse demand function 
is P=a–bX. On the production side we assume that the firms face a constant marginal 
cost of production c. Gross emissions are assumed to be proportional to the firms´ 
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output (rxi) where r is the pollution intensity which is common for both firms. The firms 
can reduce emissions by either reducing output or making abatement. Abatement cost is
a quadratic function qi (d + tqi) where d and t are technological parameters. We assume
the same abatement technology for both firms. Finally both firms trade permits. We
denote permits purchased (sold) by firm i iy , which in equilibrium has to be equal to 
satisfy i iy y  , where -i refers to the firm other than i.
We also assume, as it is common in the literature that the emissions generated by
both firms can be perfectly monitored without cost by the regulatory authorities and
firms cannot emit more than the number of permits they hold. Alternatively, we can 
interpret that a high enough penalty has to be paid to ensure that there is no room for
moral hazard.
4.3 A dominant firm in the emission permits market
Regardless the oligopolistic structure considered in the product market, we will
solve every model by backward induction. It means that Firm 2 solves its abatement 
cost problem in the last stage. This problem is:
   2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2. .            
qMin q d tq py
s t S q y rx
 
  
(1)
	
We can substitute the constraint into the objective function and arrive at the
familiar first-order condition, which states that marginal abatement costs equal the
permit price.
2
22   
MAC
d tq p  (2)
	
and combining this expression with the constraint we get optimal demand for permits of 
firm 2:
121
	
 
 
                                                                
    
 
    
 
                                     
   
  
                                                           
   
   
       
                     
          
    
      
  
                       
       
    
  
2 2 2 2
p d
y rx S
t

   . (3)
These conditions define firm 2´s optimal emissions and permit purchase
decisions as a function of the permit price. 
The dominant firm minimizes its own costs anticipating the reaction of the
follower. It faces a permit market-clearing condition given by
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( )y rx q S y rx q p S         . (4)
	
Solving the problem yields the optimal abatement of the dominant firm (details 
can be found in the Appendix):
 1 2 1 2
1
2 2
3
r x x S S
q
  
 . (5)
Equations (4) and (5) let us find firm 2´s optimal abatement and demand for
permits in equilibrium as a function of output and the initial allocation of permits:
 2 1 2 1
2
2 2
3
r x x S S
q
  
 , (6)
   1 2 1 2
2 1 2 13
  
    
S S r x x
y y q q . (7)
	
Equation (7) shows that the dominant firm will be a net buyer of permits (y1 > 0)
when its abatement exceed the follower´s. It means that, in such a case, the dominant
firm buys permits at a price that is lower than its marginal cost of abatement, as can be
easily proof considering equation (2)
2 1
2 12 2   
MAC MAC
p d tq d tq .
In the same fashion it can be stated that if the dominant firm is a net seller of
permits the price will exceed its marginal cost of abatement. In both cases the dominant 
position is an instrument that firm 1 can use to reduce its cost and increase its profit.
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Equation (7) also reveals that the equilibrium in the permit market is driven by
two main elements: first, the equilibrium in the output market, and more specifically, 
the difference in both firms' output, and second, the difference in the initial permit
allocation. If we consider the particular case where both firms receive the same amount
of free permits, Equation (7) shows that the net demand for permits is proportional to
the difference in output which means that the firm that produces more (less) output acts 
as a net buyer (seller) of permits. If both firms produced the same, there would not be
any trade of permits, and both firms will abate the same amount of emissions.
To have a full picture, in the following sections we investigate the equilibrium of
the output market and how such equilibrium is influenced by the initial allocation. We 
consider two possibilities: first, both firms compete simultaneously in output a la
Cournot, and second, there is a follower and a leader, a la Stackelberg. In the second 
case, in turn, we consider two possibilities depending on whether the leader in the 
output market is the same firm that has a similar position in the permit market or not.
4.4 A Cournot Model
In this section we assume a Cournot oligopoly in the product market. Therefore,
both firms choose their output simultaneously, anticipating that in the emissions permit
market firm 1 is a dominant firm while firm 2 acts as a price taker.
Then, our model results in a game with two stages, which we solve by backward 
induction.
In the first stage of the game the firms solve simultaneously its profit
maximization problem anticipating the equilibrium of the second stage given by
equations (2), (5), (6) and (7). As in the standard Cournot model, the FOC´s yield the 
reaction functions as we show below. 
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The profit maximization problem on output for firm 2 is:
	
      1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
         . .  (2)  (6)
Max a b x x x cx q d tq p rx q S
s t to Eq and
       
(8)
And the resulting reaction curve is
	
    22 1
2 12 2
9 2 8 9 2
18 16 18 16
a c dr rt S S b r t
x x
b r t b r t
    
 
 
. (9)
In a similar way we obtain firm 1's reaction curve:
	
    21 2
1 22 2
9 6 2 9 6
18 12 18 12
a c dr rt S S b r t
x x
b r t b r t
    
 
 
. (10)
Solving the system given by equations (9) and (10) we obtain the optimal output
of both agents in terms of the model parameters:
 
 
 
  
2
2 1
2 2 2 2
26 20 8
3 2 9 10 3 2
rtS b r t brtSa c dr
x
b r t b r t b r t
  
 
  
, (11)
 
 
 
  
2
1 2
1 2 2 2
22 20 4
3 2 9 10 3 2
rtS b r t brtSa c dr
x
b r t b r t b r t
  
 
  
. (12)
Note that output is not necessarily equal for both firms as it would be the case in 
the standard Cournot model with symmetric firms. Combining (11) and (12) we
conclude that the difference in output is given by
 
 
1 2
1 2 2
10
9 10
rt S S
x x
b r t

 

. (13)
This result is somewhat surprising. If both firms initially receive the same 
amount of permits, firm 1´s dominant position in the emission permits market does not 
lead to any advantage in practical terms as both firms will produce the same amount of
output  1 2x x and, as a consequence, abatement will be the same for both firms, as 

can be seen from equations (5) and (6) and there will not be any permit trade.
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Plugging equations (11) and (12) into equation (5) we obtain the optimal
abatement of the dominant firm in terms of the parameters of the model.
   
 
1 2
1 2
2
3 2
r a c dr b S S
q
b r t
   


. (14)
A similar procedure is employed to obtain the abatement of firm 2
 
 
   
  
2 2
2 1
2 2 2 2
2 9 8 9 14
3 2 3 2 9 10
bS b r t bS b r tr a c dr
q
b r t b r t b r t
   
 
  
. (15)
Combining both expressions it is immediate to compute the difference in the 
abatement made by both firms which, according to (7), provides the equilibrium of the
permit market:
 2 1
1 2 2
3
9 10
b S S
q q
b r t

 

. (16) 
Summing up, although there is a dominant position in the permit market, if both 
firms receive the same amount of permits and compete a la Cournot in the output
market, both firms will produce the same, and therefore, there will be no trade of
permits. As a consequence, both firms will also make the same profit.
From equations (13) and (16) it can easily be proved that both firms increase
output and decrease abatement by the same amount when they receive one more permit.
But the marginal profit that Firm 1 obtains from one additional permit is higher than the 
marginal profit that Firm 2 would obtain in the same event, due to the fact that Firm 1
buys (sells) permits at a lower (higher) price than its marginal abatement cost. 
We can summarize the main results regarding firms´ behavior when they receive 
a different amount of free permits in the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 1
a) When firm 1 receives more (less) free permits than firm 2, it produces more (less) 
output and consequently its gross emissions are higher (lower). Although firm 1
increases (decreases) its abatement as increases (decreases) its output with respect to
the case with symmetric allocation, it still abates a lower (higher) quantity of emissions
than firm 2 and become a net seller (buyer) of permits. 
b) The firm that receives more free permits makes a higher profit
The first part of the proposition has a trivial demonstration. We prove the second 
part in the Appendix.
4.5 A Stackelberg Model with a Different Leader in Each Market
In this section we analyze another situation where one firm dominates the 
product market and the other dominates the permit market. The rest of the elements of
the model are the same as in the previous section.
With such an approach we aim at determining the potential advantages of being
a leader in each of these markets. For consistency with the previous sections, we denote 
as “Firm 2” the one that acts as a leader in the output market (and as a price taker in the
permit market) while “Firm 1” is still the dominant firm in the permit market and act as
a follower in the output market. Initially, we consider that both firms enjoy an equal 
initial free allocation of permits S1 = S2 = S.
The game has four stages that develop as follows:
1. Firm 2 sets its output acting as a Stackelberg leader
2. Firm 1 sets its output as a follower
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3. Firm 1 decides its abatement level (and thus its demand for permits) and the price of
permits anticipating the reaction of Firm 2.
4. Firm 2 decides its level of abatement and demand for permits acting as a price taker.
The model is solved by backward induction. Stages 3 and 4 have already been
solved in Section 4.3. Due to the assumption S1 = S2 = S, equations (5) and (6) become
 1 2
1
2 3
                            
3
r x x S
q
 

 2 1
2
2 3
                            
3
r x x S
q
 

(17)
	
(18)
	
and the associated permit price is
 1 22 22
3

  
tr x x
p d tS . (19)
From (17) and (18) we get the number of traded permits as a proportion of the
difference between the agent´s output quantities, and also as the difference between the
abated quantities.
 1 2
1 1 23
r x x
y q q

   (20)
	
which is a particular case of (7) when both firms receive the same amount of free
permits. 
In the first two stages of the game the agents solve its profit maximization
problem sequentially as it is common in the Stackelberg models. As in a standard 
Stackelberg model, the product leader (firm 2) considers the follower´s reaction curve
and closes the market. After some algebra we get optimal outputs in terms of the 
parameters (detailed calculations are given in the Appendix): 
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(21)
	
  
  
2
2 2 2
6 6 2
>0               
6 4 2 3
b r t a c dr rtS
x
b r t b r t
   

 
  
  
2
1 2 2
3 6 2
>0        
6 4 2 3
b r t a c dr rtS
x
b r t b r t
   

 
(22)
	
Throughout our analysis, we assume (a-c-dr) > 0, to make sure that output is
always positive even in the case of null allocation of free permits (S = 0).
Using expressions (21) and (22), we can immediately compare both outputs:
 
  2 1 2 2
3 2
>0                  
6 4 2 3
b a c dr rtS
x x
b r t b r t
  
 
 
(23)
	
Equation (23) shows that as long as both firms produce positive amounts, the
leader´s output is always greater than the follower´s, which is a standard result in the
Stackelberg model. Actually, in the standard Stackelberg model with linear demand and 
constant marginal cost, the leader produces exactly double as much as the follower. In 
our case, the ratio between the outputs of both firms equals
 
2
2
2
1
2 2
1,2                
2
x b r t
x b r t

 

(24)
	
and so the leader produces less than double except if 0r or 0t , which would lead 
us to the standard Stackelberg model. The higher the value of r and t, the more similar
the outputs of both firms are. The interpretation of this result is that, the more important 
the environmental problem (as determined by the pollution intensity and the convexity
of the abatement cost function) the more able firm 1 is to overcome the leadership
position of firm 2 in the output market, although it will never be able to leapfrog firm 2
in terms of output.
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To find out how firm 1 takes advantage of its leadership in the permit market, 

note the fact that 2 1x x , combined with (17) and (18) implies that 2 1q q , i.e., firm 2
	
makes more abatement than firm 1, and since the abatement cost function is strictly
convex, we conclude that, in equilibrium, the marginal abatement cost of firm 2 is 
higher than that of firm 1 and this result, combined with equation (2), implies that firm
1 exerts its market power in the permit market by setting a price that is above its
marginal abatement cost (and equal to that of firm 2). The main features of the 
equilibrium are summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2
In equilibrium, the following results hold:
a) Firm 2 produces more and abates more than firm 1.
b) Firm 2 is a net buyer and firm 1 is a net seller of permits.
c) The permit price is above firm 1´s marginal cost of abatement.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Equation (23) and equation (20) 
directly imply a) and b). If we take these equations combined with equation (2) we
obtain the following inequality that proves c):
1 22 2p d tq d tq    .
Plugging equations (21) and (22) into equations (17) and (18), abatement and the
amount of traded permits can also be stated in terms of the parameters of the model as
follows 
  
  
2
2 2 2
5 6 2
       
6 4 2 3
r b r t a c dr trS
q S
b r t b r t
   
 
 
(25)
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  
  
2
1 2 2
4 6 2
                
6 4 2 3
r b r t a c dr trS
q S
b r t b r t
   
 
 
(26)
It is trivial to see that both firms output and abatement are increasing in the 
demand intercept (parameter a) and in the number of allocated free permits (parameter
S) and decreasing in marginal output cost (parameter c) and the marginal cost of the 
first unit of abatement (parameter d). The difference of outputs and abatements follows
the same rule, meaning that all changes have a greater impact on the product market 
leader´s variables. 
   
  
2 1
2 1 22 2
2
     
3 6 4 2 3
r x x br a c dr trS
q q y
b r t b r t
   
   
 
(27)
Regarding profit, we come up with the following Proposition:
PROPOSITION 3
a) The profit of the output market leader (Firm 2) is always greater than the 
profit of the emissions permit market leader (Firm 1).
b) The difference between Firm 2's and Firm 1's profits is increasing in
parameters “a” and “S” and decreasing in parameters “c” and “d”.
We prove Proposition 3 in the Appendix. The economic interpretation of the 
results regarding parameters S and c is straightforward. As long as the number of free
permits is increasing, less abatement is needed for a fixed production and the product 
market leader is taking a bigger advantage. On the other hand, if the marginal product
cost is increasing firm 1 is suffering less impact in its profits since its production level
is always lower than the production level of firm 2.
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Asymmetric free allocation of permits
In this subsection we relax the assumption that both firms receive the same
amount of initial permits by allowing for S1 being different from S2. For the sake of
completeness, we consider, not only the case that firm 2 receives more permits than firm
1, which could be justified if the regulator allocates permits in proportion to production
amounts, but also the opposite case, which could explain the dominant position of firm 
1 in the permit market. For comparison purposes we also assume that the regulator sets 
the same total cap as in the symmetric case. That means 2S =S1+S2.
The abatement quantities and the demand for permits follow from equations (5), 
(6) and (7). Proceeding in a similar way as in the symmetric case we obtain the
following corresponding expressions for the output quantities.
    
  
2 2
2 1 2
2 2 2
6 6 4 4 3
6 4 2 3
b r t a c dr rt b S S r tS
x
b r t b r t
       
 
(21.a)
    
  
2 2
1 2 1
1 2 2
3 6 2 5 2 6
6 4 2 3
b r t a c dr rt b S S r tS
x
b r t b r t
       
 
(22.a)
We compute the difference as:
	
    
  
2
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2
3 ( ) 2 10 7 12
6 4 2 3
b a c dr brt S S rt r t S S
x x
b r t b r t
     
 
 
(23.a)
And now the sign is ambiguous. The free allocation of permits directly impact
both firm’s outputs and consequently firm’s profits.
Consider first S2 > S1. By simple differentiation it can be immediately seen that 
firm 2 increases production and decreases abatement as the difference is increasing,
while firm 1´s output decreases and abatement increases.
From Equation (23.a) we immediately obtain
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   
  
2
2 1
2 2
2
4 5 3
0
6 4 2 3
rt b r tx x
S b r t b r t
 
 
  
. (24.a)
From Equations (7) and (23.a) we conclude
	
 
  
2 2
2 1
2 2
2
4 2
0
6 4 2 3
q q b br t
S b r t b r t
   
 
  
. (25.a)
As we know from equation (7) the difference in abatement determines the 
amount of sold and bought permits. Therefore, (25.a) implies that the number of permits
demanded by firm 2 is decreasing as a consequence of the reduction in the difference of 
abated quantities. And the permit price is also decreasing because Firm 2 lower
abatement means a decrease in its marginal abatement cost and therefore in the permit 
price. The number of permits sold reach zero at a certain value of the difference as it is 
shown in the following proposition (which is proved in the Appendix).
PROPOSITION 4
a) There is a particular allocation of free permits, with 2 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ;  2  S S S S S , such that
the market is closed without transactions. At this point both firms abate the same
amount of emissions. Specifically,
   
 
2
2 2
8
ˆ
2 4 3
r a c dr S b r t
S
b r t
   


(28)
	
b) For any allocation between the symmetric one (S1 = S2) and the one given by (28), 
Firm 2 is a net buyer of permits and the permit price exceeds firm 1's marginal cost of 
abatement.  
c) For any allocation above the threshold value 2Sˆ firm 2 becomes a net seller of 
permits. The permit price is below firm 1's marginal cost of abatement.
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It trivially follows that whenever 2 1S S firm 2 produces 2 more and makes a
	
higher proft than firm 1.
Consider now the case S1 > S2. By simple differentiation, as in the previous case,
it can be shown that, as the difference S1-S2 increases, firm 1 increases output and
decreases abatement while firm 2 decreases output and increases abatement. The
number of permits sold is increasing as it is the permit price because the marginal cost 
of abatement of firm 2 is also increasing. At a certain value of the difference, both firms
produce exactly the same amount of output.
PROPOSITION 5
a) There is a particular allocation of free permits S1
*, S2
* (satisfying S1
* > S2
*) such that
both firms produce the same amount of output. Specifically,
   
 
2
* *
1 22
3 4 10 6
2
2 17 12
   
  

b a c dr rtS b r t
S S S
rt b r t
(29)
b) For any allocation between the symmetric one (S1 = S2) and the one defined by (29), 
firm 1 produces less than firm 2. Beyond this threshold firm 1 produces more than firm 
2.
	
c) At the threshold point and beyond, Firm 1´s profits are higher than firm´s 2 profit.
	
We prove the proposition in the Appendix. The importance of this proposition
is to show that the dominant position that firm 2 enjoys in the output market can be
offset if the cost advantage enjoyed by firm is reinforced by assigning it a larger number
of free permits. In such a case, firm 1 can make higher profits because marginal product 
cost is the same for both firms and the dominant position in the emissions permit market
makes that firm 1 is selling permits at a price exceeding its marginal cost of abatement.
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4.6 A Stackelberg Model with the same Leader in Both Markets
In this section we assume that firm 1 is not only a dominant firm in the emission
permits market but also in the product market. To some extent, our approach is similar
to the followed by Hinterman (2011) but introducing several significant differences.
First, Hinterman considers a dominant firm and a competitive fringe in the output while
we are analyzing a duopoly. In our model the follower that acts strategically, by placing 
itself in its reaction curve, while the Hinterman's approach the firms in the fringe are
price takers i.e.: price equals their marginal cost in the optimum. A second depart from 
Hinterman's paper is the fact that we are setting a separable cost function considering a
particular abatement function and a constant ratio between output and emissions.
Finally we consider a linear demand function. 
Now the timing of the game is the following: 
First, Firm 1 set its output acting as a Stackelberg leader and simultaneously
decides its level of abatement and the price of permits anticipating the reaction of the 
price taker.
Second, Firm 2 set its output and abatement level as a follower.
Both firms solve a profit maximization problem to determine their optimal levels 
of abatement, taking into account the cost of buying permits. The follower´s profit
maximization problem is
   1 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2. .    
Max a b x x x cx q d tq py
s t y rx q S
       
  
(30)
	
We can substitute the constraint into the objective function and arrive at the
familiar first-order conditions that marginal abatement costs equal the permit price, and 
the reaction curve for the output.
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   2 2 1
1 1
2 2
FOC x x a c rp x
b
     , (31)
 2 2 2
p d
FOC q q
t

  . (32)
The dominant firm takes equations (31) and (32) into account when maximizing
its own profits. It also incorporates the permit market-clearing condition, which is given
by
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2( ) ( )y rx q S y rx x q p S         . (33)
	
Equation (33) lets us find the permit price as a function of the leader´s output
and abatement:
     1 1 1 2
2
2 2bt rx q bd bt S S rt a c
p
b r t
     


. (34)
	
The permit price is increasing in leader´s output and decreasing in leader´s 
abatement. If we combine Equation (34) with Equation (31), and applying the chain
rule, we find the slope of the reaction curve of the follower:
 
2
2
1
1
22
x rt
x b r t
 
 
 
. (35)
Equation (35) captures the double effect of an increase in the leader´s output:
The standard effect due to the dominant position in the output market, and the indirect 
effect due to the permit price increase that further reduce the follower´s output. This
effect can be identified as the so called “raising rival´s cost” that can be found in the
related literature. In short, a dominant firm can improve its position in the product
market indirectly via manipulation of input prices (in our case, the price of emission
permits).
The leader's profit maximization problem on output and abatement is:
         1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ,Max a b x x x p x q x cx q d tq p x q y x q      (36)
The resulting FOC´s are:
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2 1
1 2 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 0           0
x y p
a bx x x c p y x
x x x
  
       
  
(37)
  2 11 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 0           0
x yp p
bx d tq y p q
p q q q
  
      
   
(38)
Combining (37) and (34) the solution to the leader´s problem is
	
   1 2
1 2
3 2 2
6 4
a c dr rt S S
x
b r t
   


   1 2
1 2
2 2 2
6 4
r a c dr b S S
q
b r t
   


(39)
	
(40)
	
And the follower output comes from plugging equation (39) in (31)
	
 
2
2 2
2
4
a c dr rtS
x
b r t
  


(41)
	
Once we have solved the model we analyze whether a particular allocation of free
permits can alter the Stackelberg model standard results, with the following finding:
PROPOSITION 6 
In any interior solution, the leader´s output is always higher than the follower´s
regardless the initial allocation of free permits.
We prove this proposition in the Appendix.
We have checked that, for some range of parameter values, although the leader 
always produces more than the follower, the follower can still make a higher profit than
the leader if the follower’s allocation of permits is large enough as compared to the 
leader’s.
136
	
 
 
  
       
 
       
 
     
        
      
     
     
 
     
    
      
     
       
 
       
     
          
 
   
 
 
 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have considered three different oligopolistic structures in the 
product market under the common assumption of imperfect competition in the related 
permit market. The main focus of our analysis has been to analyze the role of
grandfathering in the outcome of firms in terms of output and profits.
For the Cournot model, we have shown that if both firms initially receive the 
same amount of permits, there will not be any permit trade. Both firms will produce the 
same quantities and make the same profit and therefore firm 1´s dominant position in
the emission permits market does not lead to any competitive advantage. If the
allocation is not symmetric, the firm who receives more free permits produces a higher 
quantity and makes higher profits.
For the Stackelberg model with two different leaders, one in each market, the
Stackelberg leader produces more and make more profits than the dominant firm in the 
permit market under a symmetric allocation of free permits but as soon as we consider 
that the permit market leader is receiving more permits, both firms output tends to
equalize first and it comes to a point where the Stackelberg leader in the product market
produces less and makes less profits than the follower.
When there is only one leader for both markets, and regardless the allocation of
free permits, the leader is always producing more than the follower, although the 
follower can still make a higher profit than the leader if the follower’s allocation of
permits is large enough as compared to the leader’s.
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APPENDIX
	
Permit Market Leader Optimal Solution
The leader solves the following problem
   1 1 1 1 1,
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
min  
. .       
            2 2 ( )
q y q d tq py
s t S q y rx
p d tq d t rx S y
 
  
     
(A1)
	
Solving for p in the above equation leads to a single variable problem
	
   
       1
2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
2 2  
min  2q
p d t rx S y d t rx rx q S S
q d tq rx S q d t rx rx q S S
         
          
(A2)
The FOC of this problem is
	
   1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 12 2 2 0d tq t rx q S d t rx rx q S S          
Solving for q1 
  1 2 1 21 1 2 1 2 1
2 2
6 2 2 2
3
rx rx S S
tq t rx rx S S q
  
     
Proof of Proposition 1 
Let us consider the function 
    
     
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
2
2
P c x x dy t q q py
P c x x dy t q q q q py
         
          
(A3)
This function shows de difference between profits. We have taken into account 
equation (7) and we denote the product price as P. By simple algebraic manipulation we
obtained the following expression
       1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 22P c x x y d p t r x x S S              (A4)
We have considered equations (5) and (6) to arrive at the following equation
	
   1 2 1 2 1 2q q r x x S S     (A5)
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The sum of both firm´s abatement must be non-negative as long as any firm
abatement is non-negative. If firm 1 is a net buyer of permits (y1 > 0), the second term
of the function is positive while the first one is negative (x1 – x2 < 0). Therefore the 
profit made by firm 2 exceeds the profit made by firm 1. The opposite case can be
proved in a similar way.
Model 2 Firm 1 Problem in the Output Market
Firm 1 solves the following problem
   1 2 1 1 1 1 1Max a b x x x cx d tq q py        (A6)
	
FOC lead us to the reaction curve after some algebraic operations
	
1 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 0
q q yp
a bx bx c d tq y p
x x x x
  
       
   
 
 
1 21 2
2 1
2 1
2 32 4 2
2
3 3 3 3 3
3 6 2 2
0
3 3
r x xrx rx Sdr tr tr
a bx bx c
d tS tr x x r
   
        
   
   
  
 
 
1 22
3 6 1
6 4 2
a c dr trS
x x
b tr
  
 

(A7)
Model 2 Firm 2 Problem in the Output Market
The leader in the output market solves the following problem
   1 2 2 2 2 2 2Max a b x x x cx d tq q py        (A8)
	
The FOC for optimal output is
	
1 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 0
x q q yp
a bx bx bx c d tq y p
x x x x x
   
        
    
The partial derivatives take the following values
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2 2
2 2 2
2 4
; ;
3 6 2 3 6 2 3 3
y qr r r r r r p tr tr
tr
x x x
  
        
  
Plugging these values on the FOC and taking into account the reaction curve of the 
follower, lead us to the following expression
 
 
2 1
2 2 22
2 1 2 1
3 6 2 31 1
2
2 6 4 2 2 3
3 6 2 2
0
3 2 3
a c dr trS rx rx Sdr
a bx bx b x c tr
b tr
d tS tr x x rx rxr
tr
      
          
   
     
     
  
Now some algebraic operations yields the optimal output value of the leader as it is 
shown in Equation (21)
  
  
  
  
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 2 6 6 2
3 2 2 3 6 4 2 3
b tr a c dr trS b tr a c dr trS
x
b tr b tr b tr b tr
       
 
   
(A9)
Plugging this value in the reaction curve of the follower yields Equation (22) 
Proof of Proposition 3
We define the function of the difference between firms profit as:
      2 22 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22P c x x d q q t q q py           (A10)
Considering Eq (20) we compute the function as
	
      1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 22 2a bx bx c x x dy ty q q d tq y           (A11)
We plug equations (21), (22), (23), (25), (26), and (27) in (A11) and after some tedious
calculations we obtain the following expression
   
  
2 22
2 2
2 9 13
4 2 3 3 2
a c dr rtS b r tb
b r t b r t
   
 
 
(A12)
	
The expression is obviously strictly positive and proves the first part of this Proposition.
To prove the second part, we take into account that a necessary condition for producing 
and selling positive quantities is:
140
	
 
 
                      
  
 
 
 
  
                                                               
   
                                 
        
 
  
                                                                  
a – c – dr > 0,
	
We differentiate (A12) and we find the following results:
	
  
   
 
  
   
 
2 2
2 22 2
2 2
2 22 2
2 9 13
2 3 3 2
2 0 0                                               
2 9 131
2 2 3 3 2
2 0 0                      
b tr a c dr trS b tr
S b tr b tr
a c dr trS
S
b tr a c dr trS b tr
d b tr b tr
a c dr trS
d
   

  

     

    

  

     

  
   
 
  
   
 
2 2
2 22 2
2 2
2 22 2
                          
2 9 131
2 2 3 3 2
2 0 0                                                
2 9 131
4 2 3 3 2
2 0
b tr a c dr trS b tr
c b tr b tr
a c dr trS
c
b tr a c dr trS b tr
a b tr b tr
a c dr trS
    

  

     

   

  
    0                                                
a

 

Proof of Proposition 4
Based on equation (7) the condition for a positive or null demand of permits is:
   2 1 2 1 0r x x S S    (A13)
	
Plugging equation (23a) in (A13) yields
	
     2 2 2 22 13 12 6 12 12 0br a c dr b br t S b br t S       (A14)
Solving (A14) in the equality case for S2, and taking into account that S = S1 + S2, we
obtain Equation (28), which proves the first part of the proposition.
Firm 2 is a net buyer of permits if 
   2 1 2 1 0r x x S S    (A15)
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which is the case when both firms receive the same amount of free permits, because in 
this case firm 2´s output exceeds firm 1´s, as can be seen in Equation (23.a). When the
value of S2 is above the threshold in Equation (28), the expression (A14) is strictly
positive and this fact proves the second part of the proposition.
The last part of the proposition follows immediately when we consider 
   2 1 2 1 0r x x S S    (A16)
	
which is the condition for Firm 2 being a net seller of permits. In that case equation 
(A14) becomes
     2 2 2 22 13 12 6 12 12 0br a c dr b br t S b br t S       (A17)
and S2 satisfies the required condition of being beyond the threshold.
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the first part of the proposition we simply set equation (23.a) to zero and solve
for S1 to find the threshold value. Since the output functions are continuous and we have
already proved that x2 > x1 at the symmetric allocation of permits, the second part of the 
proposition is trivially proved.
Now consider the function
        2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22P c x x d q q t q q p y y            (A18)
At the threshold point, both outputs are equal 1 2x x and Firm 1 is a seller of permits
( 1 0y  ). The above equation can be reduced to
 1 2 1 1 1 2 12 2 0dy ty q q py         (A19)
	
Beyond the threshold point the first term on the right side of (A18) is positive
and the rest of the terms of that expression is (A19). Both equations are positive and the
proposition is proved.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Based on Equations (39) and (41) we see that the difference between outputs is
increasing in S1 and decreasing in S2.
 
 
 
   
1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 2
4 2 2
0; 0
6 4 6 4 4 4
x x x xrt rt rt
S Sb r t b r t b r t
   
    
   
We consider that the maximum number of free permits that can be allocated is covering 
total gross emissions. The minimum difference is obtained when all the free permits go
to the follower, therefore S2 = r (x1+x2). Plugging this result into equations (39) and 
(41), both firms output are given by
       2 21 2 1 2
1 22 2
3 2 2
;
6 4 4 4
a c dr r t x x a c dr r t x x
x x
b r t b r t
       
 
 
(A20)
The solution for the above system is given by
   
 
   
 
2 2
1 22 2
3 2 3 4
;
6 5 2 6 5
b a c dr r t a c dr b a c dr r t a c dr
x x
b b r t b b r t
         
 
 
(A21)
And the difference between both outputs (in this limit case) shows that the leader is 
always producing more than the follower
 
 1 2 2
3
0
2 6 5
a c dr
x x
b r t
 
  

(A23)
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Chapter 524 
Optimal Taxation on Fossil Fuels with Varying 
Extraction Costs 
ABSTRACT
In this chapter we analyze the optimal taxation on fossil fuels in general equilibrium
under alternative assumptions on extractions costs. The tax instruments include a profit
tax and an ad valorem tax. Without extraction costs these tax instruments are equivalent, 
but these is no longer the case when extraction costs depend on two different factors, the 
flow of extraction and the stock not yet extracted. The quantitative importance of those
alternative assumptions is illustrated over relevant specification of the damage function 
in line with Golosov et al. (2009). Finally, per unit of extraction taxes are also
considered even though they are not typically an available policy tool.
24 This chapter represents a joint work with Luis A. Puch, and has been presented in a seminar in Madrid
(2015) and a congress in Vigo (2012). Still incomplete, this chapter is the basis for a future publication as 
a working paper
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5.1 Introduction
Carbon taxes are often proposed as a policy instrument to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases. Emissions of greenhouse gases are generated by fossil fuel burning
and therefore the extraction path of such non- renewable resources becomes a key issue. 
Under non-renewable use, Hotelling (31) states the first optimality condition, which
requires the growth rate of the resource price equalizing the market interest rate. This
arbitrage condition shows that the firm is indifferent between extracting the resource
now or delays it for one period. Alternatively, the basic condition for efficiency stated 
by Solow (1974), Stiglitz (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal (1974) implies that the
marginal product of resource growth rate has to be equal to the marginal product of
capital. Indeed, in the competitive equilibrium of the economy, this condition (DHSS,
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz) is the very same as Hotelling´s one.
None of these conditions takes into consideration the existence of extraction
costs and externalities. Sinn (2007) generalized the DHSS efficiency condition, by
taking into account both climate change as an externality and an extraction cost
following the Herfindahl rule. That efficiency condition is Pareto optimal and implies a 
flatter extraction path than Hotelling’s rule.25 In this setting, the marginal product of
capital equals the sum of three elements: a) the growth rate of the marginal product of
the resource net of extraction cost, b) the rate of return of a better environmental quality
(global warming effect) and c) the rate of return of the delayed use of resources in terms 
of its marginal cost.  
25 Withagen (94) stated that current resource consumption should be lower if pollution is to be taken into
account, and accordingly extraction has to be postponed.
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Sinn (2008) argues that if suppliers feel threatened by a gradual greening of
economic policies, they will extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global 
warming. This argument gave rise to the so called “Green Paradox”26 
Optimal taxation in such a setting has been recently addressed by Sinn (2008)
and Golosov et al (2009, 2011 and 2014) among other authors. While Sinn focus on the
supply side of the non-renewable resources in partial equilibrium, the Golosov et al 
sequence of papers consider a General Equilibrium model in discrete time, to
characterize optimal tax and subsidy policies.27 We build upon these two approaches to
focus on varying fossil fuel extraction costs. Some interesting results related to optimal
taxes can be found in the existing literature based on the different treatment of
extraction costs. For instance, if we consider no extraction costs (or insignificant), then 
a constant ad valorem tax will have no effect on the extraction path.28 In such a
circumstance what matters is the time path of the tax regardless its level. Further,
without extraction costs a profit tax and an ad valorem tax are equivalent, but this is no
longer the case when extraction costs depend on the general path of extraction.
Several authors have considered the existence of extraction costs, like Cremer
(79), Long and Sinn (85) and Ulph and Ulph (94), but it is Sinn (2008) that noticed that
Hotelling´s rule differs whether we consider marginal extraction costs depending on the 
26 Sinn (2008) also stated that subsidizing a carbon-free backstop can have adverse climate effects as the
anticipation of oil being made obsolete more quickly by such renewable encourages oil extraction, but
van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) argue that the Green Paradox occurs for relatively expensive but
clean backstops (such as solar or wind), but does not occur if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to
marginal global warming damages (e.g., nuclear energy) as then it is attractive to leave fossil fuels
unexploited and thus limit CO2 emissions.
27 The literature does not provide a uniform view about the optimal environmental policy, mainly a tax on
the polluting resource. While Sinclair (92,94) shows that an optimal ad valorem tax on the use of non
renewable resources is decreasing, Ulph & Ulph (94) analyzed a special case when carbon tax would be 
rising when the initial stock of pollutant is small and Hoel & Kverndokk (96) stated that optimal tax
increases and then decreases. Moreover Grimaud and Rouge (2005) show that the optimal ad valorem tax
is either increasing or decreasing according to assumptions taken on pollution´s marginal disutility and
the discount rate. And Dasgupta(82) and Ploeg & Withagen (91) show that if the stock of CO2 is below its
steady state level, then a carbon tax should rise overtime.
28 Dasgupta and Heal (79)
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current flow of extraction or depending on the stock not yet extracted. We follow this 
line of research but assuming that the way in which extraction costs depend on the 
general path of extraction depends on any or both the flow and the stock effects. The
quantitative importance of those alternative assumptions is illustrated over relevant 
specification of the damage function in line with Golosov et al. (2009).
It is worth noting that the negative climate change externality raises several
issues related to optimal policies and their impact on the economy. These issues have
been recently studied in general equilibrium by comparing the decentralized equilibrium
and the social planner´s optimum. It is widely accepted that it is the stock of CO2 rather
than the flow of emissions what should be taken into account when considering the
damage costs caused by climate change. Then the carbon tax required to maximize
some measure of social welfare should be calculated according to this assumption. We
analyze the impact of the use of non-renewable resources in the production process and 
the optimal taxation needed to cancel out the externalities of climate change. 
The aggregate production function is neoclassical with positive and decreasing
marginal products in capital and energy. The climate variable is also part of the 
production function with positive and increasing marginal damage. Within this
framework we consider an extraction cost function depending upon resource extracted
and the existing stock.
The chapter is organized in five parts of which the introduction is the first. The
second states the social optimum whereas Section 5.3 presents the decentralized
equilibrium. Section 5.4 discusses the role of the different tax instruments in connection
to alternative assumptions on extraction costs. A quantitative assessment of these
alternative assumptions on extraction costs is illustrated in Section 5.5 Concluding
remarks are given in the last section.
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5.2 The general setting and the planner´s problem
The household´s period utility function depends only on consumption and we
write the intertemporal utility function as:
 
0
t
t
t
U u c


 (1)
	
As usual the marginal utility of consumption is positive and decreasing and β is
the constant utility discount rate. The economy is subjected to the following budget 
constraints:
     1 , , , 1 ,t t t t t t t t tK F K N E S c K Q E R     
     1
0
1 ; = , .....
t T
t t
t s t s T T t
s
S L E d E E E E E

   

  
1 0
0
;t t t t
t
R R E E R



  
(2)
	
(3)
	
(4)
	
The capital accumulation is described by Equation (2).29 The final good
production function uses physical capital (K), labour (N), energy input (E) and the 
climate variable (S) as production factors. It means that polluting emissions are a
consequence of the use of non-renewable resources, and the pollution flow is modeled
as an identity function of the extracted exhaustible resources. Not only the flow of
emissions enters the production function, but the climate stock does. It is represented by
one variable, which is taken to be the global concentration of carbon in the atmosphere
denoted by St.
29 We could also consider a two sectors economy as in Golosov et al (2011). In this case equation (2) is
replaced by three new equations:
   1 1, 1, 1, 1,, , , 1t t t t t t t tK F K N E S c K    
 2, 2 2 2 1, , , ,t t t t t t tE F K N E R R 
1 2 1 2 1 2; ;K K K N N N E E E     
 (2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
Resources are extracted and transformed according to the production function described in Equation (2.2).
The transformation activity uses capital, labor and energy while the stock effect is represented by R.
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The production function presents positive and decreasing marginal products in
K,N and E, while FS < 0 and FSS > 0, that is to say positive and increasing marginal 
damage due to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Physical capital depreciates at a δ
constant rate.
Total extraction costs are represented by Q = Q (E, R) a function of resources 
extracted (E) and the existing stock (R). In line with Sinn (2007), the sequence of
extraction is in inverse order of the site specific extraction costs. We assume marginal 
cost is an increasing function of the extraction rate and will likely increase as more of
the resource is extracted. That means QE > 0 and QR < 0.
Equation (3) represents the dynamics of the environmental quality. We follow
Golosov et al (2011) in this general form of the carbon cycle, as a function of the fossil
fuel extracted in the past. Equation (4) describes the use of the non renewable resource.
The initial stock is denoted by R0.
The social planner maximizes (1) subject to (2) – (4). The Lagrangian is:
     
   
1
0
1
0
1 ,
1
t t K
t t t t t t
t T
t S t R
t t s t s t t t
s
L u c F c K Q E R K
S d E R E R
   
   



 

         
 
      
 


(5)
We use the minus in front of λS to ensure that the co-state variable can be
interpreted as a positive shadow price. And also for simplicity we abstract from the use
of labor (N = 1).
The first order conditions and the characteristic Ramsey and Hotelling rules are
shown in the Appendix. We have omitted time subscripts for ease of notation.
 
 
 , 1 1
1
1t K t t
t
U c
F
U c
 

 


   

, 1 , 1 1
1
,
S
E t R t t
t S
E t t
NP Q
NP
   
 


(6)
	
(7)
	
149
	
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                                                 
     
      
 
    
         
  
       
      
     
   
      
 
     
          
  
                                             
                                                 
       
                                                                
We have defined:
	
 
,0
0
t jj K
t j S t jj
s t
t
t
S
F
E
u c
 
 
 



  


, , ,E t E t E tNP F Q 
(8)
	
(9)
	
Equation (8) measures the climate change externality. It is the marginal cost of a
unit of carbon in the atmosphere. Note that FS,t+j < 0. It represents the present value of
damage cost in terms of period-t consumption.
Equation (9) is the marginal product of energy net of extraction cost. Equation
(7) is a modified Hotelling rule and deserves further examination.30 It shows the
marginal condition for optimal resource extraction under stock and flow dependent 
extraction costs and climate change externalities. This efficiency condition requires that
the social rate of discount should equal the rate of return from holding the resource, 
which is the sum of the rate of capital appreciation plus the effects due to stock 
dependent extraction costs and marginal damages due to climate change. This is the 
Hotelling rule in terms of the efficiency condition established in the DHSS model when 
extraction costs and climate change externalities are considered.
It is very useful to analyze this expression as a portfolio choice between
extracting one more unit of the non-renewable resource this period or delay the
extraction to the next one. An alternative expression for equation (7) is as follows:
  1 , , 1 1 , 1  s st E t t E t t R tNP NP Q        (10)
	
30 The corresponding equation in the two sectors model is:
2
1, 1 2, 1 1
11
1 1 1
1 2
1, 2,
1
1
1
1
t t St
t
t t t
t
t t St
t
t t t
F F
E R
F F
E R





  

  


  
   
  
  
   
  
(7.1)
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The efficiency condition requires that the marginal cost of not extracting an
additional unit of the stock (left side) should equal the marginal benefit (right side).
The left side of the equation is what can be obtained in period t+1 if one
additional unit of the resource is extracted in period t and its net marginal product is
invested at the net marginal product of capital. It is also called the holding cost of the 
resource stock because is the marginal cost of not extracting an additional unit of the 
stock.
The right side of the equation is what can be obtained for the same unit if
extracted in period t+1. The first term is again the net marginal product of the resource.
The second term is the additional return due to the delay of the marginal damage. And
the third term is the present value of the extraction costs that is avoided by a delayed use
of a unit of resource. It should be noted that a period ahead marginal extraction cost will
be lower as more resources remain available. 
In the absence of the stock effect (QR = 0) the optimal rate of extraction reduces
to:
, 1 1
1
,
s
E t t
t s
E t t
NP
NP
  



(11)
	
The interest rate equals a rate of return of the resource which is lower than in Eq 
(10). The marginal benefit of not extracting one unit is lower than before and the 
optimal rate of extraction accelerates.
The comparison between (10) and (11) also shows that the level of the net
product of the resource is only affected by the cost related to the extraction rate. But the
rate of increase of the net product of the resource has to be lower when considering the
stock effect. Therefore the stock effect will slow down the rate of extraction. It means
that the growth rate of prices is lower when considering the stock effect, known also as 
the scarcity rent.
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5.3. Decentralized equilibrium
When we consider the decentralized equilibrium, the effect of emissions on 
climate damages is assumed to be a pure externality, not taken into account by any
private agent.
We define ΠF as profits from final goods production and ΠE as profits from 
resource extraction. Price of physical capital is r and the price of the resource is PE.
The problem of the goods production firm under perfect competition takes prices 
as a data. Final good is the “numeraire”. 
      ,s Et s s s s s s s
s t
Max F K E K r K P E


   
We have denoted
	
0
1
;1
ss
t s t sj
t j
r 



   
First order conditions read that factors are paid its marginal product.
	
 1 , 1 1t K t tFOC K F r    
  ,   
E
t E t tFOC E F P 
(12)
	
(13)
	
A representative individual solves:
	
 
0
1
   
. .       
t
t
F E
t t t t t t t t
Max U c
s t C K K r K T


     

Profits from final goods production equal zero in equilibrium while profits from 
resource extraction are strictly positive representing the stock value of fossil fuels in the
ground. 
Hamiltonian and First order condition are shown in Appendix 2. It yields the
well-known Ramsey rule
 
  1 11
1  t t t
t
U C
r
U C


 


  

(14)
	
152
	
 
 
  
            
 
                 
     
   
                                           
                                                          
                                                   
                                  
     
      
 
      
    
                                                 
           
             
    
                                                           
And it is the same as (6) when we consider (12).
The problem of the extraction firm will be solved considering the existence of a
profit tax (τt) and a per unit tax (θt).
     
0
1 0
0
1
   , 1 ;                     
. .       ;
s
s E E s
t s s s s s s t
s t j t j
t t t t
Max P E Q E R
s t R R E E R
 


  


       
  
 

Lagrangian and First Order Conditions are shown in the Appendix where we
also obtained the optimal extraction rate in the different cases considered. They yield:
, , ,
E E
E t t E t t E tF P NP P Q   
, 1 , 1
1
,
A) Without taxes  E t R tt
E t
NP Q
NP
  

 (15)
, 1 , 1
1
,
B) Fixed taxes       E t R tt
E t
NP Q
NP



 

 


(16)
  
  
, 1 1 , 1 1
1
,
1
C) Var taxes        
1
E
E t t R t t
t E
E t t t
NP Q
NP
 

 
   

  

 
(17)
Based on (13) the price of the resource equals its marginal product and therefore
these are Hotelling formulas updated with extraction cost and taxes. The price net of the 
marginal extraction cost rises at a rate equal to the market rate of interest.
It is worth noting that QE affect the price level (static efficiency condition) but the price
growth rate is only affected by QR (dynamic efficiency condition).
31 
31 The corresponding equations when two sectors are considered, follows the same process. In this case 
the price is the cost for the final good sector and η is the relative shadow price of energy in terms of the 
shadow price of the final good:
2, 1
1 1
1
1
2,
1
1
A) Without taxes  1+
1
tE E
t t
t
t
tE E
t t
t
F
P
R
r
F
P
R



 



 
  
 
 
  
 
(15.1)
153
	
 
 
     
       
     
  
     
       
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
      
      
 
    
       
                                                                                                                                               
                                                        
                              
If we do not consider taxes then, the decentralized equilibrium is not considering 
the climate change externality and differs from the central planner optimum in (10). The
firm will extract the resource at a quicker rate than the central planner, because the
social cost decelerates extraction. When we consider Pigouvian taxes, the rate of
extraction has to be the same as in the central planner equilibrium. The issue we explore
in the next section is whether the optimum tax (increasing or decreasing) will accelerate
extraction, leading to the green paradox. 
5.4 Policy instruments and extraction costs
From the previous equations the following results can be derived:
PROFIT TAX
1. A constant profit tax rate has no impact on the allocation of resources. 
Equation (17) under this assumption and no ad valorem tax reads as equation (15). This
is a standard result in fiscal policy as explained by Sinn (2008). This result is valid
regardless the stock effect extraction cost and considering a model with one or two
sectors.
2. A changing profit tax rate gives rice to substantial intertemporal distortions.
An increasing profit tax rate leads to more extraction. As pointed out by Sinn 2008, a
2, 1
1 1
1
1
2,
1
1
B) Fixed taxes 1
1
tE E
t t
t
t
tE E
t t
t
F
P
R
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F
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R
 
 

 



 
   
  
 
   
 
(16.1)
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  

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


   
     
    
   
     
   
(17.1)
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firm facing increasing profit tax rates is the same as a firm that maximizes the present 
value of profit net of taxes facing a higher interest rate or a lower growth in the resource
price leading to an acceleration of the extraction. Considering equation (17) without ad 
valorem taxes the firm finds the following situation
  
 
      
      
, 1 , 1 1
1
,
1 , , 1 , 1
1 , , 1 , 1
1
1
1
1 1 1
0 1 1 1
E
E t R t t
t E
E t t
E E E
t E t t E t R t t t
E E E E
t t E t t E t R t t t
NP Q
r
NP
r NP NP Q
r NP NP Q


  
   
  

  
  
  
   
  
      
        
(18)
The result is the same regardless the model has one or two sectors.
3. Optimal profit tax rate is a single rule when the stock effect is not considered. 
From equations (10) and (17) and taking into account that there is no ad valorem tax:
 
 
, 1 1 , 1 1
, ,,
1
 t 
1
E S S
E t t E t t E t
tSE
E t t E tE t t
NP NP
NP NPNP



   
  
   

(19)
The negative relationship between profit tax rate and energy net prices is consistent with
the objective of internalize the marginal damage. Higher net prices mean a higher
amount of profits. Therefore, a lower profit tax rate cover the amount needed to cope
with the marginal damage. 
4. The stock effect introduces a substantial impact in the optimal profit tax rate. 
From equations (11) and (17) and no ad valorem tax: 
  
 
 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
,,
1
1
E S
E t R t t E t R t t
SE
E t tE t t
NP Q NP Q
NPNP


     
   


1
1
, , 1 , 1
 ;   
S S
E Et t
t t
E t E t R tNP NP Q
  
 
 
 

(20)
	
(21)
	
Equation (20) implies that the profit tax rate is lower when the stock effect is
taken into account. Equation (21) should be understood as either the tax at t+1 is a
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 
2, 1 , 11
1 , 1 , 1
, 1
0
E
R t R tSt
t E t R t
R t t t
Q Q
NP Q
Q R R
  
  

 
   
  
                                    
     
         
 
 
 
function of the tax at t, or we need two instruments to correct for the externality in order 
to overcome a time inconsistency problem. The second case is less interesting for our
study in terms of dynamics, so I try to characterize a g function as
 1E Et tg   (21a)
	
In so doing, we also need at the steady state a consistent general relation. In
Section 5.5.3 we explore that function on particular cases. Provided such a g function 
exists, then equation (21) can also give us a policy rule to deal with the evolution of the
proven reserves. By differentiation:
, 1 , 11 1 1
, 1 , 1
E E E
E t R tt t t
t E t t R t t
NP Q
R NP R Q R
     
 
   
 
    
(22a)
The first term on the right side of equation (22a) is measuring the impact of
reserves on the tax rate due to the profit change. 
 
2, 1 , 11
1 , 1 , 1
, 1
0
E
E t E tSt
t E t R t
E t t t
NP NP
NP Q
NP R R
  
  

 
   
  
(22b)
The positive sign of equation (22b) depends on the way that an increase in 
proven reserves influences the profit level. Both revenue and cost are decreasing in Rt 
but we guess that marginal profit is null at the optimum under the assumption of
competitive markets. 
The sign of the second term on the right side of equation (22a) is:
(22c)
	
Equation (22c) is positive under the assumption of convex cost (QRR > 0), and 
therefore an increase in the amount of oil reserves implies an increase in the profit tax
rate for the next period.
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PER UNIT TAX
5. Optimal tax per unit of oil is equal to the marginal externality cost. If profit
taxes are constant, optimal tax per unit of oil must be set equalizing equations (10) and 
(17). Therefore:
, 1 1 , 1 1
, ,
,
S
E t t E t t S
t tS
E t t E t t
NP NP
t
NP NP



    
    
 
(23)
	
The tax equals the marginal social damage generated by externalities. This result does 
not change when the stock effect is introduced.
AD VALOREM TAX
An ad valorem tax is close to a per unit tax under the following relation
 1t tP P   
Therefore we will update the Equations (15) (16) and (17) accordingly
6. A constant ad valorem tax makes the extraction path flatter and is neutral
without extraction costs. This result is in line with Sinn (2008)
The firm equilibrium before tax implementation is:
 , 1 1 , 1 , 1E Et E t t t E t R tP Q P Q Q       
After the tax the firm faces the following inequality
	
     , 1 1 , 1 , 11 1E Et E t t t E t R tP v Q P v Q Q         
And the firm postpones extraction. Note that in the absent of any kind of costs
the price growth at the interest rate, but the stock effect increases the return of extracting
later and therefore the price is growing at a lower rate than the interest rate. Therefore
the loss coming from the tax reduces de difference and the firm postpones the extraction
    1 1 1 11 1E E E Et t t t t tP P v P P v             
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7. Optimal ad valorem tax rate equals the ratio between marginal damage cost 
and the price of the resource. As long as the extraction cost is positive, the optimal ad
valorem tax rate is lower than the optimal profit tax rate.
 
 
1 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
, ,
1
1
 
E E S
t t E t R t t E t R t t
E E S
t t E t t E t t
S
E S t
t t t t E
t
P v Q Q P Q Q
P v Q P Q
P v t v t
P
            

   

     
(24)
The result is the same in all the cases considered. The optimal ad valorem tax 
rate could be increasing constant or decreasing, based on the ratio between the 
growth of the marginal damage cost and the price increase of the resource.
8. An increasing ad valorem tax produces different impacts based on the 
extraction costs:32 
8.1 With no extraction cost accelerates extraction.
8.2 With significant extraction costs the acceleration is mitigated
8.3 With sufficiently strong extraction cost it even produces a deceleration.
8.4 A borderline case exists. An absolute tax wedge that increases at the rate of
discount
Sinn (2008) shows that with an increasing tax rate, the growth rate of prices
would have to be higher. That means steeper rather than flatter extraction rate. It is the 
same result regardless extraction costs. With sufficiently strong extraction costs, current 
extraction may even move in the right direction as it was shown by Long and Sinn (85).
Taxation is neutral for the extraction path if the tax wedge increases at the rate of
discount since the discounted revenue loss per unit of the extracted resource is constant. 
32 The market reactions to a changing ad-valorem tax rate were studied by Sinn (82) Ulph and Ulph (94)
and Sinclair (94). 
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Faster increase implies the resource firms anticipate extraction and a smaller increase
implies they will postpone.
Before implementing the tax, the equilibrium is given by
 , 1 1 , 1 , 1E Et E t t t E t R tP Q P Q Q        (25)
	
Once the tax is implemented, the condition for indifference extraction is:
	
     , 1 1 1 , 1 , 11 1E Et t E t t t t E t R tP v Q P v Q Q           (26)
The difference between (26) and (25) yields the condition for tax neutrality
	
   1 1 1 1 11 1
E E E E
t t t t t t t tP v P v r P v P         
This is the same result as Sinn (2008).
5.4.1 Extraction Costs Discussion
Several assumptions on extraction costs have been used when studying the role
of carbon taxes in reducing GHG emissions. Herfindahl rule says that reserves with 
lower cost to extract are used first, implying that stock dependent extraction costs are
rising as reserves diminish. Constant or even decreasing extraction cost are justified on 
the basis of technological advances and also based on the assumption that variables 
costs are insignificant and only fixed cost should be taken into account.
How the extracting firm will react to a constant ad valorem tax depends on the 
extraction cost path. If it is constant, then the extraction path becomes flatter and this 
effect is even greater if the firm is facing decreasing costs. Under the assumption of
increasing costs, a constant ad valorem tax can have different impacts on the extraction 
path that could even accelerate in some cases. A borderline case exists when the rate of
growth of extraction costs equals the interest rate.
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As far as profit tax is concerned, only a changing trend gives rise to distortions.
An increasing rate accelerates extraction regardless its optimality. Without considering
the stock effect the trend of the tax follows the ratio between marginal damage and 
profit and closely follows the ad valorem tax behavior apart from the flow effect of the
extraction cost component. But the stock effect substantially changes the optimal rate.
From the analytical results we have shown that increasing taxes can be
paradoxical or not depending upon suppliers´ extraction cost and that proven reserves
might play a key role in the fiscal policy when the stock effect is taken into account.
We combine the various results on taxes so as to relate to actual policy and 
provide a quantitative assessment in the next section. But previously we analyze some 
facts related to oil production and extraction to get a better insight on the issues we will
tackle next.
1. Proven reserves´ path is episodic. Some big price increases, particularly in 
1980 and the first decade in 21st century resulted in significant jumps in the level of
reserves some years later as can be seen in graph 5.1.
2 Oil is simultaneously extracted at very different production costs across the 
world and this fact is not in line with Herfindhal rule. However countries show 
homogeneity in extraction costs technology with common slopes for production (flow)
and proven reserves (stock) suggesting that the role of scarcity cost is well above the
role of marginal cost. Graph 5.2 in the Appendix shows this fact. 
Big exceptions are USA, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Venezuela as can be seen in 
Graph 5.3 in the Appendix. We will take these facts in the next section to understand 
whether tax policy interacts with extraction costs.
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Source: EIA US Energy Information Administration and BP 2015 Statistics
Graph 5.1 Evolution of Proved Reserves and Prices
Although we cannot reject the assumption that extraction costs might be
irrelevant for global carbon taxes policies, numerical experiments could be useful to
investigate local fiscal policies. In other words, policy for “rich” producers might be
affected for the evolution of the stock effect.
Based on the above considerations, a natural question is to check whether it
makes sense to take into account the role of proven reserves in fiscal policy. This is the
reason why we will explore a shock (with perfect foresight) in R. We want to compare
the marginal effect on resource productivity (price) versus the marginal effect on
extraction costs, i.e.: to keep track of profits. So in this stage we will focus more in the
medium-run, rather than in the long-run described by the analytical case.
5.5 Quantitative assessment of carbon taxes with extraction costs
The quantitative assessment will be divided in three parts. The first part is
analytical without extraction costs and we perform two cases with different energy path 
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consumption. On the first case, energy use is constant while on the second one is
decreasing. Within this first part, we check the dynamics of extraction costs in order to 
understand its quantitative importance to calculate optimal taxes.
The second and third parts are numerical and include a specific extraction cost 
function. On the second part we analyze the impact on marginal productivity and 
marginal extraction cost of a shock in proven reserves. On the third part we explore the
role of extraction costs, mainly the stock effect, in the optimal taxes setting.
5.5.1 Analytical part: implied extraction costs
The analytical part is discussed with zero extraction cost as in Golosov et al 
(2009). It is a version of the model that provides a closed form solution to the
neoclassical growth model and a benchmark calibration, as long as extraction costs are
zero. The main objective of performing this task is to learn from the analytical part on 
the damage costs and implied parametric extraction costs. 
We assume logarithmic preferences and a Cobb-Douglas specification in capital 
and energy.
  lnt tU c c
 t t t t tY S S A K E
 
(28)
	
(29)
	
Following Golosov et al (2009) we consider α = 0.3 and γ = 0.03. Together with
full depreciation and a constant saving rate the following closed form solution for
optimal capital is obtained:
1t tK Y  (30)
	
As model period is 10 years, it supports the full depreciation assumption.
Associated discount factor is β = 0.9910. The following steps are followed to find the
solution for the dynamics:
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1. Find shadow price of marginal damage, which is given by
	
(31a)
	 
 
 
1
1 0
1
1
ss t sS
t t ss j
t j t s
S S
Y
S S


  
 
 

   
2. Plug into Hotelling rule: solve for Et under negligible Q(*) and “simple”
damage function.
3. Then solution for Rt and St is inmediate.
Note that equation (31a) differs from equation (8) in the general setting of the
section 5.2. Both equations measures the marginal cost of a unit of carbon in the
atmosphere in terms of the consumption good. But equation (31a) is based in equation 
(31b) we show below, which is a simple law of motion of the accumulation of carbon
between two consecutive periods. Equation (8) is based in equation (3) which states the
accumulation of carbon in terms of the amount that is left in the atmosphere a number
of periods into the future. That leads to a marginal social damage that is the discounted
value of future marginal damages. In the quantitative assessment we follow the
approach used by Golosov et al (2009) and in the general setting of Section 5.2 we
follow Golosov et al (2011).
A particular solution for the dynamics that we first consider is a constant Et and
it can be shown that 
 
0
1 1
t
S
E E E
 

 
 
  
is a solution for Et which implies constant damage S (St). We can interpret this solution
as if Rt being very big, so it is optimal a constant Et path.
Beyond the analytical solution of macro variables, the current settings allow
analytical solution for climate variables. We do have measures of carbon in the 
atmosphere. Pre-industrial level is set at 583 GTC and today value is said to be about
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783 GTC. To start with, the law of motion for the stock of carbon and the parameter´s 
value sticks to Golosov et al 2009:
 1 1t t tS S E    (31b)
	
With φ = 1/11.7, so that the half-life of carbon in the atmosphere is 117 years.
We further retain a simple damage function where the climate variable St shows
exponential γS accumulation. 
   expt S tS S S  (32)
	
We calibrate γS = 8.6 x 10
-5, so that St = 783 in the base case as estimated for
current times. We set current proven reserves to R0 = 2000 GTC. With this choice of
parameters it turns out that we run out of the resource (depletion) after about 300 years. 
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the resource from the initial value of 2000 GTC. 
We parameterized extraction costs implied by the numerical experiment. From
the function
 ,t t t tQ E R E R
 (33)
	
Q(*) represents about 1/10 of a 1% over Gross output and σ equals -0.8
	
Figure 5.1 Energy Use and Resource Depletion
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Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of Extraction Costs over Gross Output for the
300 years period.  This is consistent with Mohaddes (2012) estimations.
Figure 5.2 Extraction Costs over Gross Output
The second experiment retains the analytical solution but alternatively considers 
a decreasing Et path starting at 90% of E0. Figure 5.3 shows that in such a case the
resource is not depleted after 300 years as before. 
Figure 5.3 Resource Evolution
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    Figure 5 Extraction Costs Evolution 
 
                                            
  
Damage is increasing as can be seen in Figure 5.4. The stock of carbon in the
atmosphere is measured in GTC´s and evolve from 583 GTC which means a value of
S(St) = 1. At this value there is no damage to the production.
Figure 5.4 Damages as a function of the stock of CO2 
Now we are in a position to evaluate whether the evolution of extraction costs supports
our claim that they are relevant for the optimal taxes setting. Figure 5 shows that
evolution.
Figure 5.5 Extraction Cost Evolution
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The extraction costs over gross output indicate that for relevant 
parameterizations extraction cost might be hump-shaped. However there is no 
exponential behavior when we consider a decreasing extraction path. It means that if we
start from an environment in which extraction costs are small, then they might remain 
small. 
5.5.2 Numerical Statics in Rt A Shock in Proven Reserves 
Now we depart from the analytical case and consider a case in which the planner
takes Rt as exogenous with no dynamics, so the optimality conditions are specified 
accordingly, and considers a proven reserves shock from R0 = 2000 GTC to R0 = 3000 
GTC. We make this simplifying assumption on the dynamics of the model but 
incorporating extraction costs. There are no changes in parameters apart from the 
exponential damage (now it takes the value γS = 3.54 x 10
-4) and the extraction cost
function which takes the following values: 
–   1.1 0.8, 0.1t t t t t tQ E R E R E R
   
The shock yields some significant changes in the marginal product and marginal
extraction costs.
As it can be seen in Figure 5.6, gross output sharply increases after the shock, 
due to the increase in energy consumption, which implies a decrease in energy
productivity, that is to say in energy prices as Figure 5.7 shows. After around 100 years
both variables partly recover the initial values showing a flat trend to the end of the 
period considered. 
167
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
 
   
  
   
   
   
 
Figure 5.6 Gross Output Evolution after Reserves Shock

                             Figure 5.7 Competitive Price Evolution after Reserves Shock
Total extraction cost sharply increases due to the volume increase, but marginal 
extraction cost sharply decrease, mainly due to the stock effect component as figures 5.8 
and 5.9 show. As output decreases, total extraction cost do, but around 100 years after
the shock, as output trend is flat, total extraction cost increases due to the continuous 
increase of the marginal cost
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Figure 5.8 Extraction Costs after Reserves Shock

                           Figure 5.9 Marginal Extraction Costs after Reserves Shock
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5.5.3 Full Numerical Case
A full numerical case requires a commitment to alternative BGP. Future research
should address whether the first best optimal tax can be obtained by one specific policy
instrument as discussed for Equation (21a) or an additional policy instrument would be
needed. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we formulate a neoclassical growth model with two important 
features: an exhaustible natural resource (fossil fuel) and a global externality created by
the combustion of the resource. The model is based in Golosov et al (2009, 2011 and
2014) and we particularly focused on the role that extraction costs plays on optimal
Pigouvian taxes.
We solve the model to obtain the optimal tax formula considering two different 
effects on the extraction cost. The effect based on the flow of extraction and the scarcity
effect (the cost based on the stock not yet extracted). Our main finding is that this stock
effect generates significant inter-temporal distortions in an optimal profit tax while it
has no impact in a per-unit tax. The optimal profit tax follows a trending rule that could
be affected by shocks in the amount of available resource (proven reserves). Increases 
of proven reserves mean increases of the optimal profit tax.
We also analyze the stock effect impact over the so called green paradox and
find that under rising pricing of energy (sufficiently strong stock effect) an increasing ad 
valorem tax can postpone extraction. The optimal ad valorem tax could be increasing or
decreasing based on the ratio between growths of the marginal damage and the resource
price. 
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We perform a quantitative assessment to check on several issues, like the role of
the scarcity cost vs. the role of marginal cost and the interaction of extraction costs and 
tax policies. We find that for relevant parameterization, extraction cost might be hump-
shaped, but there is no exponential behavior under a decreasing extraction path. It
means that if extract cost were small they might remain small, so we cannot reject the 
assumption that extraction costs might be irrelevant for carbon taxes policy at a global
level
Still some important open issues have not being covered in this chapter and 
remain for further research:
1.		 The theoretical results on proven reserves merit further investigation to 
quantify their importance on optimal taxes.
2.		 The stock effect might be quantitatively important
3.		 A time inconsistency problem may ocurr
4.		 Numerical experiments are useful to investigate local fiscal policies.33 
33 Some work has already being done on Norway fiscal policy to analyze the evolution of proven reserves 
and carbon tax rate. In general it seems that OCDE (rich) countries extract resources at a higher speed
than OPEP and third world countries. It is like they are not considering the scarcity effect.
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APPENDIX
Optimality Conditions Social Planner
The Lagrangian of the social planner´s program is (A.1). There are two control variables
(C, E) and three state variables (K, S, R), where λt
i (i = K, S, R) are the co-state
variables.
     
    
1
0
10
1 ,
1                       
t t K
t t t t t t t t t
t Tt S t R
t t s t s t t t t
L u c F c K Q E R K
S d E R E R
   
   



 
         
     


(A1)
The first order conditions yield (A.2) to (A.5).
	
     t t K Kt t t t tFOC c u c u c        (A2)
   
 
, , 0
, , 0
0
0
t jt K t j S t R
t t E t E t t jj
t
t jK j S R
t E t E t t jj
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FOC E F Q
E
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F Q
E
     
   
 

 


     


    



(A3)
    11 1 , 1 1 0 t K t Kt t t K tFOC K F           (A4)
 1 ,+ 0
t S t K
t t t S tFOC S F      (A5a)
  1 11 1 , 1 1 0
t R t K t R
t t t R t tFOC R Q     
 
       (A5b)
Considering (A.2) at time t+1 and (A.4) we get (A.6) which gives us the real interest 
rate of the economy. We define ρ as the capitalization factor (1 + the net return on 
capital).
 
 
 , 1 1
1 1
1
K
t t
K t t K
t t
u c
F
u c

 
 
 
 

      
(A6)
Differentiating (A.3) with respect to time give us (A.7)
	
  11 1 11 , 1 , 1 1 10
1
0t jt K t j S t Rt E t E t t j tj
t
S
F Q
E
     
     
     


   

 (A7)
172
	
 
 
 
                               
 
                            
   
                         
   
                      
                                 
 
 
 
   
                            
 
                 
The difference between (A7) and (A3) yields (A8)
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Consider (A5a) yields
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(A8b)
Denote the climate change externality measured in consumption units as:
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Take the above expression on equation (A8b) and consider (A5b) to get the optimal 
extraction path (A9)
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This is Equation (7).
Optimality conditions Consumers
The Lagrangian of the consumer´s problem is 
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FOC on capital and consumption yields:
	
     
   
1
1 1
1 1 1
0 0
1 0
t K t K
t t t t t
K K
t t t t
FOC c U c U c
FOC K r
   
 

 
  
      
   
173
	
 
 
 
                        
 
 
  
                 , 1, 1 ( )s e Rt E s s s s s s s t t tL P E Q E R E R E R                       
  
                                           
  
   
 
 
 
 
, , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
1 1
1 1, ,
 1 1
1
1
s e s e
t E t t E t t t E t t E t R t t
es
E t t E t R t t tt
t ts e
t tE t t E t t
P Q P Q Q
P Q Q U C
U CP Q
   
 
 
 
     
    
 
 
               
       
   
     
               
      
 
        
   
              
      
 
 
From the above equations it is trivial to get the standard optimal condition
	
(A11)
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Optimality Conditions Resource Extraction
The Lagrangian of the Resource Extraction Problem is: 
(A12)
And the FOC´s on energy and resource
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Now we combine the above expressions to get the optimal extraction rate
(A14)
This is the case of variable taxes that correspond to Equation (17). The case without
taxes is trivial from the above expression. In the case of fixed taxes the Lagrangian is:
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And the corresponding FOC´s
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From the above expressions we can get Equation (16) considering PE,t – QE,t = NPE,t 
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Evolution of Reserves and Production by Countries
We first take all significant countries but the “four majors” in terms of proven reserves
and production amounts. USA is the main producer in the world and Saudi Arabia 
comes second. Venezuela and Saudi Arabia have the most important reserves. And 
Russia is the third most important producer.
The graphic 5.2.a shows the homogeneity of countries in the relationship between their 
proven reserves and production amounts. Only China is a clearly outsider. Like the 
USA and Russia, China production exceeds what is the OPEP countries behavior.
The graphic 5.2.b shows a similar situation, but in this case China is not included.
The graphic 5.2.c excludes China and OPEP countries and still shows a remarkable
homogeneity among countries.
Graph 5.2.a Proven Reserves and Production
	
175
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
         
    
  
 
Graphic 5.2.b Proven Reserves and Production W/O China
	
Graphic 5.2.c Proven Reserves and Production W/O China and OPEP countries
Graphic 5.3 consider all significant countries and clearly show how “big producers” are
extracting faster than the rest of countries. It is like they are not taking into account the 
scarcity effect. On the other hand Venezuela shows a completely different approach, 
although this could be a temporary situation.
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Graph 5.3 Relationships between Reserves and Production all countries
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